Stephen Goose, director of Human Rights Watch's Arms Division, was instrumental in bringing about the 2008 convention banning cluster munitions, the 1997 treaty banning antipersonnel mines, the 1995 protocol banning blinding lasers, and the 2003 protocol requiring clean-up of explosive remnants of war. He and Human Rights Watch co-founded the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), which received the 1997 Nobel Peace Prize. Goose created the ICBL’s Landmine Monitor initiative, the first time that non-governmental organizations around the world have worked together in a sustained and coordinated way to monitor compliance with an international disarmament or humanitarian law treaty. In 2013, he and Human Rights Watch co-founded the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots. Before joining Human Rights Watch in 1993, Goose was a US congressional staffer and a researcher at the Center for Defense Information. He has a master's degree in International Relations from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and a B.A. in History from Vanderbilt University.

Posted: January 1, 1970, 12:00 am

A member of Argentine National Gendarmerie aims his gun to demonstrators during a protest against government-proposed pension reforms as protesters march to Argentine National Congress in Buenos Aires, Argentina, on December 14, 2017.

© 2017 Mariano Sanchez/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images
(Washington, D.C.) – A new government resolution in Argentina to regulate the use of firearms by security agents runs counter to basic human rights standards and could encourage shootings in unjustifiable circumstances, Human Rights Watch said today.

On December 3, 2018, the Argentine Security Ministry approved a resolution regarding the use of firearms by members of federal security forces. The resolution cites the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, which provide authoritative guidance concerning use of force by security officers. However, the Argentine resolution contains loopholes and ambiguities that could allow security officers to employ firearms in an unacceptably broad set of circumstances.

“The resolution cites to the UN principles on the use of force, but in fact it fails to adhere to them,” said José Miguel Vivanco, Americas director at Human Rights Watch. “The Argentine government should promptly review this resolution to ensure that it puts more appropriate limits on the use of firearms and clearly requires any deliberate lethal use of firearms to be strictly unavoidable to protect life.”

The government claimed that, under previous norms, federal agents could not use firearms to “detain delinquents or stop them from fleeing, even if they had killed or tried to kill someone,” nor to stop the commission of grave crimes because agents “had to wait until the aggressor shot first.”

The resolution establishes that federal security forces have an obligation to respect human dignity and human rights, and that they will only be able to use firearms when such use is strictly necessary and proportionate to “fulfil their duties.” It adds that security forces “will use” firearms in self-defense, or to protect someone else from an imminent risk to life or serious injury, to prevent a particularly serious crime involving grave threat to life, to arrest a person presenting such a danger and resisting authority, or to prevent their escape.

However, the new provisions are inconsistent with human rights standards that strictly limit the use of firearms.

The resolution fails to distinguish between the use of firearms and the deliberately lethal use of firearms – that is, the distinction between shooting and shooting with intent to kill. This is another key distinction because, even in those limited cases where the use of firearms is justifiable, officers should generally not shoot to kill. Under the UN Basic Principles, the intentional lethal use of firearms is permissible only “when strictly unavoidable in order to protect life.”

Moreover, the provisions allow federal security officials to use firearms when “non-violent means are ineffective,” without specifying that there are other means to use force that should be employed before using firearms.

Under the UN Basic Principles, security officers should only employ firearms when “less extreme means,” including violent ones, are insufficient. This is a key provision because it recognizes that firearms are more likely to cause death or injury than other uses of force. For that reason, security forces should use firearms not just where non-violent means are ineffective, but where other, less lethal modes of force are also impracticable. The resolution fails to maintain that principle, and for that reason seems to countenance shootings in a wide variety of unjustifiable scenarios.

The UN principles also lay out standards aimed at minimizing the use of force across the board, which are not explicitly included in Argentina’s new regulations. Specifically, law enforcement officials should “exercise restraint,” “minimize damage and injury, and respect and preserve human life.”

Moreover, the resolution includes vaguely worded examples of what would be considered an “imminent danger,” granting federal security forces broad discretion to use firearms. These include when a person is part of a group of two or more people and someone else holds a firearm or has injured a third party; when someone is running away after causing – or trying to cause – death or injuries to someone else; or when the “unforeseen nature of the attack” makes it impossible  for security officers to “carry out their duties.”

Posted: January 1, 1970, 12:00 am

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson.

The exceptional cruelty and ongoing use of incendiary weapons demand a global response.

Over the past year, Human Rights Watch has documented thirty new attacks with incendiary weapons across six governorates of Syria. While the use of such weapons is not new to that conflict, the number of attacks in 2018 is almost double the annual average for the previous five years.  

One attack in eastern Ghouta in March 2018 exemplifies the extent of harm that incendiary weapons can cause. According to Syria Civil Defense, this strike killed at least 61 people and injured more than 200. 

In light of these developments, Human Rights Watch welcomes the productive discussions of Protocol III that have taken place this week. Many states have expressed their outrage at the recent use of incendiary weapons and supported continuing discussions next year. In some cases, they have called for strengthening existing law. High Contracting Parties should act on these statements in order better to protect civilians.

Incendiary weapons inflict excruciating burns and require agonizing treatments. They cause respiratory damage and organ failure. People who survive initial injury often endure psychological trauma and severe disfigurement that can lead to being shunned by society.

Protocol III provides some protection from these effects, but as a number of states have mentioned, the protocol has two major loopholes that weaken its impact. First, its definition excludes multipurpose munitions, such as white phosphorus, that operate in the same manner and cause comparable harm as the incendiary weapons covered by the protocol. Second, the protocol’s regulations create an arbitrary and outdated distinction between the use of air- and ground-launched incendiary weapons.

Strengthening this law is a humanitarian imperative. It is also legally straightforward.

Small changes to the protocol’s text would close its loopholes. Article 1 should adopt an effects- rather than design-based definition of incendiary weapons in order to encompass multipurpose munitions with significant incendiary effects. Article 2 should prohibit the use of all incendiary weapons, regardless of their delivery system, in concentrations of civilians.

These simple changes could save lives by imposing stricter legal obligations and building the stigma against incendiary weapons, which can in turn influence the actions of parties outside the CCW. 

States parties often refer to the CCW as a flexible, dynamic, and living document. Since 1980, states parties have amended one protocol, adopted two new ones, and expanded the scope of the framework convention. But they have yet to properly review Protocol III and to assess its adequacy for dealing with the concerns of contemporary armed conflict.   

Momentum for addressing the problems caused by incendiary weapons has grown steadily, particularly since Protocol III was added to the agenda of the Meeting of High Contracting Parties last year. States should seize this opportunity to deepen discussions and move toward more concrete action.  

We call on states to continue to condemn recent use of incendiary weapons. We urge them to dedicate additional time for discussion in 2019 to examine in more depth the adequacy of Protocol III and ways to address its shortcomings. They should then agree to a negotiating mandate with the goal of strengthening the protocol the following year.

For more information, please see our new report, “Myths and Realities about Incendiary Weapons,” and our overview of new developments over the past year.

Thank you.

Posted: January 1, 1970, 12:00 am

I am speaking on behalf of the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, the international coalition of 87 non-governmental organizations in 49 countries formed six years ago to preemptively ban fully autonomous weapons, known here as lethal autonomous weapons systems.

This year’s meetings of the Convention on Conventional Weapons Group of Governmental Experts covered significant ground, resulting in the report delivered yesterday. We are grateful to the chair for his work to achieve this substantive outcome.

The principles contained in that report affirm that “human responsibility for decisions on the use of weapon systems must be retained.” For us, this was the most significant take-away as it confirms what we have heard here over and over again since 2013.

The work this year demonstrated to us that states here at the Convention on Conventional Weapons are able to rise to the challenge and negotiate on substantive matters and reach agreement. Yet the end result was a report and not the legally-binding instrument that we demand.

We remind you that public expectations are rising rapidly that states will take serious action to respond to the multiple, serious challenges posed by killer robots. We commend the UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres for his strong appeal made at the Paris Peace Forum marking 100 years since the end of World War I, where he said, “I call upon States to ban these weapons, which are politically unacceptable and morally repugnant.”

Today and yesterday more than 80 country statements have referred to the need to continue deliberations here at the Convention on Conventional Weapons next year on lethal autonomous weapons systems. Not a single state has opposed continuing this work.

Many states have proposed moving to prohibit fully autonomous weapons and we warmly welcome Morocco’s call today. We support Austria, Brazil, and Chile’s recommendation “to negotiate a legally-binding instrument to ensure meaningful human control over the critical functions” of weapons systems.

Convention on Conventional Weapons high contracting parties should not simply roll over the current mandate and consider options. Most states here have expressed their strong preference to meet for 10 days next year. We believe you should set aside at least four weeks of time for your deliberations next year. The objective should be to adopt a new Protocol VI no later than 2020.

It’s abundantly clear there is an urgent need for bold leadership to address this imminent challenge before it is too late. It’s time to launch negotiations. We ask: if not now, then when? If not here, then where? If the Convention on Conventional Weapons is really the “appropriate forum” then let’s get started.

Thank you.

Posted: January 1, 1970, 12:00 am

Saudi-led coalition aircraft struck three apartment buildings in Faj Attan, a densely populated neighborhood in Sanaa, on August 25, 2017. Two of the buildings were completely destroyed and the third suffered extensive damage.

© 2017 Mohammed al-Mekhlafi

(Paris) – President Emmanuel Macron of France should raise serious concerns with Abu Dhabi’s crown prince regarding laws-of-war violations in Yemen, Human Rights Watch said today. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed al Nahyan of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) will visit Paris on November 21, 2018.

The UAE plays a prominent role in the Saudi-led coalition’s military operations in Yemen. Since March 2015, the coalition has indiscriminately bombed homes, markets, and schools, impeded the delivery of humanitarian aid and used widely banned cluster munitions. Human Rights Watch has documented nearly 90 apparently unlawful coalition attacks, some of them likely war crimes. The UAE and UAE-led proxy forces have arbitrarily detained, forcibly disappeared, and tortured Yemenis in southern and eastern Yemen, including Yemeni activists who have criticized coalition abuses.

“As the UAE’s de facto leader and deputy commander of its armed forces, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed al Nahyan could have acted to stop grave abuses in Yemen, but instead war crimes have mounted,” said Bénédicte Jeannerod, France director at Human Rights Watch. “If President Macron is truly concerned about the humanitarian crisis in Yemen, he should tell the crown prince that France will stop selling weapons to the UAE if there’s a real risk of their unlawful use.”

Despite Saudi Arabia’s and the UAE’s records of abuse, France, along with the United States and the United Kingdom, continue to sell weapons to both countries. In June, the French newspaper Le Figaro reported that French special forces were on the ground in Yemen, alongside UAE forces.

Macron should press the UAE to investigate alleged serious violations by its armed forces and Yemeni forces it supports, to appropriately prosecute those responsible for war crimes, and to provide reparation to victims of violations, Human Rights Watch said. France should stop supplying weapons and munitions to the UAE if there is a substantial risk that these arms are being used in Yemen to commit or facilitate serious violations of international humanitarian law or international human rights law.

Despite leading considerable efforts to present the UAE as progressive and tolerant, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed al Nahyan, the nation’s de facto leader, has largely failed to improve his country’s human rights record.

Domestically, UAE authorities have carried out a sustained assault on freedom of expression and association since 2011. In 2014, the UAE issued a counterterrorism law that gives authorities the power to prosecute peaceful critics, political dissidents, and human rights activists as terrorists. UAE residents who have spoken about human rights issues are at serious risk of arbitrary detention, enforced disappearance, imprisonment, and torture. Many are serving long prison terms or have left the country under pressure.

In March 2017, the UAE detained Ahmed Mansoor, an award-winning human rights defender, on speech-related charges and held him incommunicado for more than a year. He was sentenced to 10 years in prison on May 29, 2018 for crimes that appear to violate his right to free expression.

UAE courts also imposed a 10-year prison sentence in March 2017 on a prominent academic, Nasser bin Ghaith, whom authorities forcibly disappeared in August 2015, for charges that included peaceful criticism of the UAE and Egyptian authorities.

On October 4, the European Parliament adopted a strongly worded resolution calling for the immediate release of Mansoor and all other “prisoners of conscience” in the UAE. The resolution expressed concern that “attacks on members of civil society including efforts to silence, imprison, or harass human rights activists, journalists, lawyers, and others has become increasingly common in recent years.” It said that European institutions should make respect for human rights activists “a precondition to any further development of relation between the EU and UAE.”

In addition, despite some reforms, many low-paid migrant workers remain acutely vulnerable to forced labor. The kafala (visa-sponsorship) system ties migrant workers to their employers. Those who leave their employers can face punishment for “absconding,” including fines, prison, and deportation. A 2017 law extended key labor protections to domestic workers, previously excluded from such guarantees, but its provisions remain weaker than those of the country’s national labor law.

Yet over the past several years, the UAE and France have strengthened their bilateral relations across a range of areas, including security, trade, and cultural exchanges. In 2017, France increased its arms sales to the UAE and opened the Louvre Abu Dhabi museum amid serious concerns regarding labor abuses in building the museum. On October 11, the UAE joined the International Organization of the Francophonie, which promotes the spread of French language and values, as an associate member, although  human rights and democratic principles are at the heart of the organization’s charter.

“By failing to address the UAE authorities’ serious rights violations in Yemen, France risks glossing over a dark reality,” Jeannerod said. “Despite outward appearances, the UAE has repeatedly shown itself to be resistant to improving its human rights record at home and abroad.” 

Posted: January 1, 1970, 12:00 am

Remnant of a wing assembly that is mounted on a US-made GBU-12 Paveway II laser-guided 500-pound bomb found at the Arhab water drilling site, Sanaa governorate, where at least 31 civilians were killed in an airstrike on September 10, 2016. According to the manufacturing date as well as the national stock number, this wing assembly was produced by Raytheon Company, a US defense contractor, in October 2015.

© 2016 Priyanka Motaparthy / Human Rights Watch

On November 11, 30 senior Obama administration officials issued a statement calling on the Trump administration to end all support for Saudi Arabia in the war in Yemen. This was a positive and thoughtful effort, given America’s participation in a war that has had catastrophic outcomes for the people of Yemen. But it was, ultimately, a failed reckoning for the Obama administration’s role in risking American complicity in Saudi-led coalition abuses in the first place.

The statement by the former senior officials attempts to acknowledge that America’s participation in the war — providing intelligence, refueling, and logistical assistance to the Saudi-led coalition — was now clearly a mistake, given the coalition’s failure to limit its myriad violations and end the war. But they justify the Obama administration’s initial decision to support the war as based on “a legitimate threat posed by missiles on the Saudi border and the Houthi overthrow of the Yemeni government, with support from Iran.”

A more honest reckoning for how the US got to where it is in this war in Yemen would start with a greater admission of the truth of the Obama administration’s motivations and mistakes in participating in this war. In their letter, the Obama officials try to distinguish their administration’s support for the war as “conditional,” vs. Trump’s “unconditional” support. Of course, this matters little to the Yemeni people because the outcome has been the same: death and destruction, very often by US bombs.

Video

Video: US-Made Bombs Used in Unlawful Airstrikes in Yemen

The Saudi Arabia-led coalition killed several dozen civilians in three apparently unlawful airstrikes in September and October 2016. The coalition’s use of United States-supplied weapons in two of the strikes, including a bomb delivered to Saudi Arabia well into the conflict, puts the US at risk of complicity in unlawful attacks.

The Obama administration’s stated justifications for joining the war effort obscure the truth of what led them to the war. Other Obama administration officials had alreadystated that their support for the war, coupled with a $1 billion arms deal, was first and foremost payback for Saudi’s grudging tolerance of the Iran nuclear deal, and to reassure them that the US remained a reliable ally, despite the deal. The amount of Iranian support to the Houthis has been debated, of course, but with little evidence, all pretty murky; better known is the fact that the Houthis are a fiercely independent group with a long history of waging war in Yemen.

As the war has evolved, Iran’s involvement with the Houthis has certainly grown, filling in the vacuum for the Houthis’ desperate search for allies, effectively creating a self-fulfilling prophecy. What is clear is that the former Yemeni president, Ali Abdullah Saleh – long supported by the US – and various Yemeni defense forces controlled by his son and nephew supported the Houthis to such a degree that international observers formally dubbed them the “Houthi-Saleh forces.”  The Houthis had been at war with Saleh’s government for decades over long-simmering grievances as a minority group in the country. They had supported the uprising against Saleh and were active participants in the country’s “National Dialogue” to reshape the country’s governance. When Houthi armed groups marched on the capital, it was to rebel against the newly drafted constitution and a proposed federal structure they believed would weaken them. They negotiated an agreement with President Hadi to resolve their differences, but soon found themselves in control of the capital when Saleh-backed defense forces stepped down from defending key government buildings, including the parliament and the presidential palace.

The Obama administration, not learning enough from past foreign military experiencesin Yemen, accepted baseless assurances from the Saudis — including the then-deputy Crown Prince Mohamed Bin Salman and the inexperienced Saudi military — that they would overthrow the Houthis in months. The US decidedly looked the other way from Saleh’s strong support for the Houthis, including vast stores of weaponry from the Defense Ministry, an institution that remained loyal to Saleh. The war dragged on, with limited military gains by the Saudi-led coalition, but a rising toll of unnecessary and unlawful death and destruction.

Well before President Trump’s appearance, we at Human Rights Watch and others had documented well over 100 apparently indiscriminate or disproportionate aerial attacks by the Saudi-led coalition on civilians and civilian infrastructure in Yemen, causing devastation to Yemenis in their homes, markets, schools, hospitals, and even during their weddings and their funerals. In case after case, we showed that US weapons were being used in many of these attacks, including widely banned cluster munitions in populated areas. False denials and cover-ups by Saudi military authorities were clear signs that they were not trustworthy partners. We repeatedly provided this evidence to Obama administration officials, but they would insist, despite the obvious evidence to the contrary, that the support they were providing was reining in the Saudis and helping improve their ability to comply with the laws of war. This is not a case of hindsight knows best. The Obama administration should have known back then.

Also well before Trump adviser — and son-in-law — Jared Kushner’s conspicuous friendship with Muhammad bin Salman, the Saudi-led coalition’s arbitrary and excessive delays on imports to Yemen were exacerbating health and nutrition crises, as diseases like cholera spread like wildfire. The Saudi-led coalition’s closure of a critical airport meant that many Yemenis couldn’t travel to get the healthcare they needed. UN humanitarian agencies and global relief organizations pleaded in vain about the harm caused by the coalition restrictions, to little avail.

Meanwhile, the Obama administration was providing Saudi Arabia not only with ongoing military support (which the formal officials mention) but also diplomatic cover (which the former officials omit), especially at the UN. When the UN finally named Saudi Arabia on its “Global List of Shame,” of the worst offenders against children, for its attacks on children in Yemen, the US stood silent as Saudi Arabia strong-armed the UN. Then-Secretary General Ban Ki Moon resisted for a while, but finally caved in and removed Saudi Arabian from the list, admitting that Riyadh had threatened to cut its funding to various UN agencies. Twice during the Obama administration, the US had the opportunity to push for a UN inquiry into abuses by all sides in the Yemen conflict, and twice it did not—the Saudi-led coalition didn’t want one. Despite repeated queries about whether the US supported the first proposed UN inquiry, Obama officials responded with silence or words of deflection, which spelled the political demise of such an initiative.

The cost of the Obama administration’s support for Saudi Arabia’s war went beyond Yemen. The juxtaposition of the Obama administration decrying Syrian/Russian attacks on civilians and Assad’s ongoing blockade of humanitarian goods, while the United States was defending Saudi-led coalition attacks on civilians and the impact of the blockade in Yemen, undermined the credibility of the Obama team’s efforts to restrain the Syrian government. The Russians openly mocked then-UN Ambassador Samantha Power for this hypocrisy. The US should have condemned and acted to curb both coalitions, equally and fairly.

Whatever conditionality the Obama administration thought it had created — in holding up the transfer of precision munitions near the tail end of Obama’s term and suspending cluster munition transfers earlier — ultimately did not have meaningful impact in reining in the continued Saudi-led coalition attacks on civilians. Nor were the steps robust enough to protect the US and US officials from risking complicity in war crimes.

Despite the claimed “unconditional” support from the Trump Administration, its officials, too, have reacted strongly to some excesses: condemning the total blockade, pushing Saudi Arabia to permit cranes to get into Yemen, ending refueling of coalition planes. But, like the steps of the previous administration, it is not anywhere close to enough. As Yemenis remember the pain and suffering the US has helped inflict on their country, as they surely must, they will not look more kindly on the Obama administration’s merely “conditional” support. And that is not to mention several dozens of Yemeni civilians killed in drone strikes in the pursuit of Al Qaeda fighters.

The responsibility for these failed policies does not fall equally on all senior Obama officials, and some individuals made every effort to steer the ship in a far better direction. But that’s not the point here. The point is an honest, full appreciation of the reasons for these policies and their consequences. The statement by former senior officials fails in that task.

The tragic fact is that the US can play a less destructive role in Yemen —building on what we’ve seen these last few weeks. The US could end arms sales to Saudi Arabia, push for the UN to call out Riyadh for its role in Yemen’s nightmare, and investigate the US role in war crime after war crime so that the US, too, can ensure it does not keep making the same deadly mistakes.

The bipartisan Senate bill introduced on November 15 calling for sanctions and restrictions on Saudi Arabia for the harm it has caused in this war is the strongest effort to date for taking serious action.

The question is: Will they? Will US officials be able to look back in a few years and write a letter saying they did all they could to stop famine, to prevent more atrocities, to ensure countless Yemenis don’t go without justice or redress? Or will those officials, too, only be able to see there was so much more that could have been done when it is far too late and many more have died?

And finally, the broader reckoning Obama administration officials should provide is their failure to seize the opportunity presented by the Arab Uprisings for a new orientation of US interests in line with the interests of the region’s people and their rights, and not their dictators and outright tyranny. This is not predominately about Syria, and the ongoing debate about whether the Obama administration’s intervention— including providing arms and assistance to a variety of little-known armed groups — and at other times nonintervention helped or hurt the Syrian people.

It is, however, squarely about where the US plays a leading role in supporting, arming, and protecting abusive governments in the Middle East – namely Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE – so that America is much more directly responsible for the conduct of these foreign partners. The Obama administration had an opportunity to broadly rethink America’s historically problematic role in the region, and ultimately failed to do so. A fuller reckoning is the only way to avoid current policy debates and future policies from remaining misguided.

Author: Human Rights Watch
Posted: January 1, 1970, 12:00 am

Incendiary weapons were used in Eastern Ghouta, Syria, in March 2018, causing more than 260 civilian casualties.
 

© 2018 Syria Civil Defense
(Geneva) – Countries at an upcoming United Nations disarmament conference, faced with evidence of 30 new incendiary weapons attacks in Syria, should agree to strengthen the international law that governs their use, Human Rights Watch said in a report released today.

The 13-page report, “Myths and Realities about Incendiary Weapons,” counters common misconceptions that have slowed international progress in this area. Incendiary weapons produce heat and fire through the chemical reaction of a flammable substance. While often designed for marking and signaling or producing smokescreens, incendiary weapons can burn human flesh to the bone, leave extensive scarring, and cause respiratory damage and psychological trauma. They also start fires that destroy civilian objects and infrastructure.

Countries at UN treaty meeting should:

• Revisit existing international law on incendiary weapons in 2019.
• Work to close loopholes in that law,
• Condemn the use of incendiary weapons in populated areas.
“The excruciating burns and lifelong disabilities inflicted by incendiary weapons demand a global response,” said Bonnie Docherty, senior arms researcher at Human Rights Watch and lead author of the report. “Simple changes in international law could help save civilian lives during wartime.”

The report details the exceptionally cruel harm caused by incendiary weapons, explains the shortcomings of existing law, and lays out steps countries should take in response. The report, designed as an accessible overview of the incendiary weapons issue, was co-published by Harvard Law School’s International Human Rights Clinic.

Incendiary rockets rain fire over farmland outside a town in western Idlib, Syria, on July 30, 2018. 

© 2018 SMART News Agency

Countries that are party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) are scheduled to address incendiary weapons at the UN in Geneva from November 19 to 23. Protocol III to this treaty imposes some restrictions on the use of incendiary weapons, but it does not provide sufficient protections for civilians.

In 2018, the Syrian-Russian military alliance used incendiary weapons in at least 30 attacks across six governorates of Syria, based on Human Rights Watch research. The majority of these attacks involved ground-launched rockets, but air-dropped weapons have also caused harm. For example, an incendiary airstrike on March 16 in Eastern Ghouta killed at least 61 people and injured more than 200.

As flames from incendiary rockets rain down, smoke billows over farmland in western Idlib, Syria, on July 30, 2018. 

© 2018 SMART News Agency

Human Rights Watch documented an additional 90 incendiary weapons attacks in Syria from November 2012 through 2017. The total number is most likely higher. Syria has not joined Protocol III, but Russia has.

The countries at the UN meeting should address the weaknesses of Protocol III as well as articulate their policies and practices. They should also establish a forum dedicated to reviewing the protocol more formally in 2019 with the intention of strengthening its protections for civilians.

Local people struggle to extinguish fires from an incendiary weapons attack in western Idlib, Syria, on July 30, 2018. 

© 2018 SMART News Agency

Government support for action against incendiary weapons has grown significantly in recent years, although a small number of countries that view existing law as adequate have opposed proposals to amend the protocol.

Simple changes in international law could help save civilian lives during wartime.

Bonnie Docherty

Senior Researcher, Human Rights Watch

Protocol III has two major loopholes that have weakened its impact. First, its definition excludes multipurpose weapons, such as those with white phosphorus, which may be primarily designed to provide smokescreens or illumination, but which can inflict the same horrific injuries as other incendiary weapons. White phosphorus, for example, can continue to smolder in bandaged wounds and reignite days after treatment if exposed to oxygen. In 2017, the US-led coalition used white phosphorus while fighting to retake Raqqa in Syria and Mosul in Iraq from the Islamic State. The United States is party to Protocol III.

Second, while the protocol prohibits the use of air-dropped incendiary weapons in populated areas, it allows the use of ground-delivered models in certain circumstances. Because all incendiary weapons cause the same effects, this arbitrary distinction should be eliminated. A complete ban on incendiary weapons would have the greatest humanitarian benefits.

“Nations should make strengthening international law on these weapons a priority for the disarmament agenda,” said Docherty, who is also associate director of armed conflict and civilian protection at the Harvard clinic. “Stronger obligations would limit the conduct of treaty countries and, by increasing stigmatization of incendiary weapons, influence the behavior of other countries and non-state armed groups.”

Docherty will present the report’s findings at a side event at the United Nations in Geneva at 1:15 p.m. on November 20 in Conference Room XXII. 

Posted: January 1, 1970, 12:00 am

Related Content

Incendiary weapons are among the cruelest weapons used in contemporary armed conflict. These weapons, which produce heat and fire through the chemical reaction of a flammable substance, cause excruciating burns and destroy homes and other civilian structures. They are regulated by Protocol III to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), but that instrument has loopholes that reduce its legal and normative power.[1] CCW states parties have increasingly expressed support for revisiting and strengthening Protocol III, and they have set aside time at their annual Meeting of States Parties in November 2018 to address the topic.

Human Rights Watch and the Harvard Law School International Human Rights Clinic (IHRC) call on states to hold a robust exchange of views in November, and to dedicate additional time in 2019 for further discussions, possibly in the form of an informal meeting of experts. States should not only condemn ongoing use, but should also work toward closing Protocol III’s loopholes and building the stigma against incendiary weapons. A complete ban on incendiary weapons would have the greatest humanitarian benefits.

To bolster the case for reviewing and amending Protocol III, this paper rebuts common myths about incendiary weapons and the law that regulates them.

Myth #1: The harm caused by incendiary weapons is comparable to that of other conventional weapons.

 

Reality: Incendiary weapons inflict exceptionally cruel injuries, including horrific burns, which can produce immediate and long-term suffering and, in many cases, a painful death.

  • Incendiary weapons can cause fourth- and fifth-degree burns that damage skin, muscles, ligaments, tendons, nerves, blood vessels, and even bones. Burns can also lead to severe infections and shock.[2]  
  • Victims face an excruciating treatment process. Dressings for burns must be changed daily and dead skin removed, a painful process that has been described as being “flayed alive.”[3]
  • Incendiary weapons can also cause carbon monoxide poisoning and respiratory damage. Victims may be unable to breathe due to inflammation to the lungs or other tissues.
  • Individuals who survive an initial attack often experience organ failure, lowered resistance to disease, lifelong disability, muscle weakness, and psychological trauma. Survivors sometimes find that they are also shunned due to severe scarring and disfigurement, which can drive them to withdraw from society. 
  • In addition to inflicting physical injury, incendiary weapons can cause socioeconomic harm and displacement because they destroy homes, hospitals, schools, farmland, and other civilian infrastructure.

As flames from incendiary rockets rain down, smoke billows over farmland in western Idlib, Syria, on July 30, 2018. 

© 2018 SMART News Agency

Myth #2: Incendiary weapons are not a common tool in contemporary armed conflict.

 

Reality: Incendiary weapons have been used repeatedly in recent armed conflicts, most notably in Syria.

  • Human Rights Watch documented 30 incidents involving incendiary weapons in Syria over the first seven months of 2018. The attacks, by the Syrian-Russian military alliance, took place in six governorates: Aleppo, Damascus, Damascus Countryside, Daraa, Hama, and Idlib. Syria Civil Defense reported that on March 16, 2018, an incendiary weapon attack on Kafr Batna, in Eastern Ghouta, killed at least 61 people and injured more than 200.[4]
  • From November 2012 through 2017, Human Rights Watch documented more than 90 incendiary weapons attacks by the Syrian-Russian military alliance in Syria.[5] The total number of such attacks is likely higher because some attacks go unreported or are not recorded by visual media so cannot be investigated.
  • Human Rights Watch documented use of incendiary weapons in Ukraine in July 2014, although it could not determine who fired the weapons.[6]
  • White phosphorus munitions, which have comparable effects to incendiary weapons regulated under international law, have also been used repeatedly over the past 15 years, including by US-led coalition forces against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria in 2017;[7] by Saudi Arabia-led coalition forces in Yemen in 2016;[8] by Israel in Gaza in 2008-2009;[9] by both the International Security Assistance Force and the Taliban in Afghanistan between 2005-2011;[10] by Ethiopian forces in Somalia in 2007,[11] and by the United States in Iraq in 2004.[12]

Incendiary rockets rain fire over farmland outside a town in western Idlib, Syria, on July 30, 2018. 

© 2018 SMART News Agency

Myth #3: Existing international humanitarian law is adequate to protect civilians from incendiary weapons; preventing problematic use is a matter of compliance and universalization.

 

Reality: While states should join and comply with the Convention on Conventional Weapons, Protocol III governing incendiary weapons has two loopholes that interfere with its ability to protect civilians.

  • Article 1 of Protocol III narrowly defines an incendiary weapon as “any weapon or munition primarily designed to set fire to objects or cause burn injury to persons….” This definition excludes multipurpose munitions, notably those containing white phosphorus, which set fire and cause burns but are “primarily designed” for other uses, such as marking, obscuring, or signaling.
  • Article 2’s restrictions on use arbitrarily differentiate between incendiary weapons based on their delivery system. Article 2 comprehensively prohibits the use of air-dropped incendiary weapons in concentrations of civilians, but it allows the use of ground-launched incendiary weapons in concentrations of civilians when the military target is “clearly separated from the concentration of civilians and all feasible precautions are taken” to limit the incendiary effects and minimize injury or loss of life to civilians.
  • The drafters of Protocol III focused on regulating the incendiary weapons most troubling at the time of its negotiation: air-dropped weapons specifically designed to burn and set fires, notably those containing napalm. This narrow scope, however, is a legacy of the 1970s and no longer appropriate today.[13]

The aftermath of an airstrike using incendiary weapons on Khan Sheykhoun in Idlib Province, April 16 2017.

© 2017 Syrian Civil Defense in Idlib

Myth #4: Protocol III’s definition of incendiary weapons appropriately excludes multipurpose munitions that have only incidental incendiary effects.

 

Reality: By excluding multipurpose munitions, such as those containing white phosphorus, Protocol III fails to regulate munitions that cause the same harm in the same manner as those it defines as incendiary weapons.

  • White phosphorus is a chemical substance that ignites when exposed to oxygen. The chemical reaction creates intense heat of about 815 degrees Celsius and produces light and a thick smoke.[14]
  • White phosphorus munitions operate in the same way as the incendiary weapons covered by Protocol III: by setting fires and causing burns “through the action of flame, heat, or combination thereof, produced by a chemical reaction of a substance delivered on the target.” As noted above, they fall outside of Protocol III’s definition of incendiary weapons because they are “primarily designed” to be obscurants.
  • White phosphorus causes severe thermal and chemical burns, often down to the bone, that are slow to heal and likely to develop infections. If not all fragments of white phosphorus are removed, they can exacerbate wounds after treatment and reignite when exposed to oxygen. White phosphorus burns on only 10 percent of the body are often fatal.
  • In 2008-2009, for example, Israel’s use of white phosphorus munitions in Gaza killed at least 12 civilians and left dozens suffering from deep burns and respiratory damage.[15]
  • The use of white phosphorus munitions between 2005 and 2011 in Afghanistan also severely burned civilians, including an eight-year-old girl, who went through fifteen surgeries due to the extensive burns on her face, head, neck, and arms. Her recovery period took a number of months because whenever doctors tried to “scrape the dead tissue, flames leapt out.” While she and five other family members ultimately survived the attack, two of her sisters died.[16]

Screenshot of a video taken in April 2017 in Saraqeb, northwestern Syria, showing the bright trails produced by incendiary weapons. 

Myth #5: Armed forces need white phosphorus munitions because of their effectiveness as obscurants.

 

Reality: The humanitarian harm caused by white phosphorus munitions outweighs their potential usefulness on the battlefield, and less dangerous alternatives exist.

  • Protocol III should regulate white phosphorus munitions, despite claims about their military utility, because of the cruel and indiscriminate harm they cause.  In the past, weapons that inflict unacceptable harm, such as antipersonnel landmines and cluster munitions, have been banned or regulated regardless of purported military benefits.
  • In addition, there are alternative obscurants to white phosphorus munitions, such as 155mm smoke projectiles, which produce comparable visual screening properties without destructive incendiary effects.[17]
  • Some states have already turned to such alternatives in response to public pressure. While Israel used white phosphorus munitions in Gaza in 2008-2009, it began developing alternative smoke shells after it was widely condemned for the harm its munitions caused. There have been no reports of Israeli use of white phosphorus in Gaza since 2009, although it has conducted further military operations there.[18]

Footage showing what Human Rights Watch arms experts have identified as RBK-500 ZAB-2.5SM incendiary bombs mounted on a Russian attack aircraft at a Russian air base in Syria, June 18, 2016.

© 2016 Russia Today/YouTube

Myth #6: Protocol III’s distinction between air-dropped and ground-launched incendiary weapons reflects meaningful differences based on the types of delivery mechanism and frequency of use.

 

Reality: The distinction between air-dropped and ground-launched incendiary weapons is arbitrary because they cause the same type and magnitude of harm and have both been used in recent conflicts.

  • The delivery system of an incendiary weapon is irrelevant because the nature and extent of harm is the same. An individual will suffer cruel injury regardless of how the incendiary warhead reached them. Protocol III itself states that all incendiary weapons “set fire to objects or … cause burn injury to persons.”
  • Both air-dropped and ground-launched incendiary weapons have been used in populated areas in recent conflicts. In 2017, most of the 22 incendiary weapons attacks that Human Rights Watch documented in Syria involved air-dropped models.[19] In 2018, Human Rights Watch documented that the Syrian-Russian military alliance used ground-launched incendiary Grad rockets in at least 20 instances and air-dropped incendiary weapons in at least 10 instances.[20]   
  • Ground-launched incendiary weapons, in particular 9M22S Grad rockets, were also used in July-August 2014 in at least two towns in Ukraine, Ilovaisk and Luhansk. They burned several homes and endangered civilians.[21]
  • Because they generally lack aircraft to drop incendiary weapons, non-state armed groups are more likely to have access to ground-launched models. For example, the US military reported 11 cases from 2007-2009 in which insurgents used white phosphorus delivered by rockets or mortars in Afghanistan.[22]

Remnants of ZAB2.5SM submunitions from an August 7, 2016 incendiary weapon attack on Idlib city.

© 2016 Syria Civil Defense Idlib

Myth #7: Amending Protocol III would be complicated and time consuming.

 

Reality: Strengthening Protocol III, which requires only small changes to the text, would be legally and procedurally straightforward.

  • Expanding Article 1 to cover multipurpose munitions with incidental incendiary effects would simply require shifting from a design-based to an effects-based definition. The language could be changed to “any weapon or munition that has the effect of setting fire to objects or causing burn injury to persons….”
  • Precedent for adopting an effects-based weapons definition exists in CCW Protocol I on Non-Detectable Fragments,[23] Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions,[24] and the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion issued by the International Court of Justice.[25] Each of these documents looks to the effects of particular types of weapons in order to determine their legality.[26]
  • Strengthening restrictions on use would simply require eliminating the distinction in Article 2 between delivery systems. Article 2(2) could be amended to remove “air-delivered,” so that it prohibits making “any military objective located within a concentration of civilians the object of attack by incendiary weapons.” Article 2(3) could then be deleted.
  • Treaties regulating conventional weapons generally do not distinguish based upon delivery system. For example, Amended Protocol II to the CCW, which covers mines, booby-traps, and other devices, defines a “remotely-delivered mine” as a mine “delivered by artillery, missile, rocket, mortar, or similar means, or dropped from an aircraft.”[27]   
  • The process to amend Protocol III could be similarly straightforward and completed in a timely manner. States should set aside time to review Protocol III in 2019 and then agree to a negotiating mandate with the goal of strengthening the protocol the following year.

At least four incendiary submunitions burn on the ground of a narrow street in the al-Mashhad neighborhood of opposition-held east Aleppo city immediately after an incendiary weapon attack on August 7, 2016.

© 2016 Malek Tarboush

Myth #8: States are resistant to amending Protocol III.

 

Reality: Growing state support for strengthening the law and condemnation of recent use demonstrates the time is ripe for CCW states parties to revisit Protocol III.

  • Since 2010, at least 35 states, along with other international actors including the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the UN secretary-general, have publicly recognized the problems of incendiary weapons.[28]
  • In November 2017, CCW states parties engaged in particularly robust discussions when the topic became a separate agenda item at their annual meeting. Almost all of the 26 states that spoke expressed concerns about incendiary weapons, and the majority recommended CCW states parties take some action in response.
  • At least nine states supported amending Protocol III.[29] For example, Costa Rica described ongoing use of incendiary weapons as an “alert” to evaluate and expand the scope of Protocol III. Austria said it “continues to see value in strengthening Protocol III,”[30] while Chile promised to work with “like-minded States and civil society in order to bring about an effective prohibition of this type of weapon and to strengthen Protocol III.”[31] 
    Simple changes in international law could help save civilian lives during wartime.

    Bonnie Docherty

    Senior Researcher, Human Rights Watch

  • At least 13 states called for further discussions on Protocol III.[32] For example, the Holy See urged “[a]n honest technical and legal review of the provisions.”[33] Croatia stated, “[T]he time is right to discuss the relevance of standards set by Protocol III,”[34] while the Philippines agreed that “review and reflection is timely and consistent with the objective of keeping the convention and its protocols relevant.”[35
  • Switzerland proposed an informal meeting of experts regarding Protocol III.[36] While this proposal was ultimately blocked by a few states parties, at least five states expressly supported it.[37]
  • At least 17 states plus the European Union condemned or expressed concerns about reports of recent and ongoing use of incendiary weapons in concentrations of civilians at the CCW’s annual meeting in 2017.[38] For example, Zambia “condemn[ed] in the strongest terms the use of incendiary weapons in populated areas regardless of the method of deployment.”[39] The United States said it was “deeply concerned over the continued reports of air-delivered incendiary weapons being used in areas near civilians,”[40] while Ireland described such reports as “disturbing.”[41]
  • Final reports from CCW annual meetings, which are adopted by consensus, have noted concerns regarding incendiary weapons with increasing urgency since 2011.[42] At the end of the CCW’s 2017 Meeting of States Parties, the final report “condemned any use of incendiary weapons against civilians or civilian objects, and any other use incompatible with the relevant rules of international humanitarian law, including the provisions of Protocol III where applicable.”[43]

A ZAB-2.5 incendiary submunition from a December 5, 2016 attack on Maarat al-Numan south of Idlib.

© 2016 SMART News Agency

Myth #9: CCW states parties should not make Protocol III a priority for discussion because attention would be better spent on tackling new issues than revisiting agreed-on protocols.

 

Reality: CCW states parties should prioritize revisiting and strengthening Protocol III because the convention is intended to be a living document and states parties have not revisited Protocol III since it was adopted in 1980.

  • At the 2017 Meeting of States Parties, several CCW states parties remarked that a review of Protocol III was long overdue. While, in the words of Costa Rica, the CCW was designed to be “a convention that is dynamic and flexible,”[44] Protocol III has remained static for almost four decades.
  • States parties have, by contrast, expanded and strengthened other elements of the convention and its three original protocols several times since adoption. States parties have amended Protocol II, added two new protocols, and expanded the scope of the convention to encompass non-international armed conflicts.[45]
  • Work on incendiary weapons need not distract from progress on lethal autonomous weapons systems because states parties to the CCW have demonstrated their ability to work on multiple issues at the same time. For example, while states parties were negotiating Protocol IV on blinding laser weapons in 1995, they were also amending Protocol II. In 2003, states parties both adopted Protocol V on explosive remnants of war and agreed to a political commitment on mines other than antipersonnel mines.[46]
  • The evidence of ongoing use of incendiary weapons and growing calls for a response underscore the urgency of revisiting Protocol III.

Local people struggle to extinguish fires from an incendiary weapons attack in western Idlib, Syria, on July 30, 2018. 

© 2018 SMART News Agency

Myth #10: Amending Protocol III will not have a significant impact.

 

Reality: Closing the loopholes in Protocol III will better protect civilians by more strictly regulating states parties’ use of incendiary weapons and by creating a more powerful norm against their use.

  • A stronger protocol would bind states parties, meaning they could not lawfully engage in use that falls into the current loopholes. Eliminating ambiguity in Protocol III would also facilitate enforcement because with clearer rules, breaches are easier to recognize and condemn.
  • Strengthening Protocol III could also influence the conduct of actors not bound by its provisions by increasing the stigma against incendiary weapons. Stigmatization has already contributed to changes in domestic policies. For example, growing opposition to incendiary weapons, at the international and national levels, helped pressure Israel, which is not party to Protocol III, to alter its policies on white phosphorus in 2013 in order to dramatically restrict use.[47]
  • Stigmatization can also influence the conduct of non-state armed groups, especially those that seek to be viewed as responsible actors.

 

Annex I. Relevant Publications

A series of reports published over the past decade by Human Rights Watch and the Harvard Law School International Human Rights Clinic (IHRC) examine the issue of incendiary weapons in more depth. Approaching the topic from a variety of angles, these reports make the case that existing international law is inadequate and should be strengthened. The reports also provide annual updates of the use of incendiary weapons and the evolution of government positions.

To download the full reports, please visit: https://goo.gl/yHJQC8

 

An Overdue Review: Addressing Incendiary Weapons in the Contemporary Context
November 2017         

This 30-page report examines how the outdated regulations of Protocol III reflect concerns about incendiary weapons use at the time of the protocol’s negotiation. It argues that the law must evolve to respond to a changed military and political landscape.

 

Time to Act against Incendiary Weapons
December 2016         

This 32-page report highlights the urgency of action at the CCW’s Fifth Review Conference and calls on states to set aside time to revisit Protocol III.

 

From Condemnation to Concrete Action: A Five-Year Review of Incendiary Weapons
November 2015

This 27-page report analyzes the past five years of the incendiary weapons debate. It also discusses recent use of incendiary weapons in Syria and Ukraine, allegations of use in Libya and Yemen, and the evolution of national views on Protocol III.

 

Incendiary Weapons: Recent Use and Growing Opposition
November 2014 

This 16-page report details the latest harm caused by incendiary weapons in Syria and Ukraine while showing the influence of growing stigma on the practice of states, such as Israel.

 

Syria’s Use of Incendiary Weapons*
November 2013

This 25-page report documents new use of incendiary weapons in Syria and the civilian harm that resulted.

 

Government Positions on Protocol III on Incendiary Weapons
November 2012

This 18-page report updates an April 2012 report on countries’ views of Protocol III.

 

Incendiary Weapons: Government Positions and Practices
April 2012

This 22-page report analyzes government statements on Protocol III and provides evidence of the use, production, and stockpiling of incendiary weapons, including white phosphorous.

 

Q&A on Incendiary Weapons and CCW Protocol III
November 2011

This 3-page Q&A defines incendiary weapons, describes the harms they cause, lays out the shortcomings of Protocol III, and offers ways to strengthen the law.

 

Strengthening the Humanitarian Protections of Protocol III on Incendiary Weapons
August 2011

This 15-page report urges state parties to discuss Protocol III at the CCW’s Fourth Review Conference and proposes specific amendments to close its loopholes. The report argues that a blanket prohibition of incendiary munitions would most effectively protect civilians.

 

The Human Suffering Caused by Incendiary Munitions
March 2011

This 16-page report details the horrific harms caused by incendiary weapons, including napalm and white phosphorous, and provides a history of use since states adopted Protocol III.

 

The Need to Re-Visit Protocol III on Incendiary Weapons
November 2010

This 10-page report introduces the inadequacies of Protocol III and calls on states parties to revisit the protocol. It also examines how the US reservation has exacerbated the protocol’s shortcomings and hindered its ability to build norms.

 

Rain of Fire: Israel’s Unlawful Use of White Phosphorus in Gaza*
March 2009

This 71-page report, based on an in-depth field investigation, documents Israel’s use of white phosphorus during its 2009 military operations in Gaza.

 

*Unless noted by an asterisk, Human Rights Watch published these reports jointly with IHRC.

 

 

[1] Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) Protocol III on Incendiary Weapons (Protocol III), adopted October 10, 1980, entered into force December 2, 1983.

[2] For more information on the suffering caused by incendiary weapons, see Human Rights Watch and the Harvard Law School International Human Rights Clinic (IHRC), Memorandum to Convention on Conventional Weapons Delegates: The Human Suffering Caused by Incendiary Munitions, March 2011, https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/03/31/human-suffering-caused-incendiary-mu..., p. 3.

[3] Denise Chong, The Girl in the Picture: The Story of Kim Phuc, the Photograph, and the Vietnam War (New York: Penguin Group, 1999), p. 94.

[4] Syria Civil Defense, “A horrific massacre including unconscienable [sic] Napalm air strikes killed at least 61 civilians in #Kafr_Bata Town,” Twitter, March 16, 2018, https://twitter.com/SyriaCivilDef/status/974660689502629889 (accessed October 21, 2018).

[5] Human Rights Watch documented more than 68 incendiary weapons attacks from November 2012 to 2016, and 22 attacks in 2017. Human Rights Watch and IHRC, An Overdue Review: Addressing Incendiary Weapons in the Contemporary Context, November 2017, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/11/20/overdue-review-addressing-incendiary..., pp. 14-15. A YouTube video, published by Russia Today in June 2016, showed a Russian aircraft with incendiary bombs at Russia’s airbase in Syria, suggesting that Russia has also been using incendiary weapons in Syria. Mary Wareham, “Incendiary Weapons Pose Civilian Threat in Syria,” Human Rights Watch dispatch, June 21, 2016, https://www. hrw.org/news/2016/06/21/dispatches-incendiary-weapons-pose-civilian-threat-syria.

[6] Human Rights Watch and IHRC, Incendiary Weapons: Recent Use and Growing Opposition, November 2014, https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/11/10/incendiary-weapons-recent-use-and-gr..., p. 6; Yuri Lyamin and Michael Smallwood, “9M22S Incendiary Rocket Components Documented in Eastern Ukraine,” post to “The Hoplite” (blog), Armament Research Services, October 14, 2014, http://armamentresearch.com/9m22s-incendiary-rocket-components-documente... (accessed October 21, 2018).

[7] “Iraq/Syria: Danger from US White Phosphorus,” Human Rights Watch news release, June 14, 2017, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/06/14/iraq/syria-danger-us-white-phosphorus.

[8] Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “Saudi Arabia Appears to be Using U.S.-Supplied White Phosphorus in its War in Yemen,” Washington Post, September 19, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/ wp/2016/09/19/saudi-arabia-appears-to-be-using-u-s-supplied-white-phosphorus-in-its-war-in-yemen/?utm_term=.fd4007f43775 (accessed October 21, 2018).

[9] Human Rights Watch, Rain of Fire: Israel’s Unlawful Use of White Phosphorus in Gaza, March 2009, https://www.hrw.org/report/2009/03/25/rain-fire/israels-unlawful-use-whi....

[10] C.J. Chivers, “10 Years into Afghan War, a Thunderous Duel,” New York Times, October 7, 2011, https://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/08/world/asia/attacks-rock-us-outposts-n... (accessed October 21, 2018); Charlotte Aagaard, “Leaked Documents Show NATO Use of White Phosphorous against Afghan Insurgents,” Dagbladet information (Denmark), April 19, 2011, http://www.information.dk/265810 (accessed October 21, 2018). For further discussion of Taliban use, attempted use, and storage of white phosphorus, see “Reported Insurgent White Phosphorus Attacks and Caches,” US Central Command press release, 20090511–002, May 12, 2009, http://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/9... (accessed October 21, 2018).

[11] The Ethiopian government denied having used white phosphorus. See Monitoring Group on Somalia, “Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia pursuant to Security Council resolution 1724 (2006),” S/2007/436, July 18, 2007, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2007/436 (accessed October 21, 2018), paras. 30-34.

[12] Andrew Buncombe and Solomon Hughes, “The Fog of War: White Phosphorus, Fallujah, and Some Burning Questions,” The Independent, November 15, 2005, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/the-fog-of-war-white-p... (accessed October 21, 2018).

[13] Human Rights Watch and IHRC, An Overdue Review, pp. 11-12.

[14] For more information on white phosphorus and its effects, see Human Rights Watch and IHRC, From Condemnation to Concrete Action: A Five-Year Review of Incendiary Weapons, November 2015, https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/supporting_resources/incendiarie..., pp. 4-5.

[15] Human Rights Watch, Rain of Fire, pp. 3-4.

[16] Jason Straziuso and Evan Vucci, “Burned Afghan Girl Learns to Smile Again,” Associated Press, June 23, 2009,

 http://www.nbcnews.com/id/31509214/ns/world_news-south_and_central_asia/... (accessed October 21, 2018). It is unclear which parties used white phosphorus munitions in this particular incident. The US military documented 44 alleged uses by the Taliban. The spokesman for the commander of NATO and US troops in Afghanistan, Brig. Gen. Richard Blanchette, however, told Human Rights Watch that NATO and US forces also used white phosphorus munitions in Afghanistan. See “Taleban ‘Used White Phosphorus,’” BBC, May 11, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8045012.stm (accessed October 21, 2018); “Afghanistan: NATO Should ‘Come Clean’ on White Phosphorus,” Human Rights Watch news release, May 8, 2009, https://www.hrw.org/news/2009/05/08/afghanistan-nato-should-come-clean-w....

[17] Human Rights Watch, Rain of Fire, p. 4.

[18] “Israel: Strengthen White Phosphorus Phase-Out,” Human Rights Watch news release, May 18, 2013, https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/05/18/israel-strengthen-white-phosphorus-p... Gili Cohen, “IDF to Stop Using Shells with White Phosphorus in Populated Areas, State Tells High Court,” Haaretz, May 13, 2013, https://www.haaretz.com/.premium-white-phosphorus-ban-in-towns-1.5242691.  

[19] Human Rights Watch, An Overdue Review, p. 14.

[20] Human Rights Watch, “Incendiary Weapons,” in Reaching Critical Will, First Committee Briefing Book, 2018, http://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/1com/1... (accessed October 30, 2018), p. 25.

[21] Human Rights Watch and IHRC, Incendiary Weapons: Recent Use and Growing Opposition, p. 6.

[22] “Reported Insurgent White Phosphorus Attacks and Caches,” US Central Command press release.

[23] CCW Protocol I on Non-Detectable Fragments (Protocol I), adopted October 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 168, entered into force December 2, 1983 (“It is prohibited to use any weapon the primary effect of which is to injure by fragments which in the human body escape detection by X-rays.” (emphasis added)).

[24] Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions prohibits the use of weapons “of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.” Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Additional Protocol I), adopted June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, entered into force December 7, 1978, art. 35(2) (emphasis added). That protocol additionally forbids attacks using “means of combat the effects of which cannot be limited as required by this Protocol.” Ibid., art. 51(4)(c) (emphasis added).

[25] Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, International Court of Justice (ICJ) Reports 226, July 8, 1996, https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/95/095-19960708-ADV-01-00-EN.pdf (accessed October 21, 2018), para. 55 (noting that whether a weapon violated the prohibitions on poison or asphyxiating weapons depends on whether the weapon’s “prime, or even exclusive, effect is to poison or asphyxiate”) (emphasis added).

[26] The 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions demonstrates how even a convention with a design-based definition can take effects into account. The convention defines cluster munition as being “designed to disperse or release explosive submunitions….” but looks to the humanitarian effects of weapons to determine which are safe to exclude. It states that its definition of cluster munition does not include munitions with certain specific technical characteristics because they “avoid indiscriminate area effects and the risks posed by unexploded submunitions.” Convention on Cluster Munitions, adopted May 30, 2008, Diplomatic Conference for the Adoption of a Convention on Cluster Munitions, CCM/77, entered into force August 1, 2010, art. 2(2)(c) (emphasis added).

[27] CCW Protocol II on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and other Devices, as amended on May 3, 1996 (Amended Protocol II), adopted May 3, 1996, entered in force December 3, 1998, art. 2(2).

[28] Human Rights Watch and IHRC, An Overdue Review, p. 21.

[29] Argentina, Austria, Chile, Costa Rica, the Holy See, Jordan, Mexico, Panama, and Zambia. For these statements and all audio recordings referenced below, see UN Office at Geneva (UNOG), Meeting of High Contracting Parties to the CCW, Geneva, November 23, 2017, https://conf.unog.ch/digitalrecordings/# (accessed October 21, 2018) (audio recording).

[30] Statement of Austria, Meeting of High Contracting Parties to the CCW, Geneva, November 23, 2017, p. 1.

[31] Statement of Chile, Meeting of High Contracting Parties to the CCW, Geneva, November 23, 2017 (audio recording).

[32] Argentina, Austria, Chile, Costa Rica, Croatia, the Holy See, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Panama, the Philippines, Switzerland, and Zambia. See UNOG, Meeting of High Contracting Parties to the CCW, Geneva, November 23, 2017 (audio recording).

[33] Statement of the Holy See, Meeting of High Contracting Parties to the CCW, Geneva, November 22, 2017, p. 2.

[34] Statement of Croatia, Meeting of High Contracting Parties to the CCW, Geneva, November 23, 2017, p. 1.

[35] Statement of the Philippines, Meeting of High Contracting Parties to the CCW, Geneva, November 23, 2017 (audio recording).

[36] Switzerland proposed that the Meeting of High Contracting Parties decide “to convene an informal meeting of experts to discuss issues related to the universalization and implementation of the Protocol III in light of the humanitarian concerns expressed.” Statement of Switzerland, Meeting of High Contracting Parties to the CCW, Geneva, November 23, 2017, p. 2.

[37] Austria, Croatia, Ireland, Mexico, and New Zealand. See UNOG, Meeting of High Contracting Parties to the CCW, Geneva, November 23, 2017 (audio recording).

[38] Austria, Chile, Costa Rica, Croatia, Germany, the Holy See, Ireland, Jordan, Mexico, New Zealand, Panama, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States, Zambia, and the European Union. Ibid.

[39] Statement of Zambia, Meeting of High Contracting Parties to the CCW, Geneva, November 23, 2017 (audio recording).

[40] Statement of the United States, Meeting of High Contracting Parties to the CCW, Geneva, November 23, 2017 (audio recording).

[41] Statement of Ireland, Meeting of High Contracting Parties to the CCW, Geneva, November 23, 2017 (audio recording).

[42] For more on the final reports’ language on incendiary weapons, see Human Rights Watch and IHRC, An Overdue Review, p. 24.

[43] Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the CCW, Final Report, CCW/MSP/2017/8, December 11, 2017, https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/8A3BE602D1E4142CC12581E70054D0F4/$file/CCW_MHCP+2017_FinalReport_Advance+Version+(003)_ES.pdf (accessed November 12, 2018), para. 35.

[44] Statement of Costa Rica, Meeting of High Contracting Parties to the CCW, Geneva, November 23, 2017 (audio recording).

[45] United Nations Office at Geneva, “Convention on Conventional Weapons,” https://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/4F0DEF093B4860B4C1257180004B1B30?OpenDocument, (accessed October 21, 2018).

[46] Ibid.

[47] “Israel: Strengthen White Phosphorus Phase-Out,” Human Rights Watch news release; Cohen, “IDF to Stop Using Shells with White Phosphorus in Populated Areas,” Haaretz.

Posted: January 1, 1970, 12:00 am

At the United Nations in Geneva the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots called on governments to not allow the development of weapons systems that would select and attack targets without any human intervention.

© 2018 Mary Wareham

(Paris) – The French members of the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots on November 7, 2018 published a report "Why France Must Oppose the Development of Killer Robots," which recalls the risks arising from the development of lethal autonomous weapon systems. A few days before the first Paris Peace Forum, the campaign urged France to support the opening of negotiations for an international treaty on the preventive prohibition of fully autonomous weapons.

"The Paris Peace Forum aims to promote peace and security and to reaffirm the importance of multilateralism and collective action in the face of current challenges,” said Bénédicte Jeannerod, France director at Human Rights Watch. “The risk of developing killer robots is a challenge to peace and we hope that France will actively support a multilateral solution to address it, with the adoption of a preventive ban treaty on fully autonomous weapons. Time is running out to prevent their emergence, and we cannot wait for them to make their first victims to act."

Killer robots are weapons systems that, once activated, could choose and attack a target without human control. For the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, letting a machine decide on the life or death of a human being is a moral red line and a threat to the respect of international humanitarian law and human rights.

"These weapons systems are devoid of moral judgment and compassion, and in this respect, allowing them to kill is contrary to the principles of humanity and the requirements of public conscience," said Anne-Sophie Simpere, author of the report. "In addition, fully autonomous weapons cannot comply with international humanitarian law, in particular the rules requiring the differentiation between combatants and non-combatants, or the principle of proportionality. Only a human being has the precision of analysis to apply these principles in complex and changing combat situations.”

 

Nongovernmental organizations are also concerned about the difficulties in establishing clear accountability for crime, as well as the "high and systematic" risks that killer robots will attack the wrong people.

"Computer programs are imperfect, but robots have tenfold capabilities compared to humans,” said François Warlop, from Sciences Citoyennes, a French member of the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots. “They can act on a large scale, without the ability to assess the morality of their action. Their proliferation could therefore pose a threat to international security, especially since they require fewer human resources and could therefore lower the cost of engaging in a war. "

From Stephen Hawking to Steve Wozniak, thousands of scientists, but also religious leaders and Nobel Peace Prize winners denounce the dangers of killer robots and demand their prohibition before they are developed.

For the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, a treaty is urgent and necessary to prevent the proliferation and development of fully autonomous weapons. Since 2013, states have been debating the subject at the United Nations. At the annual meeting of the Convention on Conventional Weapons, from November 21 to 23, they are expected to adopt the terms of reference of the group of experts on lethal autonomous weapons for the coming year. One of the issues is the opening of a mandate to negotiate a treaty on these new weapons.

"France has a contradictory position in these discussions: on the one hand Emmanuel Macron has declared himself categorically opposed to autonomous weapons, while on the other hand, France does not want to start negotiations for a preventive prohibition treaty,” said Tony Fortin, from l’Observatoire des armements. “The Ministry of Armed Forces maintains that killer robots will not be allowed to emerge, while developing weapons programs over which human control is increasingly reduced. One example is the Man Machine Teaming program of Dassault and Thales, one of the announced objectives of which is to "provide the various machine systems with more autonomy and artificial intelligence."

The Campaign to Stop Killer Robots urges France to support the opening of negotiations for an international treaty to ban fully autonomous weapons.

On parle ici de robots entièrement autonomes dans leurs déplacements et leurs actions, y compris dans la décision d'ouvrir le feu, sans aucun contrôle humain. Imaginez de telles armes aux mains de gouvernements peu scrupuleux en matière de droits humains.

— HRW en français (@hrw_fr) November 7, 2018

Posted: January 1, 1970, 12:00 am

Remnant of a UK-produced missile found at the location of an air strike at Radfan Ceramics Factory, west of Sanaa, Yemen, on September 23, 2015.

© 2015 Ali Muhammad al-Sawari

(London) – Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and RW UK have received permission to intervene in a court case challenging the United Kingdom’s continued sale of arms to Saudi Arabia. The case will be heard by the Court of Appeal in April 2019.

The landmark legal case, brought by Campaign Against Arms Trade (CAAT), seeks to establish that the UK government is breaking its own arms export licensing criteria by continuing to sell weapons to Saudi Arabia, given the clear risk the weapons would be used to commit serious violations of international humanitarian law violations in Yemen. The High Court in London dismissed the case in 2017, but the Campaign Against Arms trade won the right to appeal, and the three groups again received permission to intervene.

“The October 2 murder of Jamal Khashoggi inside the Saudi consulate only highlights the government’s lack of credible investigations and accountability demonstrated during the years-long Saudi-led military campaign in Yemen,” said Clive Baldwin, senior legal adviser at Human Rights Watch. “The UK has contributed through its arms sales to a campaign that has killed or wounded thousands of civilians and brought the country to the brink of disaster.”

Since the coalition began its aerial campaign in Yemen in 2015, the UK has licensed at least £4.7 billion (about US$6.1 billion) worth of arms sales to Saudi Arabia. Human Rights Watch researchers have regularly visited Yemen and documented the use of weapons, including weapons made in the UK, in strikes that appear to be unlawful. Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, the UN, and Yemeni rights groups have repeatedly documented attacks by the Saudi-led coalition, some of which are most likely war crimes, that have hit markets, schools, hospitals, and homes, and killed thousands of civilians.

Since 2016, Human Rights Watch has called for all countries to end arms sales to Saudi Arabia until the Saudi-led coalition ends its unlawful attacks and credibly investigates those that have already occurred. A growing number of European countries have halted sales of weapons to Saudi Arabia, including Germany, the Netherlands, and Austria. On October 25, the European Parliament called for a common EU position banning arms sales to Saudi Arabia.

Meanwhile, violations in Yemen continue. On August 9, a Saudi-led coalition airstrike killed at least 26 children and wounded at least 19 more in or near a school bus in the busy Dhahyan market, in northern Yemen. The United Nations reported that on October 24, the coalition struck a vegetable packaging facility and killed 21 civilians, the latest in a series of attacks on civilian structures and yet another blow to the country’s precarious economy. The Houthi armed group, which controls much of the northern Yemen and is the target of the Saudi-led coalition’s attacks, has also committed serious violations of the laws of war, including laying antipersonnel landmines, recruiting children, and taking civilians hostage and torturing them.

“The UK should not wait for the court hearing to finally stop selling weapons to Saudi Arabia,” Baldwin said. “It should stop selling weapons now until Saudi Arabia ends unlawful attacks and holds war criminals accountable.”

Posted: January 1, 1970, 12:00 am

At the United Nations in Geneva the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots called on governments to not allow the development of weapons systems that would select and attack targets without any human intervention.

© 2018 Mary Wareham

Opposition to the creation of so-called “killer robots” – weapons systems that could select and attack targets without any human intervention – is growing. The issue has been hotly debated since 2013, when the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots began calling for a preemptive ban on the development, production, and use of such technology. The group has repeatedly warned that these weapons could have devastating consequences for civilian populations around the world.

The only way to stop the development of fully autonomous weapons is through national laws and an international ban treaty. But current diplomatic talks at the United Nations on this challenge are based on consensus – which allows just a few or even a single state to block an agreement sought by a majority – and often results in lowest-common denominator decision-making.

This is effectively what happened in Geneva last week at the sixth Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) meeting on lethal autonomous weapons systems. There was strong convergence among the 88 participating states on the need to retain some form of human control over weapons systems and the use of force. Many countries recommended a preemptive ban on the development and use of these weapons.

But a handful of states – namely Australia, Israel, Russia, South Korea, and the United States – strongly opposed any new treaty. Alarmingly, they instead suggested exploring the potential humanitarian “benefits” of developing and using lethal autonomous weapons systems.

Ultimately, the CCW meeting participants could only agree to recommend continuing their deliberations into next year. But the longer it takes states to negotiate a new international ban, the greater the chance that killer robots will become reality, and forever change the face of warfare. The world must not continue down this dangerous path.

Author: Human Rights Watch
Posted: January 1, 1970, 12:00 am

Thank you, Mr. President.

Compliance by States Parties with the Convention on Cluster Munitions has been very impressive. Indeed, compliance with the core prohibitions has been perfect thus far. There have been no instances or even allegations of use, production, or transfer of cluster munitions by any State Party. The first stockpile destruction deadline was 1 August, and every State Party with that deadline met it, some far in advance. In fact, most States Parties with upcoming deadlines have already completed destruction of their stocks. On this 10-year anniversary of the adoption and signing of the convention, we can say with great certainty that this is a convention that is working and working well.

However, there are some compliance concerns, related to transparency and national laws.

Thirteen States Parties are late in providing their initial transparency report. Four of those were due in 2011. This is an 89% compliance rate, but this should be 100%. These reports are needed, among other reasons, to establish officially if a country has stocks of cluster munitions and if it is contaminated. Moreover, far too many States Parties are late in submitting their annual updated report.

No State Party has enacted new implementation legislation since December 2016. Too few overall have enacted new laws or other national implementation measures. By our count, more than one-quarter of States Parties have yet to implement their Article 9 obligations.

In addition, we encourage all States Parties to elaborate their views on certain important issues related to interpretation and implementation of the convention, issues which are relevant to ensuring compliance. Of those States Parties that have commented on these matters, the vast majority have agreed with the following interpretations:

The Convention on Cluster Munitions prohibits (1) any intentional or deliberate assistance with activities banned by the convention, including during joint military operations with states not party; (2) any transit of cluster munitions by a state not party across the territory of a State Party; (3) any foreign stockpiling of cluster munitions by states not party in the territory of a State Party; and (4) any direct or indirect investment in producers of cluster munitions.

The convention is having a powerful impact even on nations that have not yet joined, as most are in de facto compliance with key provisions, such as no use, no production, no trade. An international norm rejecting any use of cluster munitions is clearly emerging.

Cluster Munition Monitor reports confirmed use in the past year in just two countries—in Syria, by Syrian government forces supported by Russia, and in Yemen by the Saudi Arabia-led coalition.

We expect every State Party to firmly condemn any use of cluster munitions by any actor, and to call for an immediate halt to such use. And please follow-up bilaterally after your initial reactions.

In closing, let me reiterate that at the 10-year mark, we should all feel good about the Convention, about the record of compliance, and about the strength of the growing norm. But there is no room for complacency. These gains take constant care, for the long haul.

Thank you.

Posted: January 1, 1970, 12:00 am

When we released Cluster Munition Monitor 2018 last Thursday, we highlighted the untarnished compliance record regarding the convention’s core prohibitions. One of the most visible examples is seen in stockpile destruction, where all of the first states with cluster munitions to ratify the convention destroyed their stocks within the convention’s eight-year deadline.

This achievement shows the world that States Parties take their obligations seriously and are committed to implementation. It also demonstrates to states considering joining the Convention on Cluster Munitions that the provisions are not overly burdensome or impossible to implement. 

Four States Parties completed destruction of their stockpiled cluster munitions during the previous year: Croatia, Cuba, Slovenia and Spain. We warmly welcome this achievement. We encourage them to report in detail on the process and appreciate Croatia’s detailed PowerPoint presentation here. We did not hear from Cuba today and urge it to provide details on the exact quantity and types of cluster munitions and submunitions destroyed.

During 2017, seven States Parties—those four plus Peru, Slovakia, and Switzerland—destroyed a collective total of 33,551 cluster munitions and 1.7 million submunitions. This is the lowest number destroyed since the creation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

However, the reason for that is positive: the vast majority—99 percent—of the total reported global stocks of cluster munitions once held by States Parties have now been destroyed. As the Monitor reports, 33 States Parties have completed destruction of their stocks, collectively destroying 1.4 million cluster munitions containing more than 177 million submunitions.

State Party Slovakia destroyed a substantial number of cluster munitions over the past year and we hope to hear from Slovakia at this meeting. Switzerland is on track to complete the destruction of its cluster munition stocks by the end of this year. With the technical support of Norwegian People’s Aid, Botswana and Peru have made substantial progress over the past year to plan and prepare for the destruction of their stockpiled cluster munitions within the convention’s deadlines.

Yet, as always, it is not all good news. We therefore bring the following concerns to your attention for our collective follow-up:

  • Bulgaria has reported the possession of a substantial number of cluster munitions, but still has not started destroying them. There is just one year left until its 1 October 2019 stockpile destruction deadline. We appreciate the update provided today, but are disappointed to hear that Bulgaria is considering making an extension request to its pending stockpile destruction deadline.
  • Guinea-Bissau has indicated several times that it needs financial and technical assistance to destroy its stockpiled cluster munitions by its 1 May 2019 deadline. Yet it still has not disclosed the quantity and types of stockpiled cluster munitions as it is nearly seven years late delivering its Article 7 transparency report. Guinea-Bissau last participated in a meeting of the convention in 2015.
  • There is evidence that Guinea imported cluster munitions back in the year 2000, prior to joining the convention. Yet it still has not provided its transparency report for the convention, which was due April 2015. Therefore, it is not possible to know if it still has stockpiled cluster munitions left to destroy.
  • Signatories that possess cluster munitions, such as Indonesia and Nigeria, appear to have taken few, if any, steps to ratify the convention or to declare and destroy their cluster munitions.
  • Cyprus is the last European Union member state to have signed, but not yet ratified the convention. It has not disclosed any information on its cluster munition stocks, but we have learned that 3,760 mortar projectiles and 2,559 submunitions that it transferred in 2014 for the purposes of destruction still have not been destroyed.

Under the convention’s cooperative compliance measures, States Parties and others, including our campaign members, stand ready to help States Parties requiring assistance. It is clear that several now need help to overcome financial, technical, and other challenges that are preventing them from swiftly destroying their cluster munition stocks.

Before concluding, we would like to highlight the fact that most States Parties have chosen not to retain any cluster munitions for training and research purposes. Nonetheless, 13 States Parties are retaining cluster munitions. This includes two of the newer States Parties, Bulgaria and Slovakia.

We are pleased to hear just now from the Netherlands that it intends to significantly reduce the number of cluster munitions that it has retained for research and training, but not consumed for these purposes since 2011. We were disappointed that Cameroon decided to retain all six of its stockpiled cluster munitions for research and training purposes.

Last year, Italy announced that it has destroyed the cluster munitions that it initially retained for research and training purposes and would not replenish those stocks. Several States Parties retaining cluster munitions have significantly reduced the number retained since making their initial declarations, including Belgium, France, Germany, Switzerland, and Spain.

That shows how the initial amounts retained were likely too high, but it still is not clear if current holdings constitute the “minimum number absolutely necessary” for the permitted purposes, as required by the convention.

We applaud the States Parties that have destroyed their cluster munition stocks and are not retaining any. It’s clear that most States Parties agree with the CMC that there is no compelling reason to retain live cluster munitions and explosive submunitions for the purposes of research and training.

Finally, the Cluster Munition Coalition supports both the guidelines on extension requests and the voluntary declaration of completion submitted to this meeting.

Posted: January 1, 1970, 12:00 am

A BLU-61 submunition marked for destruction in-place in the Basra governorate of Iraq, March 2018. 

© 2018 UNMAS
 
(Geneva) – No state party to the 2008 treaty prohibiting cluster munitions has violated the core prohibitions on use, production, transfer, and stockpiling of these weapons, resulting in an untarnished compliance record, Human Rights Watch said today during the release of the Cluster Munition Monitor 2018 report.
 
Cluster Munition Monitor 2018 is the ninth annual report of the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC), the global coalition of nongovernmental organizations co-founded and chaired by Human Rights Watch. The group works to ensure that all countries join and adhere to the 2008 treaty banning cluster munitions and requiring clearance and victim assistance. The report details how some non-signatories, particularly Israel, Russia, and the United States, hardened their defense of cluster munitions during the past year.
 
“Full compliance is essential to ensuring that the treaty banning cluster munitions prevents further human suffering from these widely discredited weapons,” said Mary Wareham, arms division advocacy director at Human Rights Watch and an editor of the report. “The treaty members are showing the holdouts that they have nothing to lose and everything to gain by renouncing cluster munitions and coming on board without delay.”

Treaty members are showing the holdouts that they have nothing to lose and everything to gain by renouncing cluster munitions and coming on board without delay.

Mary Wareham

Arms Division Advocacy Director at Human Rights Watch

In the US, a November 30, 2017 Defense Department policy directive abandons a longstanding policy requiring the US not use cluster munitions that result in more than a 1 percent unexploded ordnance after 2018. Human Rights Watch has condemned the policy for halting a long-planned move away from inaccurate cluster munitions. The US claims that cluster munitions have military utility, but last used them during the 2003 invasion of Iraq, with the exception of a single 2009 attack in Yemen. There is no evidence that the US or its coalition partners have used cluster munitions against the Islamic State (also known as ISIS) in Syria and Iraq.

Cluster munitions can be fired from the ground by artillery systems, rockets, and projectiles, or dropped from aircraft. They typically open in the air, dispersing multiple bomblets or submunitions over a wide area. Many submunitions fail to explode on initial impact, leaving dangerous duds that can maim and kill like landmines for years.

Currently, there are 103 states parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, while 17 countries have signed, but not yet ratified. There has been no new use, production, or transfers of cluster munitions by any state party since the convention was adopted on May 30, 2008. All states parties facing the first eight-year stockpile destruction deadline – August 1, 2018 – successfully destroyed their stocks in time, including Croatia, Slovenia, and Spain in the past year. Cuba, a new state party, also completed its stockpile destruction, while Switzerland is expected to announce completion imminently.

The destruction to date of a collective total of 1.4 million cluster munitions and more than 177 million submunitions means that 99 percent of the total reported global stocks held by states parties have now been destroyed. During 2017, seven countries destroyed a total of 33,551 cluster munitions and 1.7 million submunitions.

However, use of cluster munition by Syrian government forces on anti-government-held areas of the country, which began in 2012, continued throughout 2017 and the first half of 2018. The number of recorded cluster munition attacks fell over the past year, in part due to the decreasing number of areas that remain outside of the government’s control. In Yemen, far fewer cluster munition attacks were reported over the last year by a Saudi-led coalition that has conducted a military operation against Houthi forces in Yemen since March 2015. That decrease comes after strong public outcry, global media coverage, and widespread condemnation. There is evidence that cluster munitions may have been used in Egypt and Libya, but it has not been possible to independently confirm these allegations. None of these countries are party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

According to the Cluster Munition Monitor, there were 289 new casualties in 2017 and 99 percent of cases in which the victim’s status was reported were civilians. That included 187 casualties in Syria and 54 in Yemen from both new attacks and explosive remnants. There were 32 new casualties in Laos, all from unexploded submunitions used by the US in the 1960s and 1970s. The number of new victims in 2017 is a sharp decrease from the 971 reported in 2016, but many casualties go unrecorded or lack sufficient documentation.

Since the publication of last year’s report, Sri Lanka was the only country to ratify or accede to the convention, on March 1.

For the third consecutive year, Russia voted with Zimbabwe in December 2017 against a United Nations General Assembly resolution promoting the convention, though 32 non-signatories voted for the resolution. Russia has participated in a joint military operation with Syrian forces since September 30, 2015, in which cluster munitions have caused extensive civilian harm.

According to the Cluster Munition Monitor, 26 countries, including 12 states parties and two signatories, are contaminated by cluster munition remnants. Around the world, at least 153,000 submunitions were destroyed during 2017 in clearance operations. Under the convention, eight states parties have completed clearance of their contaminated land.

Most states parties have formally declared they are not retaining any cluster munitions for training or research, as the treaty permits, though 12 treaty members are. Thirty have enacted national laws to carry out the convention, and another 20 are in the process of doing so.  

“Several states parties still have significant work to do to clear contaminated areas, assist victims, report on their implementation, and ensure they have laws and other measures to punish any violations,” Wareham said. “Countries needing assistance should not hesitate to request help, as cooperative compliance is the bedrock of this treaty.”

Cluster Munition Monitor 2018 will be presented at the Eighth Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, which opens at the United Nations in Geneva on September 3.

Posted: January 1, 1970, 12:00 am

Thank you Mr. Chair, and thank you for your work chairing this Group of Governmental Experts, including your consultations with civil society. I am speaking in my capacity as coordinator of the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, the rapidly growing coalition of 76 non-governmental organizations in 32 countries working to preemptively ban weapons systems that, once activated, would select and attack targets without human intervention.

The serious legal, operational, moral, technical, proliferation, security and other challenges raised by fully autonomous weapons have gained widespread attention since the first CCW meeting on the topic in May 2014. However, states still have not agreed on the regulatory response needed to address the serious challenges raised.

It’s increasingly obvious that the public strongly objects to allowing machines to select targets and use force without any meaningful human control. Doing so would be abhorrent, immoral, and an affront to the concept of human dignity and principles of humanity. It’s high time governments heed the mounting calls for a new international law to prohibit killer robots and start negotiating one.

The Campaign to Stop Killer Robots urges states at this sixth international meeting on lethal autonomous weapons systems to recommend a negotiating mandate to create such a ban treaty. We hope that states heed the calls from not only us, but the African Group of states, the Non-Aligned Movement, Brazil, Austria, Chile, Colombia, Panama, and others to begin negotiations on a new treaty to retain human control over weapons systems or prohibit lethal autonomous weapons.

Momentum is starting to build rapidly for states to start negotiating a legally-binding instrument. Requests for more time to further explore this challenge may seem valid, but increasingly sound like excuses aimed at delaying the inevitable regulation that’s coming.

Promises of greater transparency, codes of conduct, meek political declarations and more committees are insufficient to deal with the far-reaching consequences of creating fully autonomous weapons. Nothing less than a ban treaty will be needed to effectively constrain the development of autonomy in the critical functions of weapons systems and avoid dehumanizing the use of force.

Posted: January 1, 1970, 12:00 am