Bulgaria bears a “big responsibility” for protecting the European Union’s external borders and should do so “in full respect” of migrants’ human rights, says Europe’s senior minister for migration, Dimitris Avramopoulos.

Bulgarian border police stand near a barbed wire fence on the Bulgarian-Turkish border on July 17, 2014. 

© 2014 Reuters

Speaking in the country’s capital, Sofia, Avramopoulos, the European commissioner for migration, home affairs and citizenship, said Bulgaria had the EU’s support as well as his “personal commitment” as it seeks to police Europe’s outer frontiers.

But can Avramopoulos really be confident that Bulgaria will respect migrants' rights in the way he hopes? Its track record suggests not.

Take the case of 16-year-old ‘Abdullah’ from Afghanistan, who experienced Bulgaria’s “respect” first hand.

“When Bulgarian police saw us, we tried to run away,” he said. “They chased us with dogs and shot at us. There were five police. When they caught us, they started beating us. They kicked me and the others wherever they could reach. They did this for about an hour and threatened us with the dogs. They took my money and mobile.”

Abdullah (not his real name) is one of several migrants and asylum seekers who told Human Rights Watch about summary returns from Bulgaria, and violence both at its borders and inside detention centers in late 2015. These are not new problems; we also documented similar abuses in April and September 2014.

Yet Abdullah’s and hundreds of others’ similar testimonies have fallen on deaf ears at EU headquarters in Brussels. While Bulgaria has the right to protect its borders, it doesn’t have the right to summarily return people to Turkey or physically abuse them. By focusing on border protection, Avramopoulos missed the chance to press Bulgaria on violence against migrants and asylum seekers.

The commission should forcefully remind Bulgaria of EU laws and standards, and urge Bulgarian authorities to investigate these credible reports of abuses and bring them to a halt. Because ignoring Abdullah’s story won’t make the allegations go away, and resorting to violence is no way to manage the refugee crisis.

Author: Human Rights Watch
Posted: January 1, 1970, 12:00 am

President Xi Jinping
General Secretary Office
Central Committee of the Communist Party of China
Zhongnanhai Ximen, Fuyou Street
Xicheng District, Beijing 100017
People’s Republic of China

Fax: +86 10 6307 0900; +11 10 6238 1025

Re: Detention of Five North Korean refugees 

Dear President Xi, 

Human Rights Watch is an international nongovernmental organization that investigates and reports on human rights abuses in over 90 countries, including China, North Korea, South Korea and the United States among others. We work on a wide range of human rights issues worldwide, including protection of refugees and stopping refoulement, ending the use of torture, and combatting restrictions on basic rights, like the freedom of movement to leave one’s home country.

We write to request you urgently stop the forced return of a group of five North Korean refugees back to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) who were apprehended by police last week in Shengyang city of Lioaning province. They are currently believed to be detained near Yanji city in Jilin province. Human Rights Watch calls on you to permit these five persons who were last seen in your government’s custody to travel safely to a third country.

If these five persons are returned to North Korea, they will likely face harsh abuses, including possible torture, imprisonment in prison camps, forced labor, and based on past incidents, sexual violence and potentially execution. This information is based on Human Rights Watch’s research as well as and the conclusions of a UN Human Rights Council Commission of Inquiry on human rights in North Korea that produced a comprehensive report in 2014. 

This matter is quite urgent because the most recent information we have received is that these persons are to be imminently sent to Helong city, 70 kilometers southwest of Yanji, near the Chinese-North Korean border. Once they are in Helong, a forced return could happen at any time.  Please find additional information in this press release.  

Your government has labeled North Koreans in China as illegal “economic migrants” and routinely repatriates them to North Korea based on arrangements established by a 1986 border protocol. But Human Rights Watch’s research has found that North Koreans who leave the country without permission face certain and harsh punishment upon repatriation. Because of this, international law requires that they should be considered as refugees sur place – people who become refugees as a result of fleeing their country or due to circumstances arising after their flight. In 2010, North Korea’s Ministry of People’s Security adopted a decree making defection a crime of “treachery against the nation,” punishable by death. North Koreans who have fled the country since 2013, or who are residing outside the country but can surreptitiously talk with contacts inside North Korea, have told Human Rights Watch that North Koreans who are repatriated from China face incarceration, torture, inhumane treatment, enslavement, and sexual violence upon their forced return.

As party to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, China should uphold its commitments and not send North Koreans - who have a well-founded fear of persecution - back to North Korea, where their life or freedom will be threatened because they left the country without permission.

We noted that in November 2015, the United Nations Committee Against Torture raised serious concerns about China’s actions to forcibly return fleeing North Koreans caught in China to North Korea. We strongly urge the Chinese government to reveal the current whereabouts of the group of five North Koreans, and abide by China’s international obligations under the Refugee Convention to protect refugees and under no circumstances force them back to a place where they could face persecution. 

Sincerely, 

Phil Robertson 
Deputy Asia Director

Sophie Richardson
China Director

Posted: January 1, 1970, 12:00 am

(Seoul) – China should immediately release five North Korean refugees held in Chinese detention and agree not to return them to North Korea, where they would face grave danger, Human Rights Watch said today. China should protect the five refugees and let them travel to safety in a third country, Human Rights Watch said in a letter to Chinese President Xi Jinping.

North Koreans who are forcibly repatriated after fleeing their country face a real risk of torture, sexual violence and abuse, incarceration in forced labor camps, and public executions, making them refugees in need of urgent protection under international law. 

“China should not force these five refugees back to North Korea, where the government is known to severely violate the rights of those sent back using methods such as torture, sexual violence, forced labor, and long-term incarceration in North Korea’s brutal prison camp system,” said Phil Robertson, deputy Asia director at Human Rights Watch. “Beijing should fulfill its obligations under the UN Refugee Convention by releasing these five refugees and permitting them to go to a third country where they can be safely protected.” 

Late last week, Chinese government officials detained the group traveling to the city of Shenyang, Liaoning province, in northeastern China. Three of the five refugees are relatives of “Lim,” a North Korean now living in South Korea and using a pseudonym. On June 16, Lim received a call from her brother, who was using a smuggled Chinese phone in North Korea. He told Lim that he had crossed the Yalu river, on the border between North Korea and China, with their mother and a cousin. He had been carrying their mother, who was too weak to walk, and needed help because the group had gotten lost on the mountain. Lim’s relatives had no food and her brother eventually lost consciousness from exhaustion and hunger. 

Lim was eventually able to contact someone who could help guide the group and provide them with food and basic assistance. Lim told Human Rights Watch that she spoke to her family a few days later, when the person trying to help them reached the group before departing by car. She has not been able to contact them since then. 

On June 21, Lim learned from her local contacts that the group, including her three relatives, was detained by the Chinese military near Yanji city, Jilin Province. On June 22, she heard that authorities were about to move her family to Helong, 70 kilometers southwest of Yanji. 

China regularly labels North Koreans as illegal "economic migrants" and forcibly repatriates them to North Korea based on a 1986 bilateral border protocol. However, regardless of why North Koreans decide to flee the country, they are virtually guaranteed to face extremely abusive treatment if forced to return. For this reason, international law considers them all to be refugees sur place, or refugees because of circumstances after their departure.

China, as a state party to the 1951 UN Convention on Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, as well as the 1984 Convention against Torture, is specifically obligated not to return refugees when that may put them at risk of persecution or torture. The same obligations bind China as a matter of customary international law. Forcing North Koreans back to North Korea amounts to refoulement, or the sending of persons back to territory where they face serious human rights violations. Such a practice forbidden by international treaties to which China is a party.

According to interviews conducted by Human Rights Watch with North Koreans who have previously been apprehended in China and returned to North Korea, the North Korean government harshly punishes all those who leave the country without permission.

In 2010, North Korea’s Ministry of People’s Security adopted a decree making defection a crime of “treachery against the nation,” punishable by death. North Koreans who have fled the country since 2013, or who maintain contacts inside the country, have told Human Rights Watch that people repatriated by China face severe penalties. Those caught while trying to go to South Korea can face 7 to 15 years of forced labor in ordinary prison camps (kyohwaso – re-education correctional facilities), incarceration in political prison camps (kwanliso), or even execution. 

North Koreans may be sentenced to more than two years of forced labor in ordinary prison camps for living illegally in China. A former senior official in the North Korean state security service (bowibu) who worked on the border and received North Koreans sent back from China, told Human Rights Watch that officials torture every returnee to find out where they went in China, who they contacted, and what they had done.

Lim remains especially concerned about her family’s treatment because police detained and forcibly disappeared her father in 2010. When detainees vanish without information on whereabouts, trial dates or result, the community assumes the person has been sent to political prison camps (kwanliso). Lim fears that because of their father’s status, her family will be lost in the kwanliso system. 

Political prison camps in North Korea are characterized by systematic abuses and often deadly conditions, including meager rations that lead to near starvation, virtually no medical care, lack of proper housing and clothes, regular mistreatment that includes sexual assault and torture by guards, and summary executions. Death rates in these camps are reported by former North Korean prisoners and guards to be extremely high. Detainees in ordinary prison camps also face forced labor, food and medicine shortages, and regular mistreatment by guards.

The 2014 UN Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in North Korea found that those fleeing the country are targeted as part of a “systematic and widespread attack against populations considered to pose a threat to the political system and leadership of the DPRK… to isolate the population from contact with the outside world.” It also found that crimes against humanity, including torture, execution, enslavement, and sexual violence, are committed against prisoners and people forcibly returned to North Korea from China. 

Human Rights Watch calls on China to stop repatriating North Koreans, and to allow the UN refugee agency to exercise its mandate and protect people. China should provide asylum to North Korean refugees, let them seek resettlement in a third country, or allow them to pass through Chinese territory without fear of arrest or forced returns.

In December 2016, the UN Security Council again discussed for a third year in a row the human rights situation in North Korea as a threat to international peace and security. In March, the UN Human Rights Council passed a resolution that strengthens the UN’s work to assess and develop strategies to prosecute pervasive human rights crimes by the North Korean government.

“There is no way to sugarcoat this: if these people are forced back to North Korea, their lives and safety will be at risk,” said Robertson. “The world is watching to see whether Beijing fulfills its duty to protect these five refugees or again becomes complicit with North Korea’s abuses.”

Posted: January 1, 1970, 12:00 am

“Ahmad,” a 34-year-old Chechen man, boarded a Polish-bound train in Brest, Belarus, last week, hoping to seek asylum there. He had fled from Chechnya, a Russian republic, where he says the authorities tortured and unlawfully detained him.

Asylum seekers in the arrivals hall at Brest train station, returned on the 13.46 pm train from Terespol, where their requests to seek asylum Poland were rejected. Brest, Belarus, December 7, 2016. 

© 2016 Lydia Gall/Human Rights Watch
Having taken the 15-minute trip from Brest to the Polish border unsuccessfully 27 times before, Ahmad hoped this time was going to be different. Polish and Belarusian lawyers and activists had asked for, and received, an emergency order from the European Court of Human Rights instructing that he not be summarily returned to Belarus. He knew Polish authorities would have a legal obligation to comply with the order while the European Court considers the claim.

But Ahmad’s hopes were crushed when Polish border guards ignored the court’s order and put him on a train back to Belarus that same day. Ahmad tried again the next day with the court order in his hand. To no avail. So Ahmad remains in Belarus, a country that does not have a functioning asylum system and where he is not safe from his persecutors back home in Chechnya due to the open border between Russia and Belarus.

And he’s not the only one. Polish border guards routinely return asylum seekers from North Caucasus and Central Asia at the Terespol border station, after concluding they are economic migrants based on no more than rudimentary, two- to three-minute pre-screening interviews conducted in front of other asylum seekers. But instead of border guards, it’s Poland’s asylum authority, the Office of Foreigners, which should be examining their asylum claims. Polish border guards are certainly not hearing what I heard from asylum seekers, who told detailed stories of political persecution, blood feuds, torture, and enforced disappearances.

The Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs claims border guards did not ignore the order concerning Ahmad, arguing that the area where pre-screening interviews are conducted is not in Polish territory. But claims of “rights-free zones” for asylum processing in other European countries have been rejected by the European Court in the past.

Polish authorities have an obligation to allow anyone at their ports of entry to claim asylum. And as Poland is a party to the European Convention of Human Rights, Polish authorities are obliged to respect the court’s emergency orders, rather than creating bogus excuses to violate the human rights of Ahmad and many others like him. 

Author: Human Rights Watch
Posted: January 1, 1970, 12:00 am

Summary

Russia will host the next FIFA World Cup, from June 14 to July 15, 2018, just over four years after hosting the 2014 Winter Olympic Games in Sochi. Mega-sporting events are a source of national pride for the Russian government, and it invests heavily in their success. Tens of thousands of workers are building the stadiums and infrastructure necessary for hosting of the World Cup. These workers often face exploitation, poor working conditions, and little recourse for abuses. These are long-standing issues that have been well-documented by Human Rights Watch and others before Russia was selected to host the World Cup. Yet the Russian government has not done enough to monitor and curb abusive practices in the construction sector and hold employers accountable.

The world’s top 32 football teams competing in the 2018 World Cup will play matches organized in 12 stadiums in 11 cities in Russia: Moscow (two stadiums), St. Petersburg, Ekaterinburg, Sochi, Kaliningrad, Saransk, Samara, Rostov-on-Don, Volgograd, Kazan, and Nizhnii Novgorod. To host the World Cup, Russia has built or renovated 10 stadiums and built infrastructure necessary to accommodate the influx of tens of thousands of players, coaches, families, media and others, and hundreds of thousands of fans.

For the first time ever, the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), the international governing body of association football, has instituted, together with the Russian officials responsible for the World Cup, a program to monitor labor conditions on World Cup stadium sites. FIFA has told Human Rights Watch that monitors conducted 58 inspections between mid-2016 and June 2017. Additional joint monitoring involving FIFA, Russian officials, and trade unions began in August 2016 and is underway.

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However, Human Rights Watch’s investigation suggests that FIFA’s existing labor monitoring system may not be effective. In response to Human Rights Watch’s inquiry, FIFA sent a letter to Human Rights Watch providing details about the methodology, frequency and other technical aspects of its monitoring program. The letter said that during the course of the monitoring there had been reductions in “inconsistencies and incompliances.” The letter provided two examples in which FIFA said it resolved specific issues revealed by the monitoring process. Beyond these two examples, the letter did not provide any substantive details about the results of the monitoring, such as the specific types of violations, where violations took place, or if or how violations were remedied and the results of those remedial actions, or any other relevant information. FIFA has not otherwise disclosed or made such information publicly available. In addition, FIFA’s program is limited. It began well after much of the World Cup construction was underway, covers only stadiums and no other World Cup infrastructure, and with respect to methodology, employers are notified in advance of any inspections.

Human Rights Watch visited seven World Cup stadium sites in 2016 and 2017. We documented the exploitation of construction workers, including: non-payment of wages; three- to four-month delays in payment of wages; workers required to work outdoors in dangerously cold temperatures well below freezing; and a failure to provide work contracts and other documentation required for legal employment. Building and Wood Workers’ International, a global trade union, reported 17 worker deaths on World Cup stadium sites.

The St. Petersburg Stadium, a 2017 Confederations Cup and 2018 World Cup venue in St. Petersburg, Russia, under construction in July 2016

© 2017 Semyon Simonov for Human Rights Watch

During its research, Human Rights Watch consistently encountered an atmosphere of intimidation, suspicion, and secrecy when trying to document conditions for workers on World Cup sites. In the most serious case, local police detained a Human Rights Watch research consultant as he tried to speak to workers outside of the Volgograd Arena. Authorities addressed the representative by name, which suggests that he was under surveillance.

Security officers outside of the St. Petersburg Stadium urged workers not to speak with Human Rights Watch’s representative. Numerous workers declined to be interviewed or insisted on anonymity out of fear of retaliation from their employers, who had threatened them with dismissal or deportation for discussing worksite concerns.

Workers told Human Rights Watch they face retaliation or threats of retaliation for raising concerns about labor conditions. Hundreds of workers at World Cup sites have organized strikes to protest abusive labor practices from 2015 to 2017. In Rostov-on-Don, the authorities arrested and deported dozens of migrant workers from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan who had participated in strikes, after allegedly finding irregularities in their employer-provided contracts.

The Volgograd Arena, a 2018 World Cup venue in Volgograd, Russia, under construction in April 2017. 

© 2017 Semyon Simonov for Human Rights Watch

Human Rights Watch interviewed Russian nationals, including some who had migrated internally for jobs in World Cup construction, as well as migrant workers from other countries. During research in 2009 to 2012, Human Rights Watch documented serious abuses of migrant workers on the Fisht Stadium in Sochi, built for the 2014 Winter Olympic Games, and to be used also for the 2018 World Cup.

The types of exploitation and abuse of workers described in this report are pervasive in Russia’s construction industry. Human Rights Watch extensively documented the same types of abuses during Russia’s preparations for the Sochi 2014 Winter Olympics, and raised these concerns with the International Olympic Committee and the Russian authorities for nearly five years. A large-scale Russian government labor inspection into workers’ rights on Olympic construction sites, undertaken after substantial pressure, two months before the Games, uncovered over US$8.3 million in unpaid wages to workers on Sochi sites. It remains unclear how many of those workers ever recovered the wages owed to them for their contribution to Russia’s mega sports projects.

International and Russian media, as well as trade unions, have also documented serious concerns on World Cup sites, including deaths and serious injuries. They have also documented the same labor concerns identified in this report regarding non-payment of wages, retaliation against workers who complain, and the failure to provide written employment contracts.

The lack of employment contracts leaves workers vulnerable to exploitation and leaves them with little legal recourse: any such worker will have difficulty proving employment relations before a court, and therefore difficulty obtaining redress for abuse. Without a written employment contract, migrant workers’ employment status is irregular, putting them at risk of deportation and often making them reluctant to seek assistance from the authorities in the event of abuse.

Despite worker strikes, media and trade union reports of worker deaths, serious injuries and other concerns on World Cup construction sites, the FIFA leadership has consistently praised the Russian government’s preparations in public statements and has not spoken out about human rights concerns related to World Cup construction in Russia, except in response to media inquiries.

Human Rights Watch calls on the Russian government to put an end to the widespread worker rights violations in the construction sector, through rigorous inspections and accountability for employers who exploit and abuse workers. A high-level public message of zero tolerance for worker abuse would send a strong message through the industry. The authorities should also refrain from punishing migrant workers, including through deportations, for the unscrupulous practices of employers. The authorities should inform workers of their rights, including effective mechanisms to file complaints without retaliation.

Human Rights Watch urges FIFA to increase significantly transparency about all aspects of the new labor conditions monitoring program, in order to ensure credibility, accountability, and meaningful labor rights improvements. Labor standards monitoring should not be limited to stadiums, but also include other World Cup-related construction, such as accommodation, communications, and transportation infrastructure. Human Rights Watch also calls on FIFA officials, including FIFA President Gianni Infantino, to make clear in public statements and in meetings with Russian officials, the importance of worker protections, the freedom for independent monitors and journalists to report on the World Cup without fear of retaliation, and other core human rights protections in this final year before the World Cup matches begin in Russia. 

Recommendations

To the Russian Government

  • Rigorously investigate and prosecute employers who deny workers legal employment contracts, withhold wages, force employees to work long hours without overtime pay, deny days off, or commit other violations of Russian law.
  • Establish accessible, effective complaint mechanisms, and rigorously investigate complaints of abuse made by migrant workers, irrespective of a migrant worker’s contractual status or migration status.
  • Ensure the capacity of the Russian Work and Employment Service “Rostrud” inspectors to investigate labor law violations by:
    • Ensuring a sufficient number of inspectors responsible for monitoring private sector labor practices;
    • Ensuring that confidential worker interviews are part of routine inspections;
    • Increasing the number of routine periodic spot inspections;
    • Instructing inspectors to check, whether workers hold their passports and a copy of their employment contract, as required by labor law;
    • Expanding the authority of Rostrud to fully investigate complaints of any labor law violations, including wage violations, even in cases in which there is no employment contract;
  • Cooperate with countries from which migrant workers come to work in Russia to facilitate prosecutions and investigations of abusive employers in Russia, including by facilitating the participation in the investigation of complaints, and any legal proceedings, of victims who have already returned home.
  • Inform and educate migrant construction workers arriving in Russia of their rights under Russian law, including avenues for filing complaints. To the greatest extent possible, written materials should be available in the languages of the migrant workers, as well as in Russian.

To FIFA

With respect to World Cup 2018 in Russia

  • Demonstrate that worker protections and other human rights protections are a top priority for FIFA including by making public statements to that effect in the final year of preparation for World Cup 2018;
  • Ensure that the workplace monitoring program includes regular unannounced inspections; private, confidential interviews with workers of different nationalities, and job specializations; experts in documenting labor rights violations, including through interviews with workers; staff trained in languages spoken by migrant workers; and other resources and best practices to ensure rigorous monitoring;
  • Ensure that monitoring of labor conditions ahead of World Cup 2018 includes monitoring not only of stadiums but of construction of other infrastructure underway for hosting the World Cup;
  • Oversee, together with the Russian authorities, a thorough and transparent investigation into the participation of North Korean workers on the St. Petersburg Stadium, as reported by international media and acknowledged by FIFA, including the current fate and whereabouts of the workers;
  • Increase transparency of FIFA’s implementation of its human rights commitments including by publishing, without delay:
    • Full information on labor disputes, workplace injuries, and deaths on construction sites for all venues for the 2018 World Cup and any actions by FIFA and the Russian government taken in response to these issues;
    • Details of the workplace monitoring program, including, in addition to technical information about the monitoring system, detailed findings of the inspections, remedies or other actions taken, and the concrete results of the actions taken.
  • Proactively consult on an ongoing basis with international and Russian stakeholders ahead of World Cup 2018.

With respect to FIFA’s general human rights commitments

  • Fully implement without delay the recommendations set out in the April 2016 report to FIFA prepared by John Ruggie, “For the Game. For the World: FIFA and Human Rights,” including by:
    • Incorporating human rights in criteria for evaluating bids to host tournaments and make them a substantive factor in host selection;
    • Significantly increasing transparency and reporting of implementation of FIFA’s human rights commitments. Transparency is essential to credibility, accountability, sustainability, and meaningful change;
    • Increasing consultation with key stakeholders, including establishing an ongoing, proactive dialogue with representatives of civil society, trade unions, academia and other experts with insight into FIFA’s human rights risks.
  • Finance a public awareness campaign using mainstream media to raise consciousness about labor exploitation, and to educate companies, countries, and football fans to these issues.

Methodology

A consultant for Human Rights Watch interviewed 42 Russian and migrant workers engaged in construction at World Cup 2018 sites in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Kaliningrad in July 2016; in Rostov-on-Don in September and October 2016; in Sochi in June 2016; and in Ekaterinburg in January 2017. Human Rights Watch also sought to interview workers in Volgograd, but faced interference from authorities, as described below. Interviewees included local workers residing in World Cup host cities; workers from different cities in Russia migrating internally for World Cup construction work; and migrant workers from Belarus, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Ukraine.

In several research trips from 2009 to 2012, Human Rights Watch also documented exploitation of migrant workers employed on the Fisht Stadium in Sochi, built ahead of the 2014 Winter Olympics, and to be used as a 2018 World Cup venue.

Interviewees in all cities were identified at random by approaching workers near the World Cup stadium sites and requesting an interview. All interviews with workers were conducted in Russian. Workers were told the purpose of the interview and its voluntary nature. Participants gave oral informed consent to participate and were assured anonymity. Some interviews were conducted in small groups of workers.

Many workers expressed fear of retaliation from their employers or authorities for speaking out about abuses. The names of interviewees have been changed to protect their privacy, confidentiality, and safety. Human Rights Watch did not seek to access any World Cup stadiums or other venues.

Human Rights Watch faced significant obstacles in St. Petersburg and Volgograd to conduct the research for this report. State officials in Volgograd and private security officers in St. Petersburg interfered when Human Rights Watch’s research consultant attempted to interview workers near the World Cup sites in those cities, as described in more detail below. The interference by state authorities in Volgograd and serious security threats posed by that interference in April 2017 forced Human Rights Watch to stop our research with workers in Volgograd and in other World Cup cities, out of concern that such incidents would recur. 

Human Rights Watch’s consultant sent a letter in October 2016 to the Krasnodar regional labor inspectorate and the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs of Krasnodar Krai, both agencies responsible for labor conditions in Sochi, proposing to conduct a joint inspection of workers working at the Fisht Stadium. The Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs of Krasnodar Krai responded, saying that they have staff competent in labor monitoring; had not received information of labor violations on the Fisht Stadium; requesting information regarding any violations; and stating that the ministry had informed the general contractor that it had received information about monitoring labor code compliance. Neither agency agreed to conduct joint monitoring.

On May 3, 2017, Human Rights Watch sent a letter to FIFA President Gianni Infantino, regarding the concerns documented in this report, including the security threats against the Human Rights Watch research consultant, and asking for information about FIFA’s monitoring of workers’ rights on World Cup sites. FIFA officials responded by email, asking for additional information. Human Rights Watch provided this information on May 23, 2017. FIFA responded in writing to Human Rights Watch’s May 3 letter on June 8, 2017. The correspondence between Human Rights Watch and FIFA can be found at https://www.hrw.org/node/304757/.

I. Background

Russia as host of FIFA World Cup 2018

In a close and controversial decision, the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) awarded the 2018 World Cup to Russia on December 2, 2010.[1] The closed-door vote was met with widespread criticism amidst allegations of corruption by both FIFA and Russia in the bidding process.[2] The decision marked the first time that the World Cup, which takes place every four years, will be held in Russia. Football matches involving a total of 32 teams will take place from June 14 to July 15, 2018, in 11 host cities—Moscow, St. Petersburg, Kazan, Volgograd, Rostov-on-Don, Sochi, Nizhnii Novgorod, Kaliningrad, Ekaterinburg, Saransk, and Samara. Prior to hosting the World Cup, Russia hosts the quadrennial FIFA-organized Confederations Cup in June and July 2017.[3]

The Kaliningrad Stadium, a 2018 World Cup venue, in Kaliningrad, Russia, under construction in July 2016. 

© 2017 Semyon Simonov for Human Rights Watch

The 12 stadiums in these cities are at various stages of construction in the lead up to the World Cup. As of April 2017, the Moscow (Spartak), Kazan, St. Petersburg, and Sochi stadiums are open for the Confederations Cup matches.[4] In addition, the government is building new airport complexes and improving infrastructure, such as airports, hotels,roads, and transportation in several World Cup host cities.[5] The total cost of preparations for World Cup 2018 had reached 643,550,000 rubles (US$11.4 billion) by May 10, 2017.[6]

Persistent labor abuses in Russia’s construction industry

Exploitation and abuse of workers are pervasive problems in Russia’s construction industry. In a February 2013 report, Human Rights Watch extensively documented exploitation of migrant workers during Russia’s preparations for the Sochi 2014 Winter Olympics.[7] Human Rights Watch also documented abuses against migrant construction workers in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Ekaterinburg, and other cities, in a 2009 report.[8]

The International Olympic Committee and Russian government took little action to investigate and remedy the widely documented problems of non-payment of wages, lack of contracts, and the like until the final months before the February 2014 games. The Russian labor inspectorate exposed that companies engaged in Sochi Olympic construction had failed to pay their employees a total of 277 million rubles (US$8.34 million).[9] The Russian authorities’ investigation was an important measure, but came too late to benefit many workers who had faced similar abuses since the Olympic preparations had begun five years earlier.[10]

Workers and the 2018 World Cup

New construction and infrastructure improvements in World Cup host cities have drawn workers from across Russia and migrant workers from numerous countries. The total number of workers engaged in FIFA World Cup construction is difficult to determine, and neither FIFA nor the Russian government have published official statistics on this, but it is likely to be in the tens of thousands. International and Russian media have written about serious concerns about exploitation of workers, worker deaths, and other concerns on World Cup sites.[11]

In March 2017 Josimar, a Norwegian magazine about football, published a detailed article about North Korean workers including those working at the St. Petersburg Stadium. According to The Guardian, following a letter from four Scandinavian football associations about the allegations in the article, FIFA President Gianni Infantino responded with a letter acknowledging the presence of workers from North Korea and poor working conditions and claiming that FIFA and the Russian authorities required the stadium’s general contractor to rectify the concerns.”

FIFA told Human Rights Watch that according to its monitoring, as of December 2016, no North Korean workers are working on the St. Petersburg Stadium and found no evidence of North Korean workers currently on other sites. It is not clear where the workers previously employed on the stadium are, what specific remedies, if any, were taken by FIFA, the Russian government or the contractor to address the allegations of abuse.[12] 

Deaths and serious injuries

The international trade union Building and Wood Workers’ International (BWI) and the Russian media have published numerous reports about deaths and serious injuries on World Cup sites, including in Volgograd and St. Petersburg.[13] In October 2016, in response to worker deaths at the St. Petersburg Stadium in 2015 and 2016, Ambet Yuson, BWI’s general secretary stated, “We are increasingly concerned by the number of fatal accidents at the site and believe that these tragedies can be averted if safety and health conditions are strictly enforced.”[14] According to BWI, there have been at least 17 deaths on World Cup stadiums.[15]

Strikes and other protest actions

Workers on several World Cup sites, including on the Luzhniki Stadium in Moscow, the Nizhnii Novgorod Stadium, the Rostov Arena, and the Kaliningrad Stadium, have staged strikes to protest non-payment of wages and other labor violations, according to Russian media reports and BWI.[16] For example, workers have staged large strikes at the Rostov Arena in Rostov-on-Don, with several hundred workers refusing to work in mid-April 2017, due to five-month delays in wage payments.[17] In May 2016, approximately 700 construction workers at the Rostov Arena protested non-payment of wages.[18]

Workers on the Rostov Arena, a 2018 World Cup venue under construction in Rostov-on-Don, Russia, in September 2016. 

© 2017 Semyon Simonov for Human Rights Watch

Construction workers in Kaliningrad organized a strike in July 2016, also in response to non-payment of wages.[19] Some of the workers involved in the strike filed a complaint with the prosecutor’s office, which opened an investigation. Other workers from the same company filed a similar complaint the month before.[20] In conjunction with a criminal investigation that followed the complaints, in April 2017, authorities arrested the director of the company, who stands accused of non-payment of 901,000 rubles (US$15,600) in wages to stadium construction workers. The director had fled to another region of Russia fearing prosecution.[21] As of this writing it is unclear if the workers have been paid.

II. Exploitation of Workers

Human Rights Watch documented exploitation of workers engaged in World Cup construction in six cities. Abuses included non-provision of contracts and other documentation required for legal employment; non-payment of wages; delays in payment of wages, including for up to five months; employer retaliation against workers who protested non-payment of wages; and employers requiring workers to work outdoors in temperatures as cold as minus 25 degrees Celsius without sufficient breaks to warm up.  

Most of the workers on World Cup sites interviewed by Human Rights Watch are low-skilled workers, many of whom have migrated from other cities in Russia or from other countries to engage in construction work. They are vulnerable to abuse and exploitation and not well-positioned to demand written employment contracts or other protections, in the way that workers in other sectors may be. The refusal by construction employers to provide written employment contracts to workers is sufficiently persistent in the sector that workers whose employer refuses to provide a contract may see little reason to seek out an alternative employer in the hopes of obtaining a contract.

Failure to provide employment contracts

Some workers, both Russian nationals and migrants, interviewed by Human Rights Watch stated that employers did not provide them with a written employment contract (trudovoi dogovor) or service contract (grazhdansko-pravovoi dogovor) when they began work, as required under Russian law.[22] Some received a contract only after several months; others never received them. In some cases, the way in which the contracts were prepared appeared inconsistent with Russian labor law requirements, such as stating only a partial sum of wages, while the remainder of the wages were to be paid in cash. This type of payment structure, though unlawful, is common in Russia in certain sectors and, when it occurs, is typically established by the employer as a condition of employment.

Workers on the roof of the Luzhniki Stadium, a 2018 World Cup venue, in Moscow, Russia in July 2016. 

© 2017 Semyon Simonov for Human Rights Watch

Workers without written employment contracts, or with employment contracts that are not consistent with Russian law, can be particularly vulnerable to exploitation as they have little recourse in the event of a dispute with their employer. Migrant workers working without a written employment contract are at risk of deportation for violations of migration law.[23]

Nuradil, 40, from Kyrgyzstan working on the Luzhniki Stadium in Moscow, told Human Rights Watch, “I don’t have a contract. … The employer just gave us a pass [for the construction site], and said ‘Go, work!’ They don’t want to prepare any official documents. I don’t know why.”[24] According to Mikhail, a Russian worker from Moscow who had just started working on the Luzhniki Stadium at the time of the interview with Human Rights Watch, “They didn’t give us an employment contract. It’s the same for others. They promised to pay 40,000 rubles (US$708) per month.”[25]

Four workers from Russia working on the Kaliningrad Stadium said that they received written employment contracts in July 2016, after working on the stadium for between five to six months. The contracts they did receive were not prepared legally, with the signature and stamp of the employer only on the final page of the contract, rather than on each page, as required by law, to confirm the employer’s commitment to the obligations regarding payment or other obligations. The workers received less than half of the wages promised to them, as detailed below.[26]

Some workers interviewed by Human Rights Watch on the Rostov Arena stated that their employer signed written contracts with them, gave them copies of the contract, and paid them regularly between 33,000 and 40,000 rubles (US$615 and $703) per month. However, as required by the employer, the contracts listed an official payment of 12,000 rubles ($211), and the remainder of the wages were made in cash, a typical, but illegal, practice in many sectors in Russia.[27] In the event of a labor dispute, the employer would only be liable for the payment specified in the contract. 

Because this formulation of contracts is common among employers in construction and other sectors in Russia, workers may feel that their only option is to accept such a contract and that demanding a contract with the full wage included would result in not being hired.

Workers building the Rostov Arena, a 2018 World Cup venue in Rostov-on-Don, Russia, in September 2016.

© 2017 Semyon Simonov for Human Rights Watch

Workers reported seeing or signing documents that they believed to be employment contracts, but employers did not provide them with copies, as required by law. For example, Pavel, 40, a welder from Chelyabinsk, a city in western Siberia, had worked at the St. Petersburg Stadium for three months when Human Rights Watch interviewed him in July 2016. He said, “When they hired me, they prepared some kinds of papers, maybe even an employment contract, but they didn’t give me a copy.” Pavel got paid part of the wages the employer promised him during his first month of work only and nothing for the other two months.[28] Sergei, a worker from Belarus employed in a brigade of workers from Belarus and Serbia also working on the St. Petersburg Stadium, told Human Rights Watch, “I saw some kind of contract. Someone [from the employer’s side] signed it, but I didn’t receive a copy.”[29]

Wage-related abuses

Numerous workers interviewed by Human Rights Watch reported non-payment of wages or serious delays in wages. Many of these workers did not have written employment contracts, as employers would only hire them based on an oral agreement. However, even the existence of a written employment contract did not guarantee the employer would respect the contract’s terms regarding wages. Because of the problems with contracts, as detailed above, in the event of non-payment of wages, many workers felt that their only option was to quit their jobs, either without any payment of wages or having received much less than employers promised.

Human Rights Watch also spoke with workers who said they received their full wages on a regular basis without problem.

Russian law requires employers to pay workers a minimum wage at least twice per month.[30] Under the Russian criminal code it is a crime, punishable by fines as well as a possible prison term, to withhold any portion of wages for over three months or to withhold wages altogether for more than two months.[31]

In Rostov-on-Don, several workers on the Rostov Arena stated that they received their wages with serious delays or did not receive their wages at all. Some said that they had not been paid for two or three months.[32] For example, one worker from Uzbekistan said, “There are 500 of us [working for one company]. We have not received wages for three months now.”[33] Umid, 63, also from Uzbekistan working on a different brigade said, “I was hired in July. They prepared the employment contract only in August. I have yet to be paid at all.”[34]

Workers from Russia, who worked together in yet another brigade on the Rostov Arena, had the same experience. One of them stated that the employer “pays wages in cash and pays with a delay of three months. Not long ago there was a strike because the employer hadn’t paid anyone for five months.”[35] Media reports also stated how in April 2017 on the Rostov Arena site 200 to 300 workers primarily from Central Asia organized a strike to protest non-payment of wages for five months.[36] Russian authorities responded and the strike concluded with a “compromise” between company officials and workers, although the details of this compromise were not clear in media reports on the incident.[37]

Also in Rostov-on-Don, several construction workers whom Human Rights Watch interviewed reported that they had signed employment contracts that listed one sum as wages, but that the employer promised a higher sum as their full wages, with the difference paid in cash. This is a common practice among employers in Russia but leaves workers vulnerable in the event of a dispute. In some cases, employers paid only part of the promised sum, either only the official wages or less than the official wages. In other cases, employers paid the full payment, both the official wages and the cash.  

For example, when Human Rights Watch spoke with Nuriddin, from Uzbekistan, at the end of September 2016, he explained: “I have been working here for eight months for 33,000 rubles (US$585) per month,” as agreed with the employer. “In the [employment] contract it states that the wages are 12,000 rubles (US$212). Right now there is a delay of two months. I haven’t been paid at all for July and August,” he said.[38] Other workers from the Rostov Arena told Human Rights Watch they had the same payment arrangement and problems with receiving promised wages.[39] Nearly four weeks after Human Rights Watch’s interviews in Rostov-on-Don, one of the workers interviewed called Human Rights Watch saying that the employer had not paid him and others working in his brigade their full wages in four months. The employer had paid them only the official sum of 12,000 rubles (US$212) listed in the employment contract and owed them another 28,000 rubles (US$496) the employer promised to pay in cash.[40] Human Rights Watch does not know if these workers ever received their wages.

As noted above, some workers interviewed by Human Rights Watch on the Rostov Arena stated that they had contracts and were paid regularly between 33,000 and 40,000 rubles (US$615 and $703) per month. These contracts also listed an official payment of 12,000 rubles ($212), and the remainder of the payment was made in cash.[41]

Workers on other stadiums reported being paid less than their employers had promised. Kirill, who began working on the Kaliningrad Stadium in March 2016, told Human Rights Watch, “I haven’t received my full wages from April to July. In May they gave me 12,000 rubles (US$212) and in June 15,000 rubles. They should pay 30,000 a month. There was no contract… I only received it now [in July]” As described below, when Kirill tried to protest the non-payment in wages, the employer retaliated against him.[42] Roman, working on the same stadium, reported receiving wages only with serious delays. “I am an excavator driver. I receive my wages but with a delay of one to two months.”[43] Sergei, from Belarus, mentioned above, said that he and the other workers in his brigade, from Belarus and Serbia, had worked on the St. Petersburg Stadium for three months, but the employer paid them only once. He said that he had signed what he believed to be an employment contract, but that the employer did not give him a copy.[44]

One worker from Kyrgyzstan working on the Luzhniki Stadium reported to Human Rights Watch, “They promise to pay you one thing, but actually pay a different sum. Less. It isn’t clear to us how they add it up. They haven’t prepared any [contracts] for us.”[45] Yaroslav, a 25-year-old resident of St. Petersburg, who performed work at heights on the St. Petersburg Stadium in a brigade of six men, said that one employer he worked with for three months from August to October 2015 cheated him of wages he believed he had earned. “They promised to pay twice per month…. The wages were calculated based on the volume of completed work. The work I completed each day was worth about 6,000 to 7,000 rubles (US$106 to 124), but they paid me just 5,000 rubles (US$88) once every two weeks.”[46] Aibek, a worker from Kyrgyzstan who collected garbage and performed other low-skill jobs on the Luzhniki Stadium in Moscow said, “They [the employer] pay whenever they want, however they want.” He did not have a contract.[47]

For many workers, the only option in the event of non-payment of wages is to quit. For example, Egor, a Russian worker on the Kaliningrad Stadium, explained that most workers in his brigade of 60 men left without receiving their wages of several months.

When the conversation turned to payment of wages, they [the employer] started [arbitrarily] fining everyone, 8,000 rubles [US$144] for taking too long a break, things like that…. Now there are only 11 [in the brigade]. People left because they didn’t get paid. We’re the only ones who stayed. We’re waiting to see what they can pay us.[48]

Pavel from Chelyabinsk, Russia, who worked on the St. Petersburg Stadium, without being given a contract, as described above, said he received only part of the wages promised to him during the first month, and no more payments after that. He chose to quit after working for three months.[49]

Not all workers interviewed by Human Rights Watch reported problems with wages. Among those who received their wages in a timely manner were workers with contracts and workers without contracts. For example, two workers from Kyrgyzstan, both about 40, working in low-skilled jobs on the Luzhniki Stadium, said that they were paid about 1,000-2,000 rubles (US$18 to $35) daily, at the end of the working day. Neither man had a written employment contract.[50] Two workers who worked on the Ekaterinburg Arena reported that they had employment contracts and were paid regularly twice a month, according to the terms of the contract.[51] Human Rights Watch did not interview other workers in Ekaterinburg. 

Working in extreme cold

Human Rights Watch saw workers engaged in construction at the Ekaterinburg Arena in January 2017, when temperatures were between minus 25 and minus 30 degrees Celsius. The two workers we interviewed at the stadium confirmed that employers require them to work when temperatures are well below freezing, without sufficient breaks for them to warm themselves. According to Kadom, from Tajikistan, “I have a brigade of 20 men. I don’t know at what temperature it’s prohibited to work. The employer simply says when it’s not allowed and we don’t go to work.”[52] Another worker on the stadium said, “We work even in minus 25 degrees Celsius, but sometimes the employer just says, ‘Today we aren’t working.’”[53]

The Ekaterinburg Arena, a World Cup 2018 venue, in Ekaterinburg, Russia, under construction in January 2017. 

© 2017 Semyon Simonov for Human Rights Watch

Russian law requires employers with employees working in cold temperatures to do a special assessment of conditions to establish what protections are required for workers to remain safe. Protections include, among other things, limits on working hours as well as frequency and duration of breaks. The workers interviewed by Human Rights Watch stated that they only received one break indoors for lunch during a nine-hour working day.[54] 

The ILO notes that work in cold temperatures can lead to systemic or localized cold injuries as well as impaired physical work capacity, reduced manual and muscular performance, as well as reduced reaction times and cognition, placing workers in high-risk jobs such as construction at increased risk. The ILO recommends employers undertake complex assessments and precautions to address the risks of working in such temperatures: “Where the assessment shows that the workers may be at risk from exposure to cold, the employers should, if practicable, eliminate the need for work in cold conditions (for example by rescheduling work to be performed in a warmer season…).” Employers are also expected to ensure adequate warm and dry clothing, adequate water and food, and “implement work-rest cycles with warm shelters for recovery.” The ILO also notes that “a residual risk of hypothermia is unavoidable, even after all the control measures have been taken, and particularly below –12 °C,” and requires a range of special measures.[55]

Human Rights Watch was not able to document the protections afforded to workers on the Ekaterinburg Arena or any other World Cup stadiums where workers worked in cold temperatures. As far as Human Rights Watch is aware, the Russian government and FIFA have also not made public the precautions for cold weather on 2018 World Cup stadiums.

III. Intimidation and Retaliation

During its research, Human Rights Watch frequently encountered, and workers consistently reported, an atmosphere of control, suspicion, and intimidation regarding reporting of labor concerns on World Cup sites in Russia. Some workers reported threats or experienced retaliation for raising concerns about labor conditions or for actively participating in strikes. Human Rights Watch’s research consultant was subjected to official surveillance as well as police detention in Volgograd.

Intimidation and retaliation against workers

In Kaliningrad, workers told Human Rights Watch that in September 2015, they tried to approach a delegation which included FIFA and Russian officials, to raise concerns about wage delays. Security guards surrounded the delegation and refused to allow the workers to get near them to speak. According to the workers, some migrant workers working at the site were forced to remain in their dormitories near the site, during the delegation’s visit. The workers did not indicate who ordered those workers to remain there.[56] According to media reports, FIFA conducted an operational visit to the Kaliningrad Stadium in September 2015.[57]

Construction workers on stadiums in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Kaliningrad, and Rostov-on-Don reported reluctance to disclose labor concerns in interviews with Human Rights Watch, out of fear of retaliation on the part of employers. One worker told Human Rights Watch, “The employers threaten us, that if we complain, that they will fire us without any payment at all and maybe even call in the police.”[58] A worker on the Kaliningrad Stadium said, “Someone makes a fuss [about wages], they’ll send him home.”[59]

Russian media reported that Rostov-on-Don authorities arrested and deported thirty migrant construction workers on the Rostov Arena who had complained about wage delays. According to the reports, the workers were not paid before their deportations. [60]  Workers on the Rostov Arena had gone on strikes in May 2016 and April 2017.[61] Human Rights Watch documented detentions and deportations of migrant workers in Sochi ahead of the 2014 Winter Olympic Games.[62]

Kirill, a Russian citizen who worked on the Kaliningrad Stadium and had not received his full wages for four months, as described above, said he called his employer’s office to say that he would not continue to work if he was not getting paid. When he came to the construction site the next day to collect his personal work gear, his site pass had been terminated.[63] Human Rights Watch interviewed Kirill the day he was locked out of the site, and we do not know if he later received the wages owed to him.

Intimidation and detention of a Human Rights Watch researcher

On April 16, 2017, police detained Human Rights Watch’s research consultant as he attempted to speak to workers outside of the Volgograd Arena. When the authorities approached him they addressed him by name, suggesting he had been under surveillance. They held him for three hours in a police station, where they questioned him about his work, threatened him by saying that they had information about his possible involvement in criminal acts, and accused him of seeking to “disrupt the World Cup.” The authorities released the Human Rights Watch research consultant without charge but have yet to produce concrete results from an inquiry opened into the incident, based on a complaint the consultant filed.

Private security officers outside the St. Petersburg Stadium interfered with Human Rights Watch’s interviews with workers at the stadium in July 2016. In the presence of Human Rights Watch’s consultant, security officers told workers that they should not discuss problems on the construction site with anyone.

IV. FIFA and Human Rights

FIFA’s growing recognition of its human rights responsibilities

FIFA has taken steps to begin to improve human rights protections in conjunction with hosting of World Cup events. FIFA announced in May 2016 that human rights requirements would be part of the consultation and bid process phases of the selection process for the 2026 World Cup. Russia, the 2018 World Cup host, and Qatar, the 2022 host, were not subject to human rights requirements.[64]

In December 2015, FIFA asked John Ruggie, author of the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (see below), to develop recommendations on what it means in practice for FIFA to embed respect for human rights across its global operations. The report describes the relevant human rights context for FIFA, and presents 25 detailed recommendations.[65] Ruggie noted, among other things, that, “FIFA needs stronger internal systems to address the increasingly predictable human rights risks associated with its business” and “to translate its commitment to respect human rights, included in its new Statutes, into its daily actions and decisions.”[66]

FIFA’s revised statutes, published in April 2016, state: “FIFA is committed to respecting all internationally recognised human rights and shall strive to promote the protection of these rights.”[67] In September 2016, FIFA created and staffed a new post—a Human Rights Manager—to coordinate and develop its human rights-related work.[68] In March 2017, FIFA established an independent Human Rights Advisory Board, composed of experts from the UN, trade unions, civil society, and business, to provide advice and report on FIFA’s implementation of its human rights commitments.[69]

FIFA leaders have called “Integration of human rights” as one of the central planks in the “Implementation of Governance Reforms,” and have spotlighted their embrace of human rights as part of the reform package “FIFA 2.0”[70]  FIFA Secretary General Fatma Samoura said the addition of human rights to the FIFA Statutes “must be translated into tangible measures,” including by “creating policies and processes and integrating human rights into everything that we do.”[71] On June 8, 2017, FIFA published its Human Rights Policy and FIFA Activity Update report on Human Rights. Human Rights Watch was not able to include discussion of these publications before this report went to publication.[72] 

Workers’ rights and World Cup 2018

With respect to the 2018 World Cup, in July 2015, FIFA and the Russian Local Organizing Committee (LOC), announced a “Sustainability Strategy for the 2018 FIFA World Cup.” The strategy’s stated goal is to help ensure “the 2018 FIFA World Cup lessens the negative and enhances the positive impacts of the event on people, the economy and the environment.” Regarding the strategy, LOC President Alexey Sorokin stated that in organizing the World Cup in Russia, “We will do our utmost to leave an unprecedented legacy of sustainability as well as social and human development.” Among the key issues identified in the sustainability strategy are decent work and capacity building, including to “promote decent working conditions for FWC [FIFA World Cup] stadium construction workers.” [73]

Although work on some World Cup stadiums had begun many years earlier, in May 2016, FIFA announced that for the first time, it was organizing a system to monitor labor conditions at stadiums being built or renovated for World Cup 2018. According to FIFA, the program, underway since April 2016, involves two-day quarterly visits to each World Cup stadium by the Klinsky Institute of Labor Protection and Working Conditions, an auditing organization, to examine “rights at work, working conditions, health and safety, and housing conditions and catering.”[74] All visits are announced in advance. According to FIFA, the monitoring evaluates labor conditions with respect to Russian legislation, International Labor Organization (ILO) conventions, and “FIFA requirements,” but FIFA does not enumerate what its own requirements are in the letter.[75] 

FIFA and the LOC describe the Klinsky, Institute, hired by the Russian LOC, as “an independent third party,”[76] The Klinsky Institute was contracted by the Sochi 2014 Russian Organizing Committee for services related to labor protections for Sochi 2014 Organizing Committee staff, and also serves as a contractor to numerous Russian federal agencies, energy, and manufacturing concerns, and multinational companies operating in Russia.[77]

Among the concerns identified during the first round of inspections were shortcomings in “provision of protective equipment, compliance with legal requirements to labour agreements… [and] working and non-working hours regulations.” [78] According to FIFA, monitoring experts prepared an internal report for each company with key findings and recommendations. The program has also involved workshops on labor issues.[79]  

In August 2016, FIFA, the LOC, the Building and Wood Workers’ International (BWI) trade union and the Russian Construction Workers Union (RBWU) signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for joint monitoring.[80] RBWU proposed the MOU in early 2016.[81] Under this MOU, the parties monitor a World Cup stadium every three months.[82]

According to FIFA, as of June 2017, under its monitoring program, a total of 58 visits have been carried out, with 10 companies operating on each stadium reviewed at each visit.[83] Typically, any major construction site in Russia has hundreds of sub-contractors. FIFA’s letter states that the working conditions of “an average of 8,984 workers” were reviewed each quarter. The FIFA letter states that “the average number of inconsistences and incompliances found per monitoring visit has been reduced by 72 percent” from the first visits to the fifth round of visits, and an 80 percent reduction from the fourth and fifth rounds of visits.[84] Neither FIFA’s June 8, 2017 letter to Human Rights Watch nor a March 2017 press release about the monitoring system provide comprehensive details, such as the specific types of violations, where violations took place, if or how violations were remedied, or any other relevant information. FIFA’s letter provided two examples in which FIFA said it resolved specific issues revealed by the monitoring process [85]

As noted above, transparency is a key component of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and is essential for private enterprises to ensure credibility, accountability, sustainability, and meaningful human rights improvements.

Another serious concern is that the FIFA program appears to be limited to stadium visits, as public statements refer to “construction sites of FIFA World Cup stadiums,” there is no readily available information suggesting any kind of monitoring is being done on related sites and infrastructure relevant to the hosting of World Cup 2018.[86] The methodology of the monitoring system of stadiums is also based solely on announced visits, giving employers advance notice of upcoming inspections. 

Human Rights Watch has other serious concerns about FIFA’s current system of monitoring, including:

  • Human Rights Watch found workers working in an atmosphere of intimidation and vulnerability. Many were reluctant to report labor concerns out of legitimate fears of retaliation.
  • Officials denied workers the opportunity to speak with FIFA officials during an official site visit to the Kaliningrad Stadium, and may have deliberately kept some migrant workers off the site during the official visit.
  • There have been frequent strikes on World Cup stadium sites, including repeated strikes at some stadiums, suggesting that many problems persist, despite FIFA’s monitoring.
  • Officials directly interfered with Human Rights Watch’s research, including by encouraging workers not to speak to Human Rights Watch and through direct surveillance and detention of the researcher.
  • Not a single worker interviewed by Human Rights Watch had spoken to any inspectors or other monitors nor had knowledge of any labor conditions monitoring having taken place on the worksite.

Human Rights Watch has set out recommendations to FIFA for improving its implementation and transparency of its monitoring program, both ahead of Russia 2018, as well as the next World Cup, in Qatar 2022, where Human Rights Watch has serious workers’ rights concerns, and in future World Cup tournaments.

V. International Legal Standards

The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) recognizes “the right of everyone to the enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of work.”[87] Such conditions must ensure: remuneration, safe and healthy working conditions, as well as rest, reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay, and remuneration for public holidays.[88] The ICESCR also guarantees “the right of everyone to form trade unions and join the trade union of his choice…” and the right to strike.[89] The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights also guarantees freedom of association and the right to form and join trade unions.[90] 

The International Labour Organization (ILO) has developed a comprehensive body of conventions that address virtually every aspect of workers’ rights. Russia has ratified several of these conventions, including the ILO Convention on the Protection of Wages (No. 95), which guarantees regular payment of wages, and the ILO Convention on Occupational Safety and Health (No. 155), which calls for policies to prevent accidents and injuries to health, for effective enforcement of laws and regulations concerning occupational safety and health, and for the government to publish annually information on accidents and other work-related health concerns.[91] 

Corporate Responsibility

Although governments have the primary responsibility to respect, protect, and fulfill human rights under international law, private entities, including businesses, also have internationally recognized responsibilities regarding human rights, including workers’ rights. These responsibilities apply to FIFA as well. The United Nations (UN) Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, which the UN Human Rights Council endorsed in 2011, recognize that all companies should respect human rights, avoid complicity in abuses, and ensure that any abuses that occur despite these efforts are adequately remedied. The Guiding Principles specify that businesses should exercise human rights due diligence to identify human rights risks associated with their operations, take effective steps to prevent or mitigate those risks, and ensure that the victims of any abuses that occur despite those efforts have access to remedies.[92] The Guiding Principles are widely accepted as an authoritative articulation of businesses’ human rights responsibilities.

As one component of such due diligence efforts, businesses, including entities such as FIFA, should vet other potential business associates to avoid forming ties with individuals or entities that undermine human rights, including workers’ rights, and include enforceable human rights provisions in contracts with parties involved in a relevant business relationship.

This should go hand in hand with company measures to monitor human rights impacts through ongoing internal processes and periodic independent reviews, and act to correct any identified problems.

Equally important, the Guiding Principles also call on private enterprises to ensure transparency as part of a credible response to human rights concerns, to “show that they respect human rights in practice.” Specifically, the Guiding Principles state: “business enterprises whose operations or operating contexts pose risks of severe human rights impacts should report formally on how they address them” including by providing “information that is sufficient to evaluate the adequacy of an enterprise’s response to the particular human rights impact involved…”[93]

Acknowledgments

This report was written by Jane Buchanan, associate director in the Europe and Central Asia division of Human Rights Watch. It was researched by Semyon Simonov, research consultant to Human Rights Watch. Kathryn Zehr, senior associate in the Europe and Central Asia division, researched and wrote parts of the background section. Vladislav Lobanov, Natalia Estemirova fellow in the Moscow office of Human Rights Watch and Semyon Simonov conducted legal research on Russian labor and migration law for this report. Cornelius Runtsch, intern in the Moscow office, assisted with research and writing on FIFA and human rights.

This report was reviewed by Rachel Denber, deputy director in the Europe and Central Asia division, Arvind Ganesan, director of business and human rights, Minky Worden, director of global initiatives, Tanya Lokshina, Russia program director, and Yulia Gorbunova, Russia researcher, at Human Rights Watch. Senior legal advisor Aisling Reidy and deputy Program director Tom Porteous also reviewed the report.

Production assistance was provided by Kathryn Zehr, Olivia Hunter, photo and publications associate, Rafael Jimenez, graphic designer, Fitzroy Hepkins, administrative manager, and José Martínez, senior coordinator.

[1] FIFA, “Russia and Qatar awarded 2018 and 2022 FIFA World Cups, December 2, 2010, http://www.fifa.com/worldcup/news/y=2010/m=12/news=russia-and-qatar-awarded-2018-and-2022-fifa-world-cups-1344698.html (accessed May 12, 2017).

[2] Jeré Longman, “Russia and Qatar Win World Cup Bids,” The New York Times, December 3, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/03/sports/soccer/03worldcup.html (accessed May 12, 2017). See also later developments regarding allegations of corruption in the biding process: Jack de Menzes, “Fifa corruption: Qatar and Russia World Cup bids under FBI investigation following Chuck Blazer's bribery confession,” The Independent, June 4, 2015, http://www.independent.co.uk/sport/football/international/fifa-corruption-qatar-and-russia-world-cup-bids-under-fbi-investigation-following-chuck-blazers-10296177.html (accessed May 25, 2017).

[3] “Russia fully ready for hosting 2017 FIFA Confederations Cup,” ITAR-TASS, March 31, 2017, http://tass.com/sport/938653 (accessed May 15, 2017).

[4] “World Cup stadiums improving day by day,” FIFA.com, April 27, 2017, http://www.fifa.com/worldcup/news/y=2017/m=4/news=world-cup-stadiums-improving-day-by-day-2880773.html (accessed May 15, 2017).

[5] “Medvedev: It’s necessary to qualitatively prepare for the Confederations Cup and the FIFA World Cup 2018 [Медведев: необходимо качественно подготовится к Кубку конфедераций и ЧМ-2018]”, ITAR-TASS, April 28, 2017, http://tass.ru/sport/4220102; “FIFA 2018 World Cup [Чемпионат Мира по Футболу 2018 Года]”, Ministry of Transportation of the Russian Federation, 2017, https://www.mintrans.ru/activity/detail.php?SECTION_ID=2447 (accessed May 16, 2017).  

[6] “Expenses for the preparation of the 2018 World Cup were increased by 4.7 billion rubles [Расжоды на подготовку к ЧМ-2018 по футболу увеличены на 4.7 млрд рублей],” ITAR-TASS, May 10, 2017, http://tass.ru/sport/4241340 (accessed May 16, 2017).

[7] Human Rights Watch, “Race to the Bottom: Exploitation of Migrant Workers ahead of Russia’s 2014 Winter Olympic Games in Sochi,” February 6, 2013, https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/02/06/race-bottom/exploitation-migrant-workers-ahead-russias-2014-winter-olympic-games

[8] Human Rights Watch, “Are You Happy to Cheat Us? Exploitation of Migrant Workers in Russia,” February 10, 2009, https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/russia0209web_0.pdf.

[9] Jane Buchanan, “Dispatches: Too Little but Not Yet Too Late for Sochi’s Workers,” Human Rights Watch dispatch, January 13, 2014, https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/01/13/dispatches-too-little-not-yet-too-late-sochis-workers

[10] “Russia: IOC Acts on Sochi Abuses,” Human Rights Watch news release, February 11, 2014, https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/02/11/russia-ioc-acts-sochi-abuses

[11]  For example, in English, Alec Luhn, “Construction Workers at World Cup Stadium Complain of Not Being Paid,” The Guardian, August 31, 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/football/2015/aug/31/construction-workers-russian-world-cup-2018-stadium-not-paid (accessed May 15, 2017).

[12] “The Slaves of St. Petersburg,” Josimar, March 2017, http://www.josimar.no/artikler/the-slaves-of-st-petersburg/3851/ (accessed May 16, 2017); David Conn, “World Cup 2018: FIFA Admits Workers Have Suffered Human Rights Abuses,” The Guardian, May 25, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/football/2017/may/25/fifa-world-cup-2018-workers-human-rights-abuses (accessed May 25, 2017); The Guardian subsequently published an article about North Korean workers on the St. Petersburg Stadium, Alec Luhn, “Like Prisoners of War: North Korean Labour behind Russia 2018 World Cup,” The Guardian, June 4, 2017 https://www.theguardian.com/football/2017/jun/04/like-prisoners-of-war-north-korean-labour-russia-world-cup-st-petersburg-stadium-zenit-arena (accessed June 4, 2017); and Letter from Federico Addiechi, head, sustainability and strategy, FIFA, to Human Rights Watch, June 8, 2017.

[13] For example, “On the Volgograd Stadium, a young welder fell 20 meters and died [На стройке Волгоград-Ареныс 20-метровой высоты упал и разбился молодой монтажник],” Kuban.info, December 3, 2016, http://kuban.info/proishestvia/5328-na-stroyke-volgograd-areny-s-20-metrovoy-vysoty-upal-i-razbilsya-molodoy-montazhnik.html (accessed May 15, 2017); “Another Worker Was Seriously Injured on the Volgograd Stadium [Еще один рабочий получил травмы на стройке Волгоград Арена”],” Fedpress.ru, February 15, 2016, http://fedpress.ru/news/society/news_event/1455536246-eshche-odin-rabochii-poluchil-travmy-na-stroike-volgograd-areny (accessed May 15, 2017). “On the Volgograd Stadium, Metalworks collapsed together with workers [На стройке Волгоград-Ареныметаллоконструкции рухнули вместе с рабочими],” Kuban.info, November 8, 2015, http://kuban.info/proishestvia/3142-na-stroyke-volgograd-areny-metallokonstrukcii-ruhnuli-vmeste-s-rabochimi.html (accessed May 16, 2017).

[14] “Another Death at the 2018 World Cup Stadium in St. Petersburg,” Building and Wood Workers’ International (BWI), October 8, 2016, http://www.bwint.org/default.asp?Index=7379&Language=EN (accessed May 15, 2017).

[15] Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Ambet Yuson, general secretary, Building and Wood Workers’ International, May 1, 2017.

[16] “Another Strike Over Unpaid Wages at 2018 World Cup Stadium in Russia,” BWI, June 11, 2016, http://www.bwint.org/default.asp?index=7180&Language=EN (accessed May 16, 2017). In Nizhnii Novgorod, 250 workers reported that they had not received wages for two months, prompting them to strike. “Strike on the 2018 World Cup Stadium in Nizhniy Novgorod,” BWI, March 16, 2016, http://www.bwint.org/default.asp?index=7022&Language=EN (accessed May 16, 2017). “Investigation of Wage Theft after Strike at World Cup Stadium in Russia,” BWI, July 18, 2016, http://www.bwint.org/pdfs/Digest%20June-July.eng.1.pdf (accessed May 16, 2017).

[17] “Rostov Arena Construction workers organized a strike [Строящие стадионРостов-Аренарабочие устроили забастовку],” Lenta.Ru, April 13, 2017, https://lenta.ru/news/2017/04/13/dolzhnystadik/ (accessed May 15, 2017).

[18]“Rostov Arena construction workers went on strike, demanding payment of wage arrears [Строители стадиона Ростов-Аренавышли на забастовку, требуя погасить долги по зарплате],” Donnews.ru, May 19, 2016, http://www.donnews.ru/Stroiteli-stadiona-Rostov-Arena-vyshli-na-zabastovku-trebuya-pogasit-dolgi-po-zarplate_24855 (accessed May 15, 2017).

[19] “In Kaliningrad, workers on the World Cup 2018 construction site organized a strike due to wage delays [В Калининграде на стройке стадиона к ЧМ-2018 рабочие устроили забастовку из-за задержки зарплаты],” Klops.ru, July 28, 2016, https://klops.ru/news/obschestvo/136310-v-kaliningrade-na-stroyke-stadiona-k-chm-2018-rabochie-ustroili-zabastovku-iz-za-zaderzhki-zarplaty (accessed May 15, 2017).

[20] In Kaliningrad, the prosecutor’s office demanded payments to be made to former employees of a construction company [В Калининграде прокуратура потребовала выплатить деньги бывшим сотрудникам строительной фирмы],” Klops.ru, June 29, 2016, https://klops.ru/news/obschestvo/134381-v-kaliningrade-prokuratura-potrebovala-vyplatit-dengi-byvshim-sotrudnikam-stroitelnoy-firmy (accessed May 15, 2017).

[21] “The director of a company, who fled, not having paid wages to World Cup 2018 Kaliningrad Stadium workers was arrested [Задержан директор, который сбежал, не выплатив зарплату строителям калининградского стадиона к ЧМ-2018],” Klops.ru, April 7, 2017, https://klops.ru/news/obschestvo/153343-zaderzhan-direktor-kotoryy-sbezhal-ne-vyplativ-zarplatu-stroitelyam-kaliningradskogo-stadiona-k-chm-2018 (accessed May 15, 2017).

[22] “Labor relations arise between employee and employer on the basis of an employment contract [trudovoi dogovor] concluded by them in accordance with this Code.” Labor Code of the Russian Federation, art. 16. The labor code details the information that must be contained in an employment contract and specifies that the contract must be signed in two copies, one for each party. Labor Code of the Russian Federation, arts. 56-62. Article 16 of the Labor Code also recognizes that formal employment relations exist for workers employed by an employer even when an official employment contract has not been signed. Service contracts are regulated by the Civil Code of the Russian Federation, chapter 37.

[23] Migrant workers from the member states of the Eurasian Economic Union (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia, and Kyrgyzstan) are not required to have a work permit to work legally. However, workers from these countries must have a written employment contract or civil-legal contract if he or she wishes to remain in Russia for longer than 90 days. Migrant workers from other countries must have both a work permit or patent as well as an employment contract. Law on the legal status of foreign individuals in the Russian Federation, Federal Law 115, July 25, 2002, art. 5. A 2015 government order simplified procedures for issuing worker permits for foreign workers on 2018 World Cup sites. Order of the Russian Government, “To accelerate and simplify: issuance of temporary residence permits to foreign citizens and stateless persons; permission to hire foreign workers; invitations to enter the Russian Federation; and work permits for foreign citizens and stateless persons hired by legal entities or individuals who have signed civil contracts for the construction of infrastructure needed to host the 2018 Football World Cup in the Russian Federation,” No. 735 of July 18, 2015.

[24] Human Rights Watch interview with Nuradil, Luzhniki Stadium, Moscow, July 12, 2016.

[25] Human Rights Watch interview with Mikhail, Luzhniki Stadium, Moscow, July 13, 2016.

[26] Human Rights Watch interviews with Alexander, with Kirill, with Egor, with Maksim, and with Dmitry, Kaliningrad Stadium, Kaliningrad, July 14, 2016.

[27] Human Rights Watch interviews with Timur, with Azmat, with Umid, with Oleg, and with Nuriddin, Rostov Arena, Rostov-on-Don, September 30, 2016.

[28] Human Rights Watch interview with Pavel, St. Petersburg Stadium, St. Petersburg, July 18, 2016.

[29] Human Rights Watch interview with Sergei, St. Petersburg Stadium, St. Petersburg, July 17, 2016.

[30] Labor Code of the Russian Federation, arts. 133 and 136.

[31]  The Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, FZ-63, 1996, with amendments, art. 145.1.

[32] Human Rights Watch interviews with construction workers at the Rostov Arena, Rostov-0n-Don, September 30 and October 1, 2016.

[33] Human Rights Watch interview with Yusuf, Rostov Arena, Rostov-on-Don, October 1, 2016.

[34] Human Rights Watch interview with Umid, Rostov Arena, Rostov-on-Don, October 1, 2016.

[35] Human Rights Watch group interview with four workers from Russia, Rostov Arena, Rostov-on-Don, October 1, 2016.

[36] “Hundreds of Rostov Arena Builders Haven’t Been Paid in Months [Сотни строителей стадиона Ростов-Аренамесяцами не получают зарплату],” Donday.ru, April 8, 2017, http://donday.ru/sotni-stroiteley-stadiona-rostov-arena-mesyacami-ne-poluchayut-zarplatu.html (accessed May 17, 2017).

[37] “The Rostov Arena Strike Has Ended [Стачка рабочих Ростов-Ареназавершилась],” Go61.ru, April 17, 2017, http://www.go61.ru/news/1622090 (accessed May 17, 2017).

[38] Human Rights Watch interview with Nuriddin, Rostov Arena, Rostov-on-Don, September 30, 2016.

[39] Human Rights Watch interviews with Umid, Rostov Arena, Rostov-on-Don, September 30, 2016, and with Anton, with Sultan, with Ismoil, Rostov Arena, Rostov-on-Don, October 1, 2016.

[40] Human Rights Watch telephone interview with worker on Rostov Arena, October 27, 2016.

[41] Human Rights Watch interviews with Timur, with Azmat, with Umid, with Oleg, and with Nuriddin, Rostov Arena, Rostov-on-Don, September 30, 2016.

[42] Human Rights Watch interview with Kirill, Kaliningrad Stadium, Kaliningrad, July 14, 2016. For more information regarding retaliation against Kirill by his employer, see Section III.

[43] Human Rights Watch interview with Roman, Kaliningrad Stadium, Kaliningrad, July 15, 2016.

[44] Human Rights Watch interview with Sergei, St. Petersburg Stadium, St. Petersburg, July 17, 2016.

[45] Human Rights Watch interview with Melis, Luzhniki Stadium, Moscow, July 13, 2016.

[46] Human Rights Watch interview with Yaroslav, St. Petersburg Stadium, St. Petersburg, July 17, 2016.

[47] Human Rights Watch interview with Aibek, Luzhniki Stadium, Moscow, July 12, 2016.

[48] Human Rights Watch interview with Egor, Kaliningrad Stadium, Kaliningrad, July 14, 2016.

[49] Human Rights Watch interview with Pavel, St. Petersburg Stadium, St. Petersburg, July 18, 2016.

[50] Human Rights Watch interviews with Nuradil and with Bakytbek, Luzhniki Stadium, Moscow, July 12, 2016.

[51] Human Rights Watch interviews with Muzafar and with Kadom, Ekaterinburg Arena, Ekaterinburg, January 9, 2017.

[52] Human Rights Watch interview with Kadom, Ekaterinburg Arena, Ekaterinburg, January 9, 2017.

[53] Human Rights Watch interview with Muzafar, Ekaterinburg Arena, Ekaterinburg, January 9, 2017.

[54] Labor Code of the Russian Federation, arts. 92 and 212, together with Federal Service for Protection of Consumer Rights and Human Welfare, Methodological Recommendation “Work hours and breaks for workers during cold weather outdoors or in unheated buildings," No. 2.7.2129-06 (2007).

[55] International Labour Organization (ILO), “Ambient Factors in the Workplace, and ILO Code of Practice,” (2001), http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_protect/---protrav/---safework/documents/normativeinstrument/wcms_107729.pdf; and Ingvar Holmér, Per-Ola Granberg, and Göran Dahlström, “Cold Environment and Cold Work,” ILO, March 21, 2011, http://www.iloencyclopaedia.org/component/k2/item/717-cold-environment-and-cold-work (accessed May 25, 2017).

[56] Human Rights Watch interviews with Kirill and with Egor, Kaliningrad Stadium, Kaliningrad, July 15, 2016.

[57] Daniel Etchells, “FIFA To Tour Venues for 2018 World Cup in Russia,” Inside The Games, February 21, 2017, http://www.insidethegames.biz/articles/1047294/fifa-delegation-to-tour-venues-for-2018-world-cup-in-russia (accessed May 17,2017).

[58] Human Rights Watch telephone interview with worker on Rostov Arena, October 27, 2016.

[59] Human Rights Watch interview with Roman, Kaliningrad Stadium, Kaliningrad, July 15, 2016.

[60] “Hundreds of Rostov Arena Builders Haven’t Been Paid in Months [Сотни строителей стадиона Ростов-Аренамесяцами не получают зарплату],” Donday,ru, April 8, 2017, http://donday.ru/sotni-stroiteley-stadiona-rostov-arena-mesyacami-ne-poluchayut-zarplatu.html (accessed May 17, 2017).

[61] “Another Builders Strike on the Rostov Arena. Workers Demand Wages [Очередная стачка строителей “Ростов-Арена”. Рабочие требуют зарплату],” GO61.ru, April 13, 2017, http://www.go61.ru/news/1618984 (accessed May 18, 2017).

[62] Human Rights Watch, “Race to the Bottom,” pp. 44-46; “Russia: Sochi Migrant Workers Targeted for Expulsion,” Human Rights Watch news release, October 2, 2013, https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/10/02/russia-sochi-migrant-workers-targeted-expulsion.

[63] Human Rights Watch interviews with Kirill, Kaliningrad Stadium, Kaliningrad, July 14, 2016.

[64] “FIFA Council Agrees on Four-Phase Bidding Process for 2026 World Cup,” FIFA.com, May 10, 2016, http://www.fifa.com/about-fifa/news/y=2016/m=5/news=fifa-council-agrees-on-four-phase-bidding-process-for-2026-fifa-world--2790472.html (accessed May 19, 2017).

[65] John Ruggie, “For the Game. For the World.” FIFA and Human Rights. Corporate Responsibility Initiative Report No. 68 (2016), Cambridge, MA, https://www.hks.harvard.edu/centers/mrcbg/programs/cri/research/reports/report68 (accessed May 16, 2017).

[66] Ibid.

[67] “FIFA Statutes. April 2016 edition,” FIFA.com, http://resources.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/generic/02/78/29/07/fifastatutsweben_neutral.pdf (accessed May 16, 2017).

[68]“Fact Sheet: FIFA’s Work on Human Rights,” FIFA.com, November 2016, http://resources.fifa.com/mm/Document/AFFederation/FootballGovernance/02/87/55/00/FIFABackgroundInfoonHumanRights_Neutral.pdf (accessed May 14, 2017).

[69] “Independent Advisory Board of Human Rights Experts to Meet on 13 March,” FIFA.com, March 10, 2016, http://www.fifa.com/governance/news/y=2017/m=3/news=independent-advisory-board-of-human-rights-experts-to-meet-on-13-march-2875485.html (accessed May 15, 2017).

[70] “One Year Extraordinary Congress,” FIFA.com, undated, http://resources.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/generic/02/86/79/92/oneyear_extraordinarycongress_neutral.pdf (accessed May 25, 2017).

[71] “Q and A with FIFA General Secretary Fatma Samoura,” FIFA.com, February 26, 2017, http://www.fifa.com/about-fifa/news/y=2017/m=2/news=q-a-with-fifa-secretary-general-fatma-samoura-2868389.html (accessed May 25, 2017).

[72] “FIFA Publishes Landmark Human Rights Policy,” FIFA.com, June 8, 2017, http://www.fifa.com/governance/news/y=2017/m=6/news=fifa-publishes-landmark-human-rights-policy-2893311.html (June 8, 2017). 

[73] Letter from Federico Addiechi, head, sustainability and strategy, FIFA, to Human Rights Watch, June 8, 2017, and “Sustainability Strategy 2018 FIFA World Cup,” FIFA.com, July 2015, http://resources.fifa.com/mm/document/tournament/compethition/02/66/69/50/sustainabilitystrategyfor2018fifaworldcup_neutral.pdf (accessed May 16, 2017).

[74] “Working conditions monitoring system launched at World Cup stadiums,” FIFA.com, May 11, 2016, http://www.fifa.com/worldcup/news/y=2016/m=5/news=working-conditions-monitoring-system-launched-at-world-cup-stadiums-2790536.html (accessed May 16, 2017). The April 2016 announcement followed a few initial monitoring steps: a September 2015 self-assessment survey of companies engaged in Russia 2018 construction, and a FIFA and LOC February 2016 inspection of the St. Petersburg Stadium together with the Building and Wood Workers’ International (BWI) trade union and the Russian Construction Workers Union (RBWU). “Experts Assess Labour Conditions and Workers’ Safety at St. Petersburg Stadium,” FIFA.com, February 9, 2016, http://www.fifa.com/worldcup/news/y=2016/m=2/news=experts-assess-labour-conditions-and-workers-safety-at-st-petersburg-s-2764629.html (accessed May 16, 2017).

[75] Letter from Addiechi, FIFA, June 8, 2017.

[76] “Working Conditions Monitoring System Launched at World Cup stadiums,” FIFA.com, May 11, 2016, and Letter from Addiechi, FIFA, June 8, 2017.

[77] Klinsky Institute of Labor Protection and Working Conditions website: http://www.kiout.ru/, and http://www.kiout.ru/clients (accessed May 17, 2017). 

[78] “First Round of Visits to Russia 2018 Stadiums for Monitoring Working Conditions Completed,” FIFA.com, July 12, 2016, http://www.fifa.com/worldcup/news/y=2016/m=7/news=first-round-of-visits-to-russia-2018-stadiums-for-monitoring-working-c-2811754.html (accessed May 16, 2017).

[79] Ibid., and Letter from Addiechi, FIFA, June 8, 2017.

[80] “Working Conditions: FIFA and Trade Unions Sign Cooperation Agreement for Russia 2018,” FIFA.com, August 26, 2016, http://www.fifa.com/worldcup/news/y=2016/m=8/news=working-conditions-fifa-and-trade-unions-sign-cooperation-agreement-fo-2823712.html (accessed May 16, 2017).

[81] “Experts Assess Labour Conditions and Workers’ Safety at St. Petersburg Stadium,” FIFA.com, February 9, 2016, http://www.fifa.com/worldcup/news/y=2016/m=2/news=experts-assess-labour-conditions-and-workers-safety-at-st-petersburg-s-2764629.html (accessed May 16, 2017).

[82] Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Ambet Yuson, general secretary, Building and Wood Workers’ International, May 1, 2017.

[83] Letter from Addiechi, FIFA, June 8, 2017.

[84] Letter from Addiechi, FIFA, June 8, 2017.

[85] Letter from Addiechi, FIFA, June 8, 2017. “Working Conditions Seminar Held in Moscow,” FIFA.com, March 17, 2017, http://www.fifa.com/worldcup/news/y=2017/m=3/news=working-conditions-seminar-held-in-moscow-2876391.html (accessed May 16, 2017).

[86] “Working Conditions: FIFA and Trade Unions Sign Cooperation Agreement for Russia 2018,” FIFA.com; “Working Conditions Monitoring System Launched at World Cup stadiums,” FIFA.com; and “Working Conditions Seminar Held in Moscow;” and “Fact Sheet: FIFA’s Work on Human Rights,” FIFA.com.

[87] International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), adopted by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, entered into force January 3, 1976, ratified by Russia October 16, 1973, art. 7.

[88] Ibid. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights also provides that everyone has the right to rest and leisure, including reasonable limitation of working and periodic holidays with pay, as well as the right to just and favorable remuneration, and the freedom to form and join trade unions. UDHR, arts. 23 and 24.

[89] ICESCR, art. 8.

[90] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), art. 22.

[91] ILO Convention No. 155 concerning Occupational Safety and Health, adopted June 22, 1981 U.N.T.S. 279, entered into force August 11, 1983.

[92] UN Human Rights Council, “Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework.” The UN Human Rights Council endorsed the Guiding Principles in resolution 17/4 of 16 June 2011: “Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises,” Resolution 17/4, A/HRC/17/L.17/Rev.1; UN Human Rights Council, “Mandate of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises,” Resolution 8/7, A/HRC/RES/8/7; UN Human Rights Council, “Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises,” Resolution 17/4, A/HRC/17/L.17/Rev.1.

[93] Ibid., Guiding Principle no. 21.

Author: Human Rights Watch
Posted: January 1, 1970, 12:00 am
Posted: January 1, 1970, 12:00 am

Two of the many children detained in the VIAL detention facility on Chios island, Greece.

© 2016 Human Rights Watch
Last October I visited camps for asylum seekers and migrants on the Greek islands, the landing spot in recent years for hundreds of thousands of people who abandoned everything in search of safety.

As I was waiting to get into the VIAL camp on Chios Island, a boy in ragged jeans called to me from the doorway of a bus. “Give up!” he said. “Do not waste your time. Nothing is going to change.” The door closed and the rickety bus bumped slowly away from the asylum processing center and into the heart of the camp.

It wasn’t what I expected to hear. VIAL is a place where asylum seekers are interviewed as part of a process that should, in the best of worlds, allow them a fair shot at finding refuge in a European country. But given the border closures along the Balkan route and deeply flawed EU deal signed with Turkey, it had become a dead-end.

The boy on the bus who was urging me to give up had told me at the processing center that he’d fled Afghanistan to avoid pressures to join the Taliban or the military. He was 15, and he’d spent two years on his own, working his way across Iran, Iraq, and Turkey, in the dicey world of the undocumented, like many other unaccompanied children in search of safety and a better future. He didn’t know whether his family back home was dead or alive.

During the following days, I met many children--from Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia—who, like the boy on the bus, felt stuck. They huddled together listlessly, without any chance to get proper schooling or work, ticking off the hours, days, weeks, and months until their refugee status might be recognized and their destinies defined.

Others have been luckier. At the beginning of May, I met members of the Majid family, including children ranging in age from 6 to 11. They fled Aleppo, Syria in 2015 and traveled for two months, crossing nine European countries, dealing with hostile border guards, barbed wire fences, hunger, rain, and sleep deprivation, until they finally reached Sweden, which gave them a new home. They were in Sao Paulo to honor the Pulitzer Prize-winning photo exhibition of their journey by the Brazilian New York Times photographer Mauricio Lima.

In Sweden, the children have been rediscovering normal life: playing, going to school, competing in soccer. They have become fluent in Swedish. For them at least, memories of the Syrian war—in which more than 400,000 have died, 12 million have fled their homes, and the government has systematically used chemical weapons—may be fading. In such tragic times, more countries need to embrace families like the Majids. Worldwide, nearly 65 million people have been displaced by war or persecution – a number unmatched since World War II.

Brazil´s response to the refugee crisis, so far, has been disappointing. The current largest refugee group worldwide is the Syrians, and Brazil has taken in only 3,000 of them. It´s true that accepting refugees and ensuring that they can integrate into a new society requires investing resources, especially when the refugees come from a distant culture and don’t speak Portuguese. But Brazil could seek funding and assistance from the private sector, United Nations agencies, and donor countries to enhance its capacity—and our well-established Syrian and other ethnic communities could facilitate integration.

Brazil has opened its door to refugees before. We took in tens of thousands of Europeans after the two World Wars. Many of them showed us that foreigners in search of a life free from fear can make invaluable contributions to their host countries.

Author: Human Rights Watch
Posted: January 1, 1970, 12:00 am

Migrants aboard a boat following their rescue from their drifting dinghies in the Mediterranean Seas by Spanish NGO Proactiva Open Arms, April 2, 2017. Reuters/Yannis Behrakis

Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) searching for and rescuing migrants from rickety or even sinking boats in the Mediterranean are saving lives. Thousands of lives.

Enough said? Apparently not.

In Italy, NGOs have come under a barrage of attacks from politicians, particularly from the 5 Star Movement and the far right Northern League, accusing them of providing a “taxi service” from Libya to the European Union. A media-savvy prosecutor in Sicily has made almost daily statements about his inquiry into NGO search-and-rescue operations, insinuating – without evidence – that they are colluding with and profiting from smuggling operations. NGOs and others have been called to explain themselves before a Senate committee.

The truth of the matter is this: The drivers of migration are many, and Libya is a hell-hole for many who risk brutal abuse and forced labor. People are prepared to risk their lives to reach safety or improve their lives, and the risk of dying at sea doesn’t seem to be a deterrent.

The debate raging in Italy over the role, objectives, and financing of NGOs is a damaging distraction from the real challenges and responsibilities facing not only Italy, but Europe as a whole.

Humanitarian NGOs out at sea are protecting the most fundamental right there is: the right to life. They do so under the control and instructions of the Italian Maritime Rescue Coordination Center. It is a measure of how toxic the debate over migration has become that organizations like Doctors Without Borders, Proactiva Open Arms, and Save the Children must defend their life-saving operations. At the same time, their critics side-step the logical conclusion of their arguments – that we should let people drown to deter others from coming to Europe.

If any NGOs are making mistakes, let’s work to improve protocols, training, and coordination. If governments are concerned by the role NGOs are taking on, let’s ensure that governments intensify their own efforts to protect lives at sea. Above all, if so many women, men, and children are risking their lives at sea, let’s rethink EU policies and create more safe and legal migration channels.  

Author: Human Rights Watch
Posted: January 1, 1970, 12:00 am

Migrants atop the double-layer fence around Spain’s north African enclave Ceuta, September 2016

©2016 Antonio Sempere

(Milan) – Lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) asylum seekers in Spain’s North African enclave, Ceuta, are exposed to harassment and abuse, Human Rights Watch said today. Spanish authorities should transfer them to mainland Spain without delay and halt its de facto policy of blocking most asylum seeker transfers to the mainland.

Migrants registering at the Ceuta migrants center after arriving in the enclave, February 2017

© 2017 Antonio Sempere
“LGBT asylum seekers who fled homophobic harassment and intimidation at home face similar abuse in Ceuta, both at the immigration center and on the street,” said Judith Sunderland, associate Europe and Central Asia director at Human Rights Watch. “Spain should transfer them to reception centers on the mainland, where they can get the services and support they are entitled to.”

All migrants who enter Ceuta irregularly are housed in the Temporary Stay Center for Immigrants (Centro de Estancia Temporal de Inmigrantes, CETI), under the authority of the Employment and Social Security Ministry. The facility, designed for short-term stays and with a capacity of 512 people, is often overcrowded. Despite staff efforts, asylum seekers cannot get the care and services there to which they have the right under Spanish law.

Tents at Ceuta migrants center to house people due to over-crowding, March 2017.

© 2017 Private

When Human Rights Watch visited on March 28 and 29, 2017, the center held 943 residents, many living in large tents set up on what should be a basketball court inside the compound, with others sleeping in rooms that should be used for classes or group activities. While the center is open, and migrants may come and go, they are not allowed to leave Ceuta, an enclave of only 18.5 square kilometers.

Inside of tent housing 24 men at Ceuta migrants center, March 2017. 

©2017 Private
According to center staff, currently 70 to 80 asylum seekers are in the Ceuta center, of whom at least 10 have filed for asylum on the grounds of discrimination based on their sexual orientation or gender identity.

Human Rights Watch spoke with three gay men housed at the center, two from Morocco and one from Algeria, all of whom had filed for asylum on the grounds of persecution due to their sexual orientation. They described extreme abuse, including physical violence, by family members, repeated and widespread societal rejection, and physical attacks on the streets in their countries of origin. One Moroccan man said he had been jailed in part due to his sexual orientation. Both Morocco and Algeria criminalize consensual same-sex sexual activity, punishable by up to three years in prison and fines.

All three spoke of difficulties in the center and in Ceuta due to their sexual orientation.

“Ahmed” (a pseudonym), a 29-year-old Moroccan, said he fled his country because he suffered threats from both his family and the police but that he is experiencing the same kind of treatment at the hands of other people staying in the CETI. “They [other CETI residents] tell me if they see me outside [the center] they’ll beat me,” he said. “They come after me, and I run. One time, in November or December, they hit me.”

LGBT asylum seekers are trapped in Ceuta by what Human Rights Watch believes to be a policy designed to deter asylum applications from all asylum seekers, except for Syrians, who manage to reach the enclave. Migrants who do not apply for asylum are given expulsion orders and transferred to mainland Spain at a target rate of 80 per week where they are placed either in detention centers pending deportation or in shelters operated by nongovernmental groups. Asylum seekers, however, are generally not permitted to transfer.

“Denying asylum seekers their freedom of movement to deter applications would not only be cruel and misguided, but also a misuse of power,” Sunderland said. “Yet, the evidence suggests that the authorities impose a terrible choice on people in need of protection, requiring them to declare their need and face months or years in limbo in Ceuta, or to take their chances and apply for asylum only after they’ve been transferred to the mainland with an expulsion order in hand.”

While some migrants may stay at the center in Ceuta four or five months, those who apply for asylum normally stay much longer, sometimes throughout the entire procedure for assessing their application for protection, a process that can last well over a year. Police in Ceuta carry out border checks and block asylum seekers who try to leave the enclave for mainland Spain.

In 2010, the Spanish Interior Ministry said that the asylum seekers in the enclaves receive documents allowing them to live both in Ceuta and in the other North Africa Spanish enclave, Melilla. However, the ministry said that these documents do not in any circumstances entitle them to travel to the Spanish mainland. Although Spanish authorities do regularly transfer Syrian asylum seekers from the enclaves, the ministry does not appear to have changed its policy with respect to other nationalities despite a series of court rulings and recommendations from the Spanish human rights institute – the Defensor del Pueblo – and refugee rights organizations. Court rulings also have said that asylum seekers should have freedom of movement inside Spain.

“The situation of the enclaves, the European Union’s borders on the southern rim of the Mediterranean, is no doubt different than for other EU countries but that’s no excuse for punishing those who enter Ceuta to seek asylum,” Sunderland said. “Spain has the wherewithal to treat asylum seekers decently including LGBT people searching for a tolerant country where they can live without fear of discrimination or violence.”

Accounts by Asylum Seekers

“Ahmed,” the 29-year-old Moroccan, told Human Rights Watch that in his home country, “I couldn’t find anyone to protect me, neither my family nor the police.” He had been sentenced to six months in prison after he ran to the police late one night from two men beating him in the streets because he is gay. But life in the center in Ceuta, where he has been housed since mid-October 2016, is hard. “Here too they insult me, call me ‘faggot.’ They tell me if they see me outside [the center] they’ll beat me. They come after me, and I run. One time, in November or December, they hit me. It was an Algerian. He called me a faggot, he said ‘I’m going to kill you.’ The day before yesterday, I was in a friend’s room [in the center] and an Algerian came and threw me out, saying, ‘Hey faggot, get out of here.’”

Ahmed spoke of his dreams of a new life: “I want to survive, I want a future. I don’t want to have to always think that I’m going to be beaten up…I can’t in Morocco, and I can’t here either because Ceuta is like Morocco.”

“Francisco” (a pseudonym), a 30-year-old from Morocco, had been living in the center for 14 months. He said that his family had kicked him out when he was 12 because of his sexuality. He had been raped by two men in a garbage dump while still a teenager, and beaten and arrested by the police. The last straw was when a cousin, with whom Francisco had been living after the cousin’s return after years abroad, turned against him after learning he was gay:

I came to Ceuta. I didn’t have any other choice but to ask for asylum. But here it’s terrible. I am desperate. Ceuta is just like Morocco. One time I was at the beach, and a man who was a little older than me offered me a joint. I said no. He wanted to have sex but I said no, and he threw a rock at me and hit me. I went to the police. At first they didn’t want to take my complaint. They didn’t do anything. That man is always there at the beach…In the CETI I don’t talk to anyone, I avoid problems. If I didn’t, I would burst. You know, being thrown out of my home when I was 12, all the problems…

“Said” (a pseudonym), a 32-year-old Algerian, had been at the CETI for almost 10 months when Human Rights Watch met him: “I want to live a new life,” he said. “I need to forget my problems. I didn’t have a clear idea of where to go, just a place where I could live without violence. It’s hard here. You can only sleep and eat, sleep and eat. I avoid everyone here to avoid problems.”

A staff member told Human Rights Watch that other residents often “ridicule, harass, and attack” LGBT asylum seekers. “Many don’t accept sharing a room with a homosexual. Either they harass them here or they fight outside the center.”

EU Policy

The European Union Reception Directive, binding on Spain, requires EU countries to take into consideration the situation of vulnerable people when it comes to accommodation, and to take measures to prevent sexual assault and harassment in reception centers. Although LGBT asylum seekers are not listed in the directive among people considered vulnerable, Human Rights Watch agrees with the EU Fundamental Rights Agency and the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans, and Intersex Association (ILGA-Europe) that many LGBT people seeking asylum qualify due to the kind of persecution experienced in their countries of origin. In a 2015 report, the United Nations Refugee Agency, UNHCR, noted that, “LGBTI persons of concern face a wide variety of protection risks in countries of asylum, including further persecution by authorities, host communities, family members, and other asylum-seekers and refugees.”

Best practices in reception for people identified as LGBT asylum seekers by such organizations include accommodation in single rooms, transfers to smaller centers, specific training for staff, and facilitating access to LGBT organizations and support networks.

These conditions cannot be met for LGBT asylum seekers at the reception center or elsewhere in Ceuta.

Nongovernmental organizations, the Defensor del Pueblo, and UNHCR have repeatedly underlined that the center in Ceuta, as well as the one in Melilla, are not fit as reception centers for asylum seekers. In a report published in June 2016, the Defensor del Pueblo concluded that these centers “cannot be considered appropriate for housing and attending to asylum seekers” and reiterated that the institute has drawn attention to “the lack of specialized assistance for asylum seekers and particularly for persons with special vulnerabilities.” UNHCR’s representative in Spain, Francesca Friz-Prguda, said in December that the centers “do not meet the minimum requirements laid out in European [asylum] directives” and “are not the place for people who arrive traumatized fleeing from war and persecution.”

Land border crossings to Ceuta have fallen over the past few years, despite some recent large group arrivals. In 2016, just over 2,000 people – mostly sub-Saharan Africans and some Algerians – crossed the land border irregularly. Fewer than 16,000 people filed new asylum applications in Spain in 2016, well under 2 percent of the EU total.

The Situation in Ceuta

Double-layer fence around Spain’s north Africa enclave Ceuta, January 2017.

©2017 Antonio Sempere
Ceuta is just across the Strait of Gibraltar from Algeciras, entirely separated from its neighboring territory in North Africa by a double-layer fence topped with razor-wire. A triple-layer fence separates Spain’s other enclave, Melilla, closer to the Algerian border, from Moroccan territory. Irregular migration to the enclaves takes a variety of forms, including large group attempts to scale the fences, crossing in hidden compartments in vehicles, approach by sea, and through the use of fake travel documents.

Human Rights Watch visited Melilla on March 23 through 26, and Ceuta on March 27 through 29. Researchers were not granted access to visit the reception center in Melilla. At the time of the visit, approximately 880 people were living in the Melilla center, which as a capacity of 480. At least 350 asylum seekers were housed in the Melilla reception center, at least 50 of whom have applied on grounds of persecution due to their sexual orientation or gender identity.

The Moroccan government has coordinated security measures and border management with EU member states, especially Spain, since the 1990s, and the country is an important partner in EU efforts to externalize border controls. While the numbers of migrants and asylum-seekers reaching Spain from Morocco pale in comparison to arrivals to Italy and Greece, EU migration cooperation with Morocco, driven by Spain, has provided a blueprint for policies pursued by the EU and member states since 2015 with other transit countries.

Bilateral readmission agreements between Spain and Algeria, as well as between Spain and Morocco, make it easier for Spain to directly return nationals of those countries from its enclaves.

Morocco adopted a national strategy in 2013 to overhaul national policies toward migrants and asylum seekers, including by providing certain basic rights. In 2016, the government granted one-year renewable residency permits to thousands of sub-Saharan Africans and to over 500 UNHCR-recognized Syrians. However, interviews with sub-Saharan Africans in Ceuta and Melilla in March 2017 indicated that police raids on informal migrant camps, destruction and theft of property, involuntary transfers to other parts of Morocco, as well as violence by Moroccan border guards, previously documented by Human Rights Watch findings, continue. Morocco does not yet have a functioning asylum system.

Spain has taken drastic border control measures in its enclaves, including summary returns to Morocco and disproportionate use of force by border guards. In April 2015, the Spanish government changed the law to formalize the unlawful practice of summary returns to Morocco of anyone apprehended scaling the fences in a group, a move denounced by numerous nongovernmental groups, including Human Rights Watch, as well as the Defensor del Pueblo, the UN, and the Council of Europe.

A challenge to summary returns in 2014 is pending before the European Court of Human Rights. On February 6, 2014, at least 15 migrants died attempting to swim to Ceuta when the Spanish Guardia Civil fired rubber bullets and teargas at the water. A high court reopened in January 2017 the investigation into criminal responsibility of 16 Guardia Civil agents, overturning a lower judge’s decision in October 2015 to close the case without filing charges.

Spain officially inaugurated border asylum offices in both enclaves in 2015. While Syrians and Palestinians continue to access the Melilla asylum office, many reportedly using fake Moroccan documents and by bribing Moroccan officials in order to leave the Moroccan side, no other nationals have ever approached the Melilla office. Since its inauguration, in March 2015, not a single person has applied for asylum at the Ceuta border office. The obstacles to exiting Morocco via the official border crossing leave many, including asylum seekers, no choice but to attempt to enter the enclaves irregularly. Once in Ceuta or Melilla, they can apply for asylum at a police station or at the CETI.

Human Rights Watch visited the well-appointed but locked and empty Ceuta border asylum office on March 29. The chief inspector in charge explained that a trained officer is always on duty, with a key, should anyone arrive. He added, however, that the office “is useless, it’s only to comply with a European regulation.” When asked why he thought no one had ever applied for asylum at the office, he explained that the Moroccans “shouldn’t let people through…they do their filter. It doesn’t make sense to have an office on this side of the border if Morocco can grant asylum, it’s not a country at war.”

Migrant looking at list of people to be transferred from Ceuta to mainland Spain, March 2017.

©2017 Private
Human Rights Watch has observed that the central Interior Ministry routinely decides not to allow non-Syrian asylum seekers be transferred to the mainland, while irregular migrants are transferred. Ricardo Espíritu Navarro, director of the Ceuta reception center, said: “It’s not the responsibility of the Ministry [of Employment] to draw up the lists of transfers. The Ministry of Interior makes its own decisions. They usually don’t transfer asylum seekers. They don’t transfer Algerians. I don’t know why, it’s not my job.” The director said he had convinced the authorities to transfer to the mainland, in early March, a group of Algerian women asylum seekers, including some who are LGBT, who had protested unfair treatment and length of their stay at the Ceuta center.

Human Rights Watch believes the prospect of having to remain in Ceuta indefinitely deters people in need of international protection from applying for asylum. Human Rights Watch spoke to a 22-year-old from the Central African Republic who, a month after arriving at the reception center, was struggling with the decision of whether to apply for asylum: “They say you have to apply in the first place you reach, but if there’s no place for me how am I going to do that? The procedure takes a long time, I don’t want to stay here.” Human Rights Watch heard from several sources about a sub-Saharan man who withdrew his asylum application after the police explicitly told him he would be transferred to the mainland if he did so; he was transferred a few days later.

The police regularly deny transfer requests by asylum seekers in Ceuta. Police orders viewed by Human Rights Watch cite Spain’s commitments under the EU’s Schengen Border Code to check identity papers and travel documents for travel from the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla to other parts of Spain or to other Schengen countries, and assert that the applicant does not fulfil any of the requirements for entry into Spain “nor is there any exceptional reason of a humanitarian or public interest” to allow the person entry. The Ceuta National Police, through its media office, declined a Human Rights Watch request to meet with the head of the immigration and borders unit (Brigada de Extranjería y Fronteras).

Numerous Spanish court rulings have upheld the right of asylum seekers to freedom of movement within Spanish territory and ruled that preventing asylum seekers from traveling from the enclaves to the mainland constituted a violation of that right. Reiterating its findings in previous cases, the Sevilla Superior Court ruled in February 2015 that under Spanish immigration law asylum seekers enjoy the right to freedom of movement, irrespective of the manner in which they entered the country, and that the “exceptionalism of Ceuta resides in [the right of the police to conduct border] checks but not in a limitation not imposed by law. That the police can check [documents] does not mean they can impede the enjoyment of a right.”

The higher court found that the lower court’s decision validating the police denial of the possibility to travel onward from Ceuta amounted to “punishing irregular entry into Spain of someone who subsequently applied for asylum, which is at odds with existing legislation.”

Posted: January 1, 1970, 12:00 am

A migrant domestic worker in a shelter east of Beirut, Lebanon, March 15, 2010. 

© 2010 Reuters

(Beirut) – Lebanon’s General Security agency has detained and deported migrant domestic workers apparently for having children in Lebanon, Human Rights Watch said today. Authorities should stop deportations and release anyone detained for this reason. Denying residency renewals to long-term workers who have given birth while living in Lebanon disproportionately interferes with their right to family life.

Lebanese authorities have deported at least 21 domestic workers with children since the summer of 2016, saying that they were not living with their employer or were not supposed to give birth in Lebanon, according to Insan, a local human rights organization. None of these women were accused of violating their visas by working for multiple employers, and Insan has not documented a similar pattern of deportations of women without children living outside their employer’s home. Human Rights Watch spoke with three of the migrant domestic workers with children who have been deported, and corroborated their stories with local nongovernmental organizations and a community leader.

“Working in Lebanon doesn’t mean that these women lose the right to start a family,” said Lama Fakih, deputy Middle East director at Human Rights Watch. “These deportations throw families’ lives into turmoil and punish workers for no reason.”

The women told Human Rights Watch by phone that the deportations had a devastating effect on their lives, cutting off their ability to work, splitting up families, and interrupting their children’s education. Some of these women had lived in Lebanon for decades, with children who were born and grew up here.

“Monika,” who after working in Lebanon for more than 20 years was detained and then deported along with her 16-year-old daughter in early 2017, told Human Rights Watch: “Now my daughter is not in school, and we have no work, and now life is too difficult for us here in India. For us, eating is difficult.”

In December 2016, “Kumari” was detained and subsequently deported with her daughter, 14, after working in Lebanon for 30 years. Her husband remained in Lebanon for work, splitting their family apart. “What did we do? Did we steal? Did we kill someone?” she asked. “I worked for people [in Lebanon] all my life, for 32 years. We worked, worked, me and my husband, to put our children through school, to pay money to educate them there, and they treat us like that?”

Sources within General Security, the agency in charge of foreigners’ entry and residency, confirmed to nongovernmental groups in 2014 that the agency had issued a new directive to deny residency permit renewals to Lebanon-born children of low-wage migrants and their parents.

In 2014, Human Rights Watch found that several migrant domestic workers with children were denied residency renewal. Some were told they were not allowed to have children in Lebanon and given a short period of time to leave the country. At the time, General Security did not respond to written requests from nongovernmental groups, including Human Rights Watch, for a copy of the 2014 directive.

The detentions and deportations largely ceased in the summer of 2015, but apparently resumed in summer 2016, Insan said, with dozens of migrant domestic workers with children summoned to General Security offices and then detained or denied residency renewal.

Human Rights Watch wrote to General Security about these deportations on March 20, and the agency responded on April 19, stating that “General Security did not deport or send away any domestic worker with a child that she wanted to bring with her,” but that a migrant domestic worker giving birth to a child in Lebanon would be “difficult to achieve without violating many laws and regulations” and “the persistence of violations of applicable laws in any country would set its inevitable outcome on the transgressor.” Human Rights Watch wrote to General Security on April 20 seeking clarification as to the meaning of their statement, but did not receive a response.

General Security should publish its current policy regarding migrant domestic workers with children, Human Rights Watch said.

Lebanese authorities have previously deported migrant domestic workers with minimal notice or process for seemingly arbitrary reasons. On December 10, 2016, International Human Rights Day, Lebanon deported Sujana Rana, a Nepalese migrant domestic worker who was involved in advocating for the rights of domestic workers and organizing a migrant domestic workers union.

The estimated 250,000 migrant domestic workers in Lebanon are excluded from labor law protections, and a kafala (visa-sponsorship) system subjects them to restrictive immigration rules, placing them at risk of exploitation and abuse. The large majority of these workers are women, who typically have short-term contracts and are expected to live in their employer’s home.

Migrant domestic workers in Lebanon commonly report non-payment of wages, forced confinement, employers’ refusal to provide time off, and verbal and physical abuse. In 2010, Human Rights Watch found that Lebanon’s judiciary failed to hold employers accountable for these abuses. In 2008, Human Rights Watch found that migrant domestic workers were dying at a rate of one per week, with suicide and attempted escapes the leading causes of death.

Under Lebanese residency regulations, certain categories of low-wage migrants, particularly domestic workers, are not allowed to sponsor residency for their spouses or children. However, in the past, migrant domestic workers could apply for year-long residency permits for their Lebanon-born children up until age 4, and then could apply for residency if the child was enrolled in school. According to two Lebanese lawyers and Insan, General Security requires migrant domestic workers to live in their employer’s home, though no Lebanese law requires this.

Lebanon is obligated under article 23 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to respect the rights of men and women of marriageable age to marry and to found a family. The 2014 General Security directive and its implementation result in disproportionate interference in family life, in particular the separation of families through expulsion. Furthermore, Lebanon has an obligation under the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination to avoid “expulsions of non-citizens, especially of long-term residents, that would result in disproportionate interference with the right to family life.”

Children have a right to, as far as possible, be cared for by their parents, and the right to family relations without unlawful and disproportionate interference. The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) requires countries to “ensure that a child shall not be separated from his or her parents against their will, except when ... such separation is necessary for the best interests of the child.”

In any proceeding that could lead to the separation of children from their parents, all interested parties, including the children, should be given an opportunity to participate and make their views known, and any separation must be subject to judicial review. The convention also says that countries should deal with questions of parents or children entering a country for the purposes of family unity “in a positive, humane, and expeditious manner.” Lebanon is required under the convention to secure the rights to all children within its jurisdiction, without “discrimination of any kind.”

The Lebanese government should comply with its international obligations by ensuring that General Security considers the family interests involved and the best interests of the child before rejecting the renewal of residency for workers or their children or considering their expulsion, Human Rights Watch said. The government should also ratify the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families and the ILO Domestic Workers Convention to safeguard the rights of migrant domestic workers in Lebanon.

“Lebanese authorities should immediately stop deportations or detention of migrant domestic workers for having children in Lebanon,” Fakih said. “Having a child in Lebanon should not be treated like a crime, and the people who come to take care of Lebanese citizens for years should be allowed to have families as well.”

Posted: January 1, 1970, 12:00 am

Demonstrators march outside the Trump Building at 40 Wall St. as part of a protest against the US government's refugee ban in New York on March 28, 2017.

© 2017 Reuters

The broad outlines of President Donald Trump’s “America First” foreign policy veers from build-a-wall isolationism to jingoistic sabre rattling, but in one dimension it has been sadly consistent: the stance that refugees should be kept out, diverted to other countries, or, preferably, confined to their home countries.

Trump has presented keeping refugees in Syria or other war zones as the sole alternative to “taking massive numbers” into the United States, as though supporting refugee-hosting countries is not an option. He has also asserted that this is the solution to Europe’s refugee crisis.

Trump appears to have given little thought to the enormously complicated enterprise of keeping refugees safe in a war-torn country. But that’s unsurprising if his motivation is not the well-being of civilian victims of war in far-off places but, rather, keeping them out of the United States. In fact, it appears to matter less to him whether displaced people from Syria or Central America or Somalia are kept within their own country or in some neighbouring country like Turkey or Mexico that can be used as a buffer zone.

Trump does not stand alone in his expressed desire to contain refugee movements and externalise migration controls. Both ‘Fortress Europe’ and Australia’s ‘Pacific Solution’ demonstrate that other regions have constructed legal and physical barriers to divert irregular migration movements and deflect responsibility to countries that often have far less capacity to process asylum claims and maintain refugees in safety and dignity. And Trump’s predecessors in the United States have at times taken the same path, whether by interdicting Haitians on the high seas or working with Mexico to stem the overland trek of Central Americans.

This is not to suggest that Trump represents mere continuity and consistency. Countervailing shifts have also been developing, as articulated most clearly when the UN General Assembly adopted the New York Declaration on Large Scale Movements of Refugees and Migrants last September. World leaders stood together to acknowledge their “shared responsibility to manage large movements of refugees and migrants in a humane, sensitive, compassionate and people -centred manner” though “cooperation among countries of origin or nationality, transit and destination.”

Early on in the Trump presidency the battle lines have sharpened in the US between accelerating and expanding exclusionary policies, such as the travel ban and suspension of refugee processing, and more inclusive ‘refugees welcome’ calls for responsibility sharing as seen in street and airport demonstrations. The fate of 65 million forcibly displaced people worldwide hangs in the balance.

US efforts to contain the flow of Central Americans

In the case of Central Americans fleeing gang violence and poverty, Trump seems content to build a wall on the US-Mexico border and to use Mexico as a refugee and migrant dumping ground. His 25 January executive order on border security and immigration enforcement would return Central Americans transiting through Mexico back to Mexico, where they would undergo “formal removal proceedings” after they had already been physically removed from the United States.

We can find echoes of Trump’s bid to externalise border controls in former US President Barack Obama’s handling of Central American migrants and asylum seekers. Obama, like Trump, was keen to keep Central American migrants and asylum seekers from reaching the United States, and went to great lengths to use Mexico to stem the northward migration flow. The effort to externalise US-Mexico border controls basically started in the summer of 2014, when tens of thousands of Central American children, and in many cases their mothers, began turning up at the US-Mexico border. The optics of overcrowded detention centres in Texas came at a particularly awkward time politically, as the US Congress was then debating comprehensive immigration reform.

Even though irregular crossings of the southwestern border from 2011 through 2013 – an average of 366,282 crossings per year – were, in fact, at their lowest number since 1972, partisan rhetoric said otherwise. It became a political imperative, if not a humanitarian one, for the administration to demonstrate its control over the southern border.

So, the Obama administration made an expensive deal with Mexico to keep desperate women and children fleeing gang violence in Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala from ever reaching the US border. It would encourage Mexico "to interdict the flow of illegal migrants from Central America bound for the United States," according to Jeh Johnson, the secretary of homeland security at the time.

Stepped-up US funding and diplomatic pressures coincided with Mexican government initiatives to prevent the Central American migration flow. On the same day in July 2014 that Obama sent Congress an emergency supplemental request of $3.7 billion "to comprehensively address this urgent humanitarian situation", his Mexican counterpart, President Enrique Peña Nieto, issued a decree announcing the programa frontera sur (southern border programme) to boost migration enforcement efforts in four southern Mexican states.

The result was often a fast bus ride back from Mexico to the deadly places people had fled, with no real opportunity for protection either in Mexico or back in their home countries.

The Congressional Research Service estimated that US State Department funding to support migration enforcement on Mexico's southern border would exceed $86.6 million prior to the enactment of the appropriation for fiscal year 2015. The US Congress increased the president's $115 million request for fiscal year 2015 by another $79 million, specifying that it was to be used for "efforts to secure Mexico’s southern border".

A year later, the number of apprehensions at the US-Mexico border had fallen by 57%, to 70,400. During that same time, apprehensions of Central American migrants in Mexico rose by 75%, to nearly 93,000.

The Mexican government reported a 60.5% increase in the number of Central Americans deported from Mexico from 2014 to 2015.

Obama won Mexican cooperation on the Central American migration front with increased assistance, cooperation, and praise. Trump’s rhetoric and actions thus far suggest a more confrontational stance toward Mexican interests and sensitivities. It remains to be seen, of course, how Mexico will respond to US government attempts to dump Central Americans across its southern border.

EU efforts to divert asylum seekers to neighbouring countries

Echoes of the Trump ‘wall-them-out-and-contain-them’ doctrine can also be seen in European efforts to divert the migration flow to its neighbours and even to green light the idea of holding refugees in Syria in the EU-Turkey deal in March 2016.

The European Union first sought to shift responsibility toward the non-EU states on the Western Balkan migration route and then ultimately to Turkey, the main transit country for the 850,000 arrivals in Greece in 2015. At the same time, the European Union renewed its efforts to create migration partnerships with African countries, establishing an emergency trust fund for Africa in November 2015 with the explicit aim of reducing migration to Europe.

But EU eyes were really set on Turkey – already home to three million refugees, the largest number in any country in the world – as the gateway to Europe that needed to be closed. In March 2016, the European Union and its member states used inducements of future visa-free travel for Turkish nationals, a renewed path toward EU membership, and billions of euros in aid to seek Turkey’s assistance in preventing Syrian refugees from crossing into the European Union.

On 18 March 2016, the European Union and Turkey came to a formal agreement to return “all new irregular migrants crossing from Turkey into Greek islands” back to Turkey. The agreement states that such returns will take place “in full accordance with EU and international law”. The agreement cites the EU’s Asylum Procedures Directive (APD), and indicates that asylum requests from Syrians, Iraqis, Afghans, and others arriving irregularly by boat from Turkey will be ruled inadmissible because Turkey will be identified as a “safe third country” or as a “first country of asylum” to which most asylum seekers can be returned with less than full examination of their asylum claim.

The agreement ignored important ways that Turkey falls short of the APD’s criteria, such as the inconvenient fact that no Syrian, Iraqi, or Afghan returned to Turkey would be allowed to request refugee status there because Turkey excludes non-Europeans from qualifying for refugee status. When Turkey ratified the 1951 Refugee Convention, it maintained the geographical limitation of that convention – as a post-World War II instrument – for people displaced from Europe.

Syrians do have access to temporary protection in Turkey, which means that Syrians have  some  access  to  assistance  and  more  recently  to  the  labour market, although in practice significant barriers remain. But Iraqis, Afghans, and other nationalities of asylum seekers are not even eligible for temporary protection. The APD also requires the safe third country to respect the principle of nonrefoulement, the prohibition on the forced return of refugees. That principle not only forbids governments from deporting refugees to places where their lives or freedom would be threatened, but also from rejecting asylum seekers at their borders who would face such threats. At the very time the EU was announcing its migration control deal, Turkey had closed its border to tens of thousands of Syrians fleeing a government offensive in the northern Syrian city of Aleppo.

The number of people crossing the Aegean Sea dropped dramatically in 2017. From January to April in 2016, 152,137 people arrived in Greece by sea compared with only 3,856 during the same period of 2017.

The containment strategy has a built-in imperative. If few Syrians are able to reach Greece by boat and the war in Syria drags on, Turkey will be left with an ever-growing refugee population. This creates an incentive for Turkey to bolster its border to prevent more asylum seekers from entering, as well as building pressure on refugees in Turkey to go back to Syria – voluntarily or not. While the deal envisions voluntary resettlement of Syrian refugees from Turkey to the European Union in exchange for the return of Syrian asylum seekers from Greece to Turkey, as of 12 April 2017, only 4,618 had been resettled to EU countries under the deal. Ten EU members, including the UK, had declined to resettle a single person. The one-for-one exchange of Syrians commodifies humans as interchangeable, and disregards the reasons some individuals may have felt compelled to board a boat bound for Greece while others were willing to wait in a camp along the Syrian border or otherwise stay for long periods in Turkey. It also leaves out a resettlement option for Afghans, Iraqis and other non-Syrian refugees.

Whatever the outcome of the EU-Turkey deal, it is clear that externalisation is now the main plank of EU migration policy. This was emphasised in June 2016, when the European Commission announced a new ‘migration partnership framework’. The framework has some positive elements, including the possibility of greater resettlement and other legal routes for migration. But the overall approach is consistent with the European Union’s efforts during the refugee crisis to deflect responsibility and legal obligations away from EU member states and onto transit and origin countries, including through the EU-Turkey deal.

While much of the framework restates longstanding policy approaches, the emphasis is on economic development as the main tool to tackle root causes of migration at the expense of attention to rights abuses that drive flight. The EU also chooses questionable potential partners, like Sudan and Eritrea, that have poor records when it comes to protecting human rights. And the effort to condition general EU aid explicitly on migration cooperation is another worrying element that will require close scrutiny in the coming months and years.

Australia outsourcing

While President Trump’s tweet after meeting with Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull about a “dumb deal” for the US to take “illegal immigrants” from Australia demonstrated his utter disregard for the meaning of refugee status, it also revealed Australia’s own ugly policy of outsourcing its refugee obligations.

Australia’s migration-control externalisation policy, called the ’Pacific Solution’, dates from August 2001 when the Australian navy began interdicting migrants on the high seas. That month, a Norwegian freighter, the Tampa, rescued migrants from an overcrowded vessel and sought to bring them to Australia’s Christmas Island, as the next “place of safety” – the proper place, according to international maritime law, to disembark people rescued from vessels in distress. After the Norwegian ship’s captain defied Australia’s order and entered its territorial waters, the Australian military blocked the Tampa off the coast of Christmas Island, prevented its passengers from disembarking, and transferred them to an Australian military vessel.

During the weeks-long standoff at sea, the Australian Parliament passed legislation with the explicit objective of stemming the unauthorised maritime arrival of asylum seekers. Among other provisions, the legislation, which went into effect in late September 2001, excised Christmas Island and other outlying territories from Australian immigration law, thus prohibiting asylum seekers in these erstwhile Australian territories from lodging asylum claims in Australia.

During September and early October 2001, Australia detained irregular maritime arrivals on Christmas Island or on board Australian naval ships and then transferred them to the Pacific-island country of Nauru, or to Papua New Guinea, where they were confined in camps. At the time, Nauru was not a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention and Papua New Guinea, though a party to the treaty, had attached numerous reservations to its accession and did not have adequate laws and structures to provide effective protection to refugees and asylum seekers.

Australian immigration officials conducted refugee status determinations in Nauru and Papua New Guinea, but they were not for the purpose of granting asylum under Australian law. Instead recognised refugees would be considered for discretionary resettlement to other countries. The asylum seekers in Nauru and Papua New Guinea had no recourse under any national law to challenge the refugee status determinations.

Refugee processing was closed at Manus Island in 2004 and at Nauru in 2008. Nauru became a party to the Refugee Convention in 2011, but lacked the capacity to provide effective asylum procedures and refugee protection.

In August 2012, the Offshore Processing and Other Measures Bill authorised the government to transfer irregular migrants arriving by sea to Nauru or to Manus Island in Papua New Guinea, where they would be held indefinitely while their refugee claims were processed. By mid-2013, all irregular maritime asylum seekers were being sent to Manus and Nauru for processing and none found to be refugees were being resettled to Australia.

Migrants who are not returned to their “sending” country continue to be transferred for offshore ”processing” in substandard conditions, where post-traumatic stress disorder and depression “have reached epidemic proportions” among those transferred, according to a leaked report by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees.

The stated guiding principle of Australia’s Pacific Solution has been the “no advantage” test, to ensure that “no benefit is gained through circumventing regular migration arrangements”. As a consequence of this approach, Australia has refused the option of resettlement to Australia for any refugees from Nauru or Papua New Guinea. The origin of Trump’s inherited agreement is Australia’s search for third countries willing to resettle refugees from its outsourcing centres.

Australia concluded a deal with Cambodia in 2014 to accept refugees from Nauru. The resettlement agreement, coupled with A$40 million in development aid, ignored concerns about safety and the lack of capacity of the Cambodian government. The first group of four refugees arrived in Phnom Penh in June 2015 at a cost to Australia of another A$15 million, but by April 2016 all of the original four had chosen to go back to their home countries rather than remain in Cambodia. As of November 2016, only two such refugees were still in Cambodia.

In April 2016, the Supreme Court of Papua New Guinea ruled that detention of asylum seekers and refugees on Manus Island violated Papua New Guinea’s constitution. The prime minister of Papua New Guinea then called on the Australian government to find alternative arrangements for its detainees on Manus Island and to relocate refugees not wanting to stay there. However, there has been little change in the past year for those being held on Manus Island. As of March 2017, over 800 people are still being held on Manus Island, although Papua New Guinea is no longer referring to Manus as a detention centre, but instead as a centre on a naval base.

International responsibility sharing

Trump’s simplistic, concrete-solutions approach sees in the building of walls and containment zones the answers to nuanced and complex human problems. But the underlying foundation for Trump’s outlook is one of values – a willingness to see the world as us and them, haves and have nots, where “America First” trumps notions of common humanity, universal rights, and a global world order based on interdependence and mutual respect.

Unfortunately, those values have already eroded both in the United States and among like-minded and situated allies in Europe and the Pacific. The result has been a willingness to externalise migration controls and divert and deflect responsibility toward refugees and asylum seekers to countries with far less capacity to process claims, to protect those needing international protection, and to integrate refugees with no durable solutions in their home countries or regions of first asylum.

Many refugee problems do, indeed, seem intractable: protracted situations in Afghanistan, Somalia, and Syria, among others, that not only remain unresolved, but seem to grow worse by the year as refugees continue to flee what seem like never-ending crises. Containment, by whatever pretext, is not the answer; pressure cookers do explode. And sloughing the problem off to poorer countries in the neighbourhood of conflict risks destabilising those countries and causing even more turmoil and displacement.

In fact, the choices are not reduced to either accepting large numbers of refugees or keeping them in dangerous situations in their own country, as Trump has suggested. There are responsible ways for the countries with advanced economies to help build the capacity of less developed countries to enable refugees and host communities to live in dignity. New models geared toward social and economic integration of refugees will do more than heightened enforcement to preserve the institution of asylum and the international refugee regime that supports millions of refugees in countries of first arrival like Lebanon, Kenya, and Pakistan where 86% of the world’s refugees live. And, of course, root causes cannot be ignored. Most refugees will want to go home if they feel that they can do so in safety and dignity, but that requires far more attention to conflict resolution, building respect for human rights, and the rehabilitation and reconstruction of failed states.

The global asylum system succeeds only to the extent that the more distant and wealthier countries and regions like the United States, the EU, and Australia are willing to contribute financially, through refugee resettlement, and through their own example in giving asylum seekers a fair chance to make their claims. Right now, the system is failing. At stake is not only refugee lives, but a world order built on a community of nations.

Author: Human Rights Watch
Posted: January 1, 1970, 12:00 am

In his speech announcing new “get tough on immigrants” policies, Attorney General Jeff Sessions said it was necessary to take a “stand” against “transnational gangs like MS-13 and international cartels.”

Members of the MS-13 gang are detained near the crime scene where two men, Jose Wilfredo Navidad and Nestor Alexander Rivera, were killed as they rode a motorcycle on their way to work, in San Salvador, El Salvador January 26, 2016.

© 2016 Reuters

MS-13. The Mara Salvatrucha. I remember when MS-13 was a local gang, centered just outside downtown Los Angeles in the Pico-Union neighborhood. It was made up primarily of Salvadoran teens whose families had left that country to escape poverty, an oppressive right wing regime, and a brutal civil war. In the 1990s, MS-13 grew large and often violent. As a public defender in Los Angeles at that time, I represented many MS-13 members, and many of their rivals, on charges ranging from petty theft and vandalism to murder.

The gang members I represented while working juvenile court were mostly lost kids struggling with poverty, poor schools, broken families, and little hope, who found a home and structure in the gang. Some committed inexcusable acts of violence, but many were convicted for minor crimes, and then, under US policy, deported to the country of their birth. They often didn’t know the language, and had nothing there – no family or cultural ties. Nothing, except the gang.

Traveling in El Salvador in 1998, everywhere I went I saw MS-13 graffiti and hard-looking, shaven-headed boys standing on the corners, who appeared straight out of Pico-Union. I saw in them the faces of my former clients. The US deportation strategy exported Los Angeles’ gangs – MS-13 to El Salvador, 18th Street to Guatemala, other LA gangs all over Mexico and Central America. Now they have become international criminal organizations, funded by smuggling drugs and people and committing violence here and throughout much of Mexico and Central America.

The US should take intelligent steps to stop gang violence. But most of the people Sessions’ policies would crack down on – recent border crossers, including asylum seekers charged with “illegal entry” or “reentry,” parents of US citizens who may have committed some minor offense – are not transnational criminals. Often, they are the gangs’ victims.

Before breaking up families, locking people in detention centers, and causing people to fear the government, Sessions would do well to take a hard look at the unintended consequences of the United States’ own past hardline policies.

Author: Human Rights Watch
Posted: January 1, 1970, 12:00 am

Summary

For the last 25 years, Israel has imposed increasingly strict restrictions on travel to and from the Gaza Strip. Those restrictions affect nearly every aspect of life in Gaza, including the ability of human rights workers to document violations of human rights and international humanitarian law (IHL) and to advocate for their remediation. While Israel makes exceptions to its travel ban for what it calls humanitarian reasons, as a rule, it does not permit Palestinian, Israeli and foreign staff of human rights organizations to enter or leave Gaza. Israel controls Gaza’s airspace and territorial waters and has prevented the operation of an airport or seaport for the past two decades, rendering Palestinians in Gaza dependent on foreign ports to travel abroad. It also severely restricts all travel between Gaza and the West Bank, recognized as a single territorial unit, even when the transit does not take place via Israeli territory.

Egypt has kept its border crossing with Gaza, Rafah crossing, mostly closed since 2013, opening it every several weeks to allow passage for a few thousand people. It has refused permission for foreign human rights workers to enter Gaza via the Rafah crossing in recent years and has restricted the ability of Palestinian human rights workers to cross. In justifying its restrictions on access via Rafah, Egypt says that Israel, as the occupying power, is responsible for Gaza, and it also cites the security situation in the area of Egypt's Sinai Peninsula bordering Gaza, where an affiliate of the Islamic State has engaged in violent confrontations with the Egyptian military since 2013, killing hundreds. But Egypt began greatly restricting transit through Rafah before the security situation in the Sinai deteriorated and shortly after the military's July 2013 removal of former President Mohamed Morsy, whom the military accused of receiving support from Hamas. While Egypt does not owe obligations to Palestinians under the law of occupation and can, with some important limitations, decide whom to allow to enter its territory, its actions are exacerbating the impact of Israel’s travel restrictions on residents of Gaza.

The Israeli government justifies the restrictions on travel, including travel for human rights workers, on two grounds. First, it says, travel between Gaza and Israel inherently endangers Israeli security, whether the travelers are Palestinians or not, and irrespective of any individualized risk assessment for a particular person. Second, it says, its obligations toward Gaza are limited to allowing passage for exceptional humanitarian circumstances only, and job-related travel for human rights workers does not qualify as exceptionally humanitarian.

Without the ability to get staff, consultants and volunteers into and out of Gaza, Palestinian human rights groups find it difficult to maintain programs across Gaza and the West Bank, which Israel recognized as a single territorial unit, and about which there is international consensus that is it occupied territory.[1] Palestinian human rights workers from Gaza are all but barred from accessing training and professional development opportunities outside Gaza and from meeting with their West Bank-based colleagues. Foreign and Israeli staff of human rights organizations are ordinarily not permitted into Gaza, limiting their ability to identify, research and advocate against human rights and IHL abuses and keeping experts from applying specialized knowledge to the research and documentation of IHL violations, including possible war crimes.

The Hamas authorities in Gaza, for their part, have not taken adequate steps to protect human rights defenders against retaliation for criticizing armed groups in Gaza, and in some cases they have arrested and harassed Palestinians who express criticism of the Hamas regime.

The prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) has opened a preliminary examination into possible serious crimes committed in Palestine, including Gaza, as of June 13, 2014. A key factor the prosecutor will consider in determining whether to open a formal investigation is whether any credible national proceedings exist that would preclude the ICC’s involvement. Under what is known as the principle of complementarity, the ICC is a court of last resort, stepping in only where national authorities are unable or unwilling to conduct genuine domestic proceedings.

In public statements and documents, the Israeli government and military have argued vigorously that the Israeli mechanism for investigating potential war crimes meets international standards and that Israeli officials are actively and genuinely investigating all relevant claims and information regarding potential violations of IHL. The Israeli authorities acknowledge the difficulty of collecting evidence from inside Gaza, where Israel no longer has a permanent ground troop presence, and of receiving complaints and information from witnesses and victims inside Gaza, who fear and distrust the Israeli military. However, they cite, among other means, cooperation with and reliance on human rights and other nongovernmental organizations as an important means of receiving information about potential violations of IHL and obtaining the cooperation of Palestinian witnesses. Yet the restrictions that the Israeli military imposes on access for human rights workers make it more difficult for human rights workers to document potential violations. These restrictions hamper what is, by the Israeli government’s own acknowledgement, a significant source of information and evidence about potential IHL violations, raising questions not just about the capability of the Israeli authorities to investigate potential violations of the laws of war but also their willingness to do so.

Israel’s restrictions on access to and from Gaza go far beyond what is permitted by international humanitarian law and human rights law. Because Israel continues to exercise control over significant aspects of life in Gaza, it continues to have obligations under the law of occupation in the areas in which it continues to exercise control – primarily to allow the movement of people and goods. While the law of occupation allows Israel to restrict travel for imperative reasons of security, the generalized travel ban it imposes is vastly disproportionate to any concrete security threat. Israel is also required, under the law of occupation as codified in Article 43 of the Hague Regulations,[2] to permit the proper functioning of civil society, including human rights organizations and activity. The ban also runs afoul of Israel’s obligations to respect the human rights of Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank, including their right to freedom of movement, which includes, with some limitations, a right to enter and leave one’s country and to choose one’s place of residence within it.

Israel should bring its policy on access to Gaza into conformity with its obligations under IHL and human rights law. It should do so by facilitating access to and from Gaza for all Palestinians, subject to individualized security screenings and inspections. In particular, it should facilitate access for Palestinian human rights workers, whose activities are an essential part of a properly functioning society and who are part of a civil society that, by the Israeli government’s own admission, plays an important role in documenting and advocating against potential war crimes and violations of IHL. Israel should also strongly consider permitting access to Gaza for foreign human rights workers, who contribute to the proper functioning of normal civilian life by providing assistance to local human rights groups, strengthening civil society, and helping to protect victims. The work of such organizations defending human rights has been recognized as worthy of protection by the United Nations General Assembly.

Human Rights Watch also recommends that the International Criminal Court open a formal investigation into the situation in Palestine in order to ensure accountability for any potential serious crimes committed in Palestine since June 2014. It recommends that the Hamas authorities in Gaza take steps to protect human rights activists and allow them to document violations by all sides, including by Hamas and armed Palestinian groups inside Gaza. 

Egypt also should consider the impact of its closure of the border with Gaza on the rights of Palestinians living there, as well as its obligations to uphold the Fourth Geneva Convention, which provides protections for people living under occupation.

Recommendations

To the Israeli Defense Ministry and Interior Ministry

  • End the generalized ban on travel to and from Gaza, and permit the free movement of people to and from Gaza, subject to individual security screenings and physical inspection. Such screenings should take place in a transparent, non-arbitrary manner, should give individuals an opportunity to challenge refusals directly before the Israeli authorities, and should balance measures to protect against specific, concrete security threats with Israel’s obligations toward Palestinians living in Gaza.
  • Until the travel ban is lifted, add human rights workers to the categories of Palestinians permitted to travel between Gaza, Israel and the West Bank and to travel abroad from Gaza in order to access work meetings, trainings, conferences, and other professional development opportunities, including rest and relaxation breaks.
  • Allow foreign and Israeli human rights organizations to send personnel, consultants, volunteers and experts into Gaza in order to engage in work-related documentation, training, research, and advocacy.
  • Facilitate access to ports for travel abroad. Until Palestinians are permitted to reopen and reestablish their airport and open a seaport, allow Palestinians to use Israeli ports for travel.

To the International Criminal Court’s Office of the Prosecutor

  • In evaluating the credibility of Israel’s domestic investigations, take into consideration Israel's policy on travel for human rights workers, including the effect of the travel restrictions on the quality and extent of the information that reaches Israeli military authorities and how this may reflect on the ability and willingness of the authorities to conduct genuine proceedings.
  • Raise concerns with Israeli authorities about their policy toward the movement into and out of Gaza for human rights workers.

To the Hamas Authorities in Gaza

  • Protect human rights workers in Gaza from all threats of retaliation or harm, physical or otherwise, stemming from their research and advocacy regarding human rights and IHL violations, including abuses by armed groups in Gaza.
  • Refrain from arresting, censoring or otherwise taking action against people in Gaza who peacefully document human rights and IHL violations and express criticism of the government, including human rights activists, journalists, and others.
  • Conduct genuine investigations into alleged serious crimes committed by armed Palestinian groups in Gaza during the 2014 war.

To Egypt

  • Like all parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention, Egypt should do everything within its power to ensure the universal application of the Convention’s humanitarian provisions, including protections for civilians living under occupation.. Egypt should also allow access for United Nations Human Rights investigators and consider the impact of its border closure on the rights of Palestinians to travel to and from Gaza.

Methodology

This report examines Israel’s policy on allowing access into and out of Gaza for staff members, consultants, volunteers and other personnel working with Palestinian, Israeli, and foreign human rights organizations. It also examines the impact of that policy on the ability of the Israeli authorities to investigate adequately violations of IHL that allegedly occurred in Gaza or are otherwise related to the conduct of hostilities between the Israeli military and armed Palestinian groups in Gaza.  

A Human Rights Watch researcher and two Human Rights Watch research assistants conducted 12 interviews with representatives of four Palestinian human rights organizations based in Gaza, two foreign human rights organizations, and one Israeli human rights organization. Four of these organizations play a prominent role in documenting abuses stemming from the conduct of hostilities between Israel and Palestinian armed groups in Gaza.

We also reviewed documents published by the Israeli Defense Ministry outlining the criteria for entering and leaving Gaza, court documents in which the Israeli authorities explained their policy regarding access for Gaza and its rationale, written responses to individual requests to travel to and from Gaza, and public statements, written and oral, made by the Israeli authorities regarding their mechanisms for investigating violations of IHL by Israeli armed forces and the nature of their relationship with human rights organizations.

We reviewed publications by these human rights organizations, including a 2016 report on the effect of the travel restrictions on civil society organizations and reports issued by human rights groups on the conduct of hostilities during the summer of 2014. Human Rights Watch wrote to the Israeli military attorney general (MAG) seeking comment and received a letter in response, the full text of which is included in the annex to this report.

In the course of researching this report, Human Rights Watch repeatedly requested permission for its foreign staff members to enter Gaza. The Israeli authorities refused most of those requests, but they approved the last request on an exceptional basis, as will be described in the report, and two representatives of Human Rights Watch visited Gaza in September 2016.

All interviewees freely consented to be interviewed. Human Rights Watch explained to them the purpose of the interview and how the information gathered would be used, and did not offer any remuneration.

I. Closure of Gaza

The Gaza Strip, the West Bank and Israel, together make up the land that was mandatory Palestine, governed by the UK, in the post-World War I era. The cultural, political, economic, social and familial ties between these areas run deep, and for most of the modern era there was freedom of movement across the region. The 1948 Arab-Israeli War divided these areas, leaving Gaza under Egyptian military occupation, the West Bank under Jordanian rule, and Israel as a sovereign state. Palestinian refugees from what became Israel fled or were expelled to Gaza, and today 72 percent of Gaza’s 1.8 million residents are refugees or their descendants.[3] The Israeli capture of Gaza and the West Bank in 1967 led to all the areas coming under the control of Israel, with Israel establishing two military governments to rule Gaza and the West Bank.

For the first two decades of the Israeli occupation, Palestinians were mostly permitted to travel between Israel, Gaza and the West Bank, effectively rejuvenating the historical ties that had been interrupted in 1948. While the Israeli military declared Gaza and the West Bank to be closed military zones, it issued a series of “general exit permits” mostly allowing Palestinians to travel without need of an individualized permit, unless individually prohibited.[4]

Students at the Islamic University of Gaza. 

© 2017 Abier Almasri

In 1991, during the first Intifada or Palestinian uprising and against the backdrop of the first Gulf War in which Iraq bombed Israel, the Israeli military canceled the general exit permit that had been in place and gradually began to require Palestinians to obtain individual permits to travel. Although the 1995 Oslo Peace Accords recognized Gaza and the West Bank as a “single territorial unit,” during the 1990s it became increasingly difficult to travel between the two areas, and in 1995 Israel built a fence along its border with Gaza.[5] With some ebbs and flows, between 1991 and 2005, travel into and out of Gaza became increasingly restricted.[6] The restrictions coincided with escalations of violence, including armed clashes between armed groups in Gaza and the Israeli military, attacks on the crossings between Gaza and Israel, and bombings targeting Israeli civilians inside Israel and the Gaza Strip.

For most of that time period, the Israeli military, which controlled access between Gaza and the outside world, justified the travel restrictions by citing security concerns or military necessity. The restrictions included both individual travel bans, based on assessments by the Israel Security Agency (ISA or Shin Bet), and generalized restrictions, such as closing crossings, blocking entire categories of people from traveling, or limiting travel to humanitarian cases.[7]

In 2005, Israel removed the civilian settlements it had established in the Gaza Strip, ended its permanent ground troop presence there, and withdrew from the Gaza-Egypt border. At that time, the rationale for imposing travel restrictions began to shift. Israel claimed that it no longer occupied the Gaza Strip and that it therefore no longer owed obligations to Palestinian residents of Gaza under the law of occupation, including a duty to permit travel.[8] In September 2007, following the collapse of a Palestinian national unity government and the takeover of internal control of Gaza by the Hamas movement, the Israeli government issued a cabinet decision announcing restrictions on the movement of people and goods into and out of Gaza, including in order to weaken the economy in Gaza, which the government declared to be a “hostile territory.”[9]

The Israeli government calls its policy restricting access into and out of Gaza “the separation policy,” which it says serves both security and political goals.[10] It says it wants to restrict travel between Gaza and the West Bank to a minimum in order to avoid transferring “a human terrorist network” from Gaza to the West Bank,[11] the latter of which has a porous border with Israel and is home to a half million Israeli settlers. Today, access into and out of Gaza for Palestinians is limited to “exceptional humanitarian circumstances, with an emphasis on urgent medical cases,”[12] although Israel also considers hundreds of senior merchants and others eligible to travel.

In 2016, there were on average 12,150 crossings per month of Palestinians from Gaza entering Israel and the West Bank,[13] compared with more than half a million crossings in September 2000, on the eve of the outbreak of the second Intifada or Palestinian uprising.[14] The number of crossings is much higher than the number of people who travel because some travelers, especially merchants, travel multiple times per month. Access for Palestinians between Gaza, Israel and the West Bank is barely more than 2 percent of what it was in September 2000, and most of Gaza’s nearly 2 million residents are not permitted to travel.

Also in 2016, an average of 700 representatives of international organizations, primarily humanitarian aid workers, traveled between Gaza and Israel and the West Bank each month. There is additional travel by foreigners (people listed on neither the Palestinian nor the Israeli population registry) between Gaza and Israel and the West Bank each month via the Erez passenger crossing, including journalists, diplomats and those traveling to visit immediate family members in cases of death, grave illness, or weddings.[15] Still, access via the Erez crossing has risen from what appears to be an all-time low in 2008, a year in which the criteria were particularly restrictive. That year, there were only about 2,000 crossings per month of Palestinians from Gaza to Israel, mostly medical patients and their companions, diplomats, and humanitarian aid workers.[16]

These restrictions have devastated the economy in Gaza,[17] separated families,[18] blocked access to medical care[19] and educational opportunities,[20] thwarted reconstruction,[21] and deepened the split between Gaza and the West Bank, a rupture exacerbated by the 2007 Palestinian factional split that left Fatah governing the West Bank and Hamas governing Gaza.

Israel withdrew from the Rafah border crossing between Gaza and Egypt in 2005, leaving Egypt and Hamas in control of their respective sides. Egypt has kept the Rafah crossing mostly closed since the 2013 overthrow of President Mohamed Morsy, reflecting strained relations between the new Egyptian government and the Hamas government in Gaza, which is affiliated with Morsy’s Muslim Brotherhood party. On the rare days that the Rafah crossing opens, once every several weeks, access is limited to the few thousand people who can cross before it closes. Priorities are determined by the Hamas government and the Egyptian authorities. In 2016, there were 3,520 crossings per month of Palestinians between Egypt and Gaza in both directions, compared with a monthly average of 34,991 in 2012.[22] In other words, access for Palestinians between Gaza and Egypt is just ten percent of what it was in 2012, and the Rafah crossing is closed most of the time.  Egypt had been the gateway to travel abroad for Palestinians in Gaza but is now mostly closed off to them.

Israel controls Gaza’s airspace and territorial waters and, citing security concerns, permits no air or sea travel to or from there.[23]

For all these reasons, travel via the Erez crossing is the primary route for travel between Gaza, Israel, the West Bank, and foreign countries.

II. Access for Human Rights Workers

The umbrella organization PNGO, whose membership includes only some of Palestine’s civil society groups, lists 135 nongovernmental organizations working in fields such as development, culture, education, environment, and human rights.[24] Dozens of Palestinian human rights organizations are either based in Gaza or conduct activities in Gaza. Among these are human rights organizations that research and report on violations of IHL or the laws of war, including during escalations of violence between Israel and armed Palestinian groups in Gaza. In addition, at least two Israeli human rights organizations conduct research in Gaza through permanent field researchers who live there, and foreign human rights organizations either employ permanent staff members or periodically conduct research in Gaza. Human Rights Watch has employed a permanent research assistant in Gaza since 2009.

Israeli Policy on Travel

The Israeli military considers both Gaza and the West Bank to be under a “closure,” meaning the default rule is that Palestinians may not travel into Israel or between Gaza and the West Bank unless they qualify for enumerated exceptions that change periodically. Following extensive litigation under Israel’s Freedom of Information Act,[25] the Israeli Defense Ministry now publishes its criteria for travel between Gaza, the West Bank and Israel, called “permissions in the closure.”[26] The criteria permit travel for patients seeking medical care outside Gaza and their companions, “senior merchants” purchasing goods from Israel or the West Bank, family visits for immediate family in cases of death, grave illness or weddings, elderly worshippers traveling to Jerusalem, visits to relatives incarcerated in Israel,[27] and others. Senior merchants make up the largest category of Palestinians entering Israel, accounting for 54 percent of all crossings by Palestinians, with medical patients accounting for 21 percent. [28] The third largest category of people crossing are employees of international organizations, who constitute nearly 5 percent of all crossings by Palestinians into Israel from Gaza, more than 700 per month.[29] This last category includes Palestinian employees or contractors of diplomatic representations or international aid organizations registered with the Israeli ministries of Social Welfare, Foreign Affairs, or Interior.[30]

Belonging to one of these approved categories qualifies an individual to apply for a travel permit but does not guarantee they will receive one. Access in some categories is subject to quotas, and access for all travelers is subject to a security screening by the ISA. Such screenings are nontransparent, and when the ISA objects to granting a permit, little or no information about the nature of the security allegations are available to the applicant or their legal representative.

Human rights workers – Palestinian, Israeli or foreign – are not included in the categories of people eligible to travel through the Erez crossing. When Palestinian, Israeli or foreign human rights organizations request access for staff, visitors or volunteers, the Israeli government systematically refuses. In some cases, the Israeli military claimed that it would not allow travel for employees of human rights organizations because those organizations have not registered with the Israeli authorities as international organizations.[31] Yet registration appears limited to diplomatic representations such as foreign embassies or the United Nations and “international aid organizations providing assistance to the Palestinian territories.”[32] No publicly available procedure has been established for allowing human rights organizations to register. Since 2013, the Israeli human rights group Gisha has asked multiple government agencies for information regarding the supposed ability of international organizations, other than aid organizations and diplomats, to register for purposes of requesting travel permits, but no government agency has taken responsibility for such registration, and a procedure to request recognition does not appear to exist.[33]

In a failed court challenge of that policy, brought by the Israeli human rights groups B’Tselem and Gisha when they sought permission for B’Tselem’s field researchers from Gaza to attend meetings and trainings in Jerusalem, the Israeli authorities explained the distinction they draw between humanitarian organizations and human rights organizations for purposes of travel into and out of Gaza:

As far as recognized international organizations are concerned, we are talking about organizations such as the International Red Cross, the World Health Organization (WHO), the United Nations Refugee Works Agency (UNRWA), the United Nations Development Corporation (UNDP), and the like, which work in the Gaza Strip and Judea and Samaria for the purpose of humanitarian assistance to residents of the Strip, including in areas such as welfare, education, health, etc.…[34]

The policy, according to the Israeli government, promotes the foreign policy interests of the State of Israel by allowing passage for employees of certain international organizations and diplomatic representatives and workers whose passage is needed to fulfil Israel’s commitment “not to harm the humanitarian minimum that residents of the Strip need – including giving travel permits in appropriate humanitarian circumstances.”[35]

The standard reply to travel requests from human rights organizations is that travel to and from Gaza is limited to exceptional humanitarian circumstances, and that travel to facilitate human rights work does not meet those criteria.[36] As noted, the Israeli human rights group B’Tselem has repeatedly failed to get permission for its field researchers to leave Gaza for meetings with the rest of the staff in Jerusalem.[37] The Gaza-based Palestinian human rights groups the Palestinian Center for Human Rights (PCHR) and al-Mezan Center for Human Rights continue to request permits for their staff members invited to workshops, trainings, meetings and conferences, but they routinely and repeatedly receive refusals.[38]

While the explanation differs slightly, the Israeli military also refuses to allow foreign human rights workers living in Israel or visiting it to enter Gaza at least since 2012. Amnesty International, a leading human rights group based in London that has documented human rights and IHL violations in Gaza since the 1980’s, has tried for the last four years to get its staff into Gaza. The last time Israel granted permission was June 2012. When hostilities between Israel and armed Palestinian groups in Gaza erupted in November 2012, the Israeli military authorities refused or failed to respond to multiple requests from Amnesty International to enter both during and after the fighting. Amnesty International was able to get its staff into Gaza in 2012 via the Egyptian border, which was open at that time. By the next period of hostilities in July and August 2014, the Egyptian border had closed. Amnesty International submitted four separate requests to the Israeli authorities during the fighting, but the authorities refused. Immediately following the hostilities, Amnesty International appealed the refusal through an ombudsman branch of the Israeli military, also with no success. [39] 

In July 2015, a lawyer acting on behalf of Amnesty International requested access for the group’s foreign staff. In September 2015, the Israeli military refused the request. [40]

Separately, Amnesty International approached the Israeli Foreign Ministry and the Israeli Ministry of Social Affairs to try to register as an international organization in order to obtain access to Gaza, but officials told Amnesty International that it does not fit the criteria for registration.[41]

Human Rights Watch has also repeatedly tried to get its staff into Gaza, but beginning in 2009 the Israeli military authorities refused or failed to answer requests. During and immediately after the 2014 hostilities, Human Rights Watch made multiple unsuccessful requests to enter Gaza via the Erez crossing. In one response, the Israeli military authorities said they only accept requests from organizations registered with the Ministry of Welfare (limited to international aid organizations) or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (limited to diplomats) and referred Human Rights Watch to another branch of the military.[42] That department refused the request, saying that it only approved entry for doctors and medical staff.[43] The authorities made an exception in September 2016, after seven years of refusals, and allowed two foreign staff members of Human Rights Watch to enter Gaza, after they requested permission to do so in order to advocate on behalf of Israeli civilians held by armed Palestinian groups in Gaza. The authorities categorized that positive response as a one-time exception, falling outside the criteria established by military policy.[44]

As of 2013, the Egyptian authorities have also refused to allow foreign human rights workers to enter Gaza during one of the infrequent openings of the Rafah border crossing, effectively closing Gaza off from the global staff of these human rights organizations and external experts invited by local groups. Neither Human Rights Watch nor Amnesty International was able to get foreign staff into Gaza during or immediately after the 2014 hostilities. In justifying its restrictions on access via Rafah, Egypt says that assuring access to and from Gaza is the responsibility of Israel, which is an occupying power in Gaza, and it also cites the security situation in the Sinai Desert, the area in Egypt bordering Gaza where armed groups engage in violent confrontations with Egyptian security forces.[45] Yet at other points in time, Egypt has managed to keep Rafah open, despite the activities of armed groups in Sinai.

In a recent letter to Human Rights Watch, the Israeli military explained why it does not permit foreign staff of human rights organizations to enter Gaza from Israel:

Exit by foreigners, lawfully present in Israel, from Israel into the Gaza Strip and their subsequent return to Israel raise the inherent risk associated with unmonitored travel between the Gaza Strip and Israel. This is partly the reason why it has been decided that exit from Israel into the Gaza Strip by foreign nationals will be permitted in humanitarian cases only and subject to the policy in effect at the time.[46]

On the one hand, the Israeli authorities interpret the criterion “humanitarian” in a narrow way, to include humanitarian circumstances personal to an applicant, such as illness or mourning the death of a family member, but to exclude human rights workers conducting work with clear humanitarian implications, such as training in rehabilitating torture victims[47] or security training to protect a staff member.[48] On the other hand, within those same narrow criteria, Israel permits nearly 7,000 crossings by merchants each month for the purpose of buying goods and 700 crossings monthly by representatives of international organizations, where, especially in the case of the merchants, one person might make multiple crossings each month.[49] 

ISA Security Screenings

All requests to travel via the Erez crossing are subject to security screenings by the ISA or Shin Bet, as it is commonly known. In some cases, the military authorities reject requests to travel based on an individualized assessment that travel by a particular person poses a security risk. Human rights groups have criticized the lack of transparency and apparent arbitrariness of the screening process.[50]

The policy described above, however, is a test that is applied to permit requests even before a person is screened by the ISA. In other words, the Israeli military first determines whether a person meets the eligibility requirement to request a permit, and only if the request meets the criteria do the military authorities consider an ISA evaluation. The refusals addressed in this report refer to refusals based on the first test: i.e. whether a person meets the criteria for travel. In some cases, human rights workers have been allowed to travel via Erez for a reason unrelated to their work in human rights organizations, meaning they have cleared the ISA screening, but when those same people request a work-related permit the military authorities refuse.[51]

Impact on Human Rights Work

The restrictions on travel make it more difficult for human rights organizations – Palestinian, Israeli and foreign – to do their work documenting human rights and IHL violations and advocating against them. The Israeli human rights group Gisha documented some of these difficulties in an extensive study on the effects of the travel restrictions on 32 civil society organizations in Gaza and the West Bank, including human rights groups.[52] By conducting interviews and focus groups, Gisha found that the inability to travel blocked access to training, impeded intra-organizational and inter-organizational working relationships and collaboration, contributed to waste and duplication of resources, made it harder to get funding, cut off access to stress-management and stress-relief opportunities, and made it more difficult for young civil society leaders to emerge and advance.

These obstacles have a direct effect on the work of human rights organizations documenting violations of the laws of war, including possible war crimes, and advocating for their remediation.

Palestinian Human Rights Workers in Gaza Isolated

Palestinian human rights workers living in Gaza find it very difficult to participate in trainings, conferences, workshops or meetings held outside Gaza, whether in the West Bank, Israel, or abroad. For Gaza-based employees of groups based in the West Bank, Israel or foreign countries, the lack of actual contact with colleagues and supervisors highlights a sense of isolation and makes it more difficult to develop and sustain the kind of working relationships that maximize productivity and creativity. Kareem Jubran, director of field research at the Israeli human rights group B’Tselem, supervises three field researchers working in the Gaza Strip. He was last able to meet two of them in 2012, when the Rafah crossing with Egypt was still open, and they traveled from Gaza to Egypt to Jordan to meet him and other staff members of the Jerusalem-based group:

The problem is with training … I’m always trying to explain things over the telephone. When we talk about the work plan, it takes time to discuss and persuade regarding what our needs are there, what we want. If I could give them more tools, research ability, theoretical knowledge regarding international law, it would help us a lot more. We are always trying to get them to trainings in Gaza, but it’s not the same as a program you build yourself. There’s also the emotional strain on them, the danger and the mental difficulty. A person like that needs to feel as if he’s part of a larger team. And he doesn’t have that feeling when he’s working in the field alone … they don’t know the staff, there are no human faces, and that affects the professional relationships … I felt that when I met them in Amman. After three years of telephone contact, I had developed a stereotype in my head of who they were. And then I discovered that their personalities were different. And from then on, it was easier to supervise them, to understand them, to know their sensitivities. It’s important for a long-term work relationship.[53]

Human rights workers in Gaza report feeling cut off from others in their field and unable to communicate their perspectives at gatherings and conferences. Fadel Mezni is a researcher at the Palestinian Center for Human Rights (PCHR). “There is no exchange or updates of ideas and principles,” he said. “The Gaza representation – their voice is silenced. In addition to the personal cost of not developing professional skills, that is the deeper, wider cost.”[54]

PCHR’s deputy director, Jaber Wishah, said that the inability to get staff out of Gaza meant that his organization could not bring its findings to international fora but rather had to rely on colleague organizations to represent its work. Advocacy is also difficult to plan, he said, because the group does not know if or when it can get staff outside, and when staff members get stuck outside Gaza waiting for the Rafah crossing to reopen, the cost of an extended stay strains the organizational budget.[55]

Bahjat al-Helou is the training coordinator at the Gaza office of the Independent Commission for Human Rights. 

© 2017 Abier Almasri

Bahjat al-Helou is the training coordinator at the Gaza office of the Independent Commission for Human Rights, a statutorily-created commission that monitors human rights compliance by the Palestinian authorities. Its headquarters is in the West Bank. He said organizational planning was difficult across the two branches without the ability to meet face to face:

I wouldn’t say the quality of our work product is lowered. We work passionately and tirelessly. But it affects the impact of our reporting and fact-finding missions. We cannot present our work. Something is lost when the person from Gaza is relying on West Bank colleagues to present and run advocacy campaigns on our behalf.[56]

Second, the travel restrictions mean that outside experts and human rights workers cannot get into Gaza, including for training or volunteer work. Wishah of PCHR said that even when he has been able to secure funding for external experts to train staff, that training has mostly taken place via teleconference, due to the inability to obtain permits. For similar reasons, PCHR has difficulty getting foreign interns and volunteers, and they often have to work out of a small PCHR satellite office in the West Bank.[57]

Samir Zaqout is the field research unit coordinator at the Palestinian human rights group Al-Mezan. 

© 2017 Abier Almasri

During and after escalations of violence, especially, the inability to get external experts or even UN investigators and human rights experts into Gaza makes it difficult to conduct documentation and reporting on potential violations of IHL. During the large-scale military operation in July and August of 2014, the Israeli authorities refused repeated requests by the global human rights organizations Amnesty International[58] and Human Rights Watch to send specially-trained emergencies researchers and weapons experts into Gaza. It also refused entry to a commission of inquiry established by the United Nations Human Rights Council to investigate potential crimes committed during the 2014 fighting.[59] While researchers at Palestinian human rights groups inside Gaza have experience in documenting the conduct of hostilities, they do not have specialized weapons training and so rely on the engineering unit of the Palestinian police to analyze shrapnel and other remains in order to determine which weapons were used and how. In 2012, external weapons experts were able to enter Gaza via Rafah to support local human rights groups, but in 2014, no external experts were able to get in.

“It would have been helpful to have external weapons experts enter Gaza” in 2014, Samir Zaqout, field research unit coordinator at the Palestinian human rights group Al-Mezan, said.[60]

Foreign Human Rights Groups Shut Out

The inability to get foreigners into Gaza is also problematic for international human rights organizations based abroad, even if they employ research assistants who are residents of Gaza.

The last time that Amnesty International was able to get staff members into Gaza was in 2012. In the summer of 2012, Israel granted permission for a delegation from Amnesty International to enter Gaza via the Erez crossing for a research project related to detention practices by the Gaza authorities. In November 2012, during the large-scale military operation, a delegation of two researchers and a weapons expert seeking to document IHL violations stemming from the conflict were not permitted to enter through Israel but reached Gaza via the Rafah crossing, which was open at that time. By 2014, however, Rafah had closed, and Israel rejected multiple requests to allow emergencies researchers and weapons and medical experts into Gaza from Israel.[61] Instead, Amnesty International worked with two local researchers hired temporarily. The external team was not even able to get safety equipment, including helmets and flak jackets, to the local researchers. Saleh Hijazi, one of the researchers responsible for Israel and the occupied Palestinian territory who was based in the UK at the time, said that without the ability to work directly with staff on the ground, he felt like he was “managing the field researcher more than focusing on the research itself ... the questions weren’t necessarily what we needed. The photographs as well were sometimes meaningless.” He said the biggest problem was the lack of military and medical experts who could examine evidence first-hand. “It’s a major loss not having these experts on the ground,” Hijazi said.[62]

The Amnesty International research team directed the local researchers by phone and Internet, and much time was spent uploading photos to be sent for analysis and sending researchers back to the field to bring supplementary information. Hijazi said that Amnesty International would have been able to do more research, and more quickly, had the team of experts been able to reach Gaza during the war and immediately afterward.

Human Rights Watch experienced similar difficulties during the 2014 war.[63] With the exception of a one-time entry in September 2016, it was last able to get foreign staff members into Gaza via Israel in 2008.  Thereafter, with one exception, the Israeli authorities refused or failed to respond to repeated requests to enter Gaza throughout the years. Until 2012, Human Rights Watch was able to get into Gaza via Egypt, but after Egypt closed the Rafah crossing to regular traffic in 2013, the Egyptian authorities also refused Human Rights Watch’s requests to enter Gaza, citing security. In 2014, the emergencies researcher, weapons expert and Israel and Palestine researcher directed the work of a consultant and a research assistant in Gaza via telephone and Internet communication. Communications with the staff on the ground were unreliable and slow. The consultant and research assistant would send photos and sketch the damage from the bombings for the weapons expert to review remotely, at best an imperfect solution.

Bill van Esveld was the Israel and Palestine researcher at the time for Human Rights Watch who directed the work of the consultant and research assistant from inside Israel:

There were a number of cases in which we needed more but we couldn’t go back, and so we dropped the cases … It’s not that we stopped reporting on them because we didn’t think there was a violation [of IHL], we stopped reporting on them because we couldn’t get the information we needed with the people on the ground that we had … It’s extraordinarily frustrating and demoralizing. Your job is to be in a place as an independent monitor. And you’re blinded. You’re not allowed to be in place, so you’re operating by remote control.

For Human Rights Watch, part of the benefit of having staff on the ground with extensive experience in conflict situations is the ability to make strategic decisions on the kind of research to make a priority, including distinguishing between IHL violations that are aberrations and violations that appear to be part of a policy. The lost time in communicating with local researchers and the lack of direct access to sites and victims limited the kind of research that Human Rights Watch could do.

In particular, not having foreign staff on the ground made it difficult to research issues that could put local staff at risk, such as IHL violations by armed Palestinian groups in Gaza. Hijazi of Amnesty International said that he was cautious to ask local staff to research violations by officials or armed groups inside Gaza that are considered sensitive, out of concern that they might be subject to retaliation. It was easier to do that kind of documentation, he said, with a foreign staff member who can travel in and out of Gaza and therefore be removed for safety reasons if necessary. Human Rights Watch has similar safety concerns and would also be better equipped to research potential IHL violations by armed groups or the Gaza authorities if its non-national staff were able to travel freely to and from Gaza. Human Rights Watch has documented arrests, harassment and torture of Palestinians in Gaza perceived to have gone too far in their criticism of the Hamas government.[64]

Representatives of the Palestinian human rights groups al-Mezan and PCHR said that although it was sensitive for residents of Gaza to report on IHL and human rights violations by armed groups or Hamas, their groups had the clout and protection to be able to do so. During the 2014 military operation, PCHR published a statement condemning Hamas for the summary executions, many of which were captured in television footage, of at least 23 men accused of collaborating with Israel.[65] A UN Commission of Inquiry[66], whose staff was not able to reach Gaza, raised concerns about additional IHL violations by armed Palestinian groups in Gaza, including deliberate and indiscriminate firing on Israeli civilians, putting Palestinian civilians at risk by firing from populated areas inside Gaza and storing weapons in civilian structures including schools.[67] None of the human rights groups based in Gaza published research on these issues, however, or on any other alleged Palestinian IHL violation, other than the summary executions.

Indeed, in the past, Palestinians in Gaza who have criticized the government or armed groups on issues considered to be sensitive have faced retaliation. In 2012, the director of international relations at al-Mezan published an opinion piece criticizing the government and armed groups in Gaza for putting civilians at risk, including by storing weapons in civilian areas.[68] Following the publication, unidentified assailants attacked him twice;[69] the Gaza authorities made no arrests in the case. That incident is far from isolated. Human Rights Watch has documented arrests and physical abuse of journalists and activists who have criticized the Hamas government, directly or indirectly,[70] and foreign journalists have complained about attempts by the Hamas government to censor their reporting, including during wartime.[71]

III. Role of Human Rights Groups in Israeli Investigations

While the Israeli authorities limit the ability of human rights groups to conduct their work in Gaza, they nonetheless cite cooperation with human rights groups as an important element of their mechanism for investigating potential violations of the laws of war.

Palestine acceded to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in January 2015 and gave the court a retroactive mandate to June 13, 2014, a period that includes the 2014 military operation in Gaza. The ICC prosecutor is currently conducting a preliminary examination into the situation. The Office of the Prosecutor’s ongoing inquiry includes analyzing whether national authorities are genuinely carrying out credible investigations and, if appropriate, prosecutions in relation to potential cases being considered for investigation by the court. 

While the Israeli government has declined to cooperate with UN commissions of inquiry that have examined successive rounds of fighting in Gaza, and Israel has not acceded to the ICC treaty, it has issued a number of public statements that address the nature and adequacy of its domestic mechanisms for investigating and prosecuting IHL violations, including war crimes.

Cooperation Between Human Rights Groups and the Israeli Government

The View of the Israeli Government

In describing its mechanism for investigating and prosecuting IHL violations and other misconduct by soldiers and police, the Israeli authorities emphasize that human rights organizations help them to overcome a number of obstacles they face in learning about and investigating alleged IHL violations in the Gaza Strip. The Israeli military attorney general, who is responsible for investigating and prosecuting IHL violations among Israeli soldiers, notes that its investigations of violations that allegedly took place in Gaza are difficult because Israel no longer has a permanent ground troop presence there and cannot easily access physical evidence or witnesses:

First, the arena in which the crime was (allegedly) committed is – usually – outside the territory of the State of Israel, and in many cases in an area controlled by an enemy nation (south Lebanon) or hostile entities (the Gaza Strip). This fact significantly limits, and sometimes even completely thwarts, the ability of the investigators to visit the area and collect physical evidence found there … in addition, there are potential witnesses who hesitate to cooperate with the investigation because it is conducted by IDF officials, and there are others who refrain from providing relevant information about the activities of terrorist organizations in the area where the incident took place, out of fear of retribution.[72]

In a position paper submitted to the Turkel Commission, an Israeli governmental inquiry that examined, among other things, the adequacy of the Israeli investigatory mechanism, then-Military Attorney General Avichai Mandelblit wrote:

Throughout the years, the military investigatory police have adopted various techniques that allow investigators to overcome many of the difficulties. Thus, there is a close relationship between the military investigatory police and human rights organizations representing Palestinian complainants, and through them, these complainants and additional witnesses are summoned to give their version of events. Assistance from human rights groups allows the investigators to overcome the fear of Palestinian residents from a meeting with IDF officials [emphasis in original].[73]

According to the Military Advocate General’s office, the Israeli military receives information about possible IHL violations via individual complainants and human rights groups representing these individuals, as well as media and other reports of incidents.[74]

Indeed, following the 2014 military escalation, the Israeli Foreign Ministry issued a report on Israel’s investigative mechanisms that emphasized the importance of an “active community of domestic and international non-governmental organizations, which are a source of many of the allegations of misconduct."[75] The Foreign Ministry further noted that NGOs assist witnesses and victims in submitting complaints and providing more information to military investigators, and that human rights organizations act as a check on military decisions, appealing decisions to close investigations before the Israeli civilian authorities and Israeli courts.[76]

The View of Human Rights Groups

The Israeli, Palestinian and foreign human rights organizations cited by the Israeli authorities have been publicly critical of the Israeli investigative mechanisms, and one of them, the Israeli organization B’Tselem, has announced that it will no longer cooperate with the Israeli military investigations, calling them a “whitewash.”[77] Other groups continue to file complaints before the Israeli military authorities and even to facilitate witness testimony and supplementary information. The Palestinian human rights organizations al-Mezan and PCHR, working as part of a coalition to document alleged IHL violations in 2014, submitted 354 complaints to the Israeli military authorities.[78]

At the request of the military authorities, these groups provided additional information in more than a hundred cases. Al-Mezan facilitated witness testimony at the Erez crossing in nine cases, and in four other cases, the witnesses declined to meet the military authorities, citing fear and concern about the psycho-social effects of revisiting the trauma through testimony.[79] These groups are highly critical of the Israeli investigation mechanisms and have called for the International Criminal Court prosecutor to investigate the situation.[80] However they confirm that they do proactively share their information with the Israeli military authorities, in an attempt to facilitate accountability for IHL violations and war crimes.

Yet the limitations the Israeli military places on the ability of human rights organization to operate raise questions not only about the ability of the Israeli authorities to investigate potential war crimes but also their willingness to do so. The Israeli military says that it relies on human rights organizations to provide evidence of alleged wrong-doing that it has difficulty obtaining because it has no investigators on the ground. Military investigators do indeed seek out information from these groups. Yet the Israeli military authorities systematically deny human rights groups the access they need to maximize their ability to detect and document potential serious crimes. For example, in 2014 the Israeli military’s refusal to issue permits meant that there were no independent weapons experts in Gaza who could review evidence directly, and the only weapons analysts available were those working for the Gaza authorities’ police department. The refusal to allow experts into Gaza – and the systematic refusal to permit human rights workers in Gaza to access the training and work meetings they need to do their jobs well – would seem to undermine the nature, extent and quality of the documentation that the Israeli military says it needs from human rights groups, compromising the capacity of the Israeli military to investigate potential war crimes. On the other hand, the policy of disallowing travel for human rights workers, in contrast to the hundreds of permits issued each month for humanitarian aid workers, for example, and the thousands of permits issued each month in total, also calls into question the willingness of the Israeli military to investigate potential war crimes. If the Israeli military was genuinely motivated to detect potential wrong-doing by soldiers and officers, why does it tie the hands of the human rights workers on the ground who, as the Israeli government acknowledges, are best-positioned to detect and document violations?

Response from Israeli Government

While preparing this report, Human Rights Watch sought and received comment and information from the Israeli authorities.  In a response dated August 29, 2016, the military attorney general stated that it attributes “great importance” to its dialogue with human rights organizations, and that it maintains an “extensive and daily dialogue” with Israeli, Palestinian and foreign NGOs, including regarding allegations of misconduct during hostilities. The MAG’s Office said that it received 500 complaints relating to 360 individual incidents during the 2014 hostilities, some of which came from nongovernmental organizations. In addition, it said, it reviews reports published by Israeli, Palestinian, and foreign human rights organizations.

The MAG’s Office expressed criticism of those reports, writing that they “in many cases suffer from methodological, factual and legal flaws (for example, they rely on reporting from Palestinian sources without investigating their reliability, they identify terrorist activists as ‘civilians’ and incorrectly apply the laws of war). Sometimes these reports even exhibit a clear bias.”

Palestine Square (Al-Saha), Gaza City. 

© 2017 Abier Almasri

However, the MAG’s Office wrote, “to the extent that these reports include information that is prima facie reliable and sufficiently concrete, the claims raised in these reports are passed along in order to make a decision about whether to open an inquiry or investigation or to receive a full picture as part of an ongoing inquiry or investigation.”

The MAG’s Office went on to write that “conducting investigations of operational incidents that took place during combat, in hostile territory, involves many difficulties. Despite these difficulties, the military investigative police make many efforts to conduct these investigations thoroughly, effectively and quickly, and receiving help from nongovernmental organizations is part of these efforts.” According to the MAG, human rights groups supply affidavits and physical evidence and facilitate witnesses giving testimony to military investigators.

The MAG’s Office did not directly address Human Rights Watch’s question regarding the apparent contradiction between the importance the authorities say they attach to the work of human rights organizations and the travel limitations they impose, but it said that the assistance provided by human rights organizations in inquiries related to the 2014 hostilities was effective, “despite unavoidable restrictions imposed on travel between Israel and the Gaza Strip due to weighty security and political considerations.”[81]

IV. International Law

Israeli Obligations to Palestinians in Gaza

Israel significantly reduced its control over Gaza in 2005, when it withdrew its permanent ground troop presence and civilian settlements. However, it continues to control movement into and out of Gaza, except for the Rafah crossing, and it controls all crossings between Gaza and the West Bank. 

Israel, of course, controls its own border with Gaza. It controls Gaza’s territorial waters and airspace, and, citing security concerns, does not allow people in Gaza to operate an airport or seaport, making them dependent on foreign ports for travel abroad.[82] It also controls all travel between Gaza and the West Bank, irrespective of whether or not the traveler crosses through Israel. So even if a Palestinian human rights defender leaves Gaza for a trip to Europe and then flies to Jordan, Israel will not allow them to enter the West Bank to attend a meeting or workshop, even though they do not seek transit via Israel.[83] Such control allows the Israeli authorities to control the Palestinian population registry, including deciding who will be listed as a resident of Gaza or the West Bank, and the rates for the customs and value added taxes that it collects on behalf of the Palestinian Authority on goods entering the common market.[84] It controls a so-called “no-go” zone inside Gaza, near the border with Israel, which constitutes 17 percent of the territory of Gaza and a third of its arable land, as well as significant parts of Gaza’s infrastructure.[85]

In light of these controls that Israel effectively exercises over the lives and welfare of Gazans, Israel continues to owe obligations toward Palestinians in Gaza under the law of occupation. This “functional” approach to interpreting Israel’s obligations,[86] adopted by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), means that the framework of the law of occupation, including Article 43 of the Hague Regulations, applies to Israel’s regulation of movement to and from Gaza. This is how the ICRC explains it:

The ICRC considers, however, that in some specific and rather exceptional cases – in particular when foreign forces withdraw from occupied territory (or parts thereof) but retain key elements of authority or other important governmental functions usually performed by an occupying power – the law of occupation may continue to apply within the territorial and functional limits of such competences. Indeed, despite the lack of the physical presence of foreign forces in the territory concerned, the retained authority may amount to effective control for the purposes of the law of occupation and entail the continued application of the relevant provisions of this body of norms. This is referred to as the ‘functional approach’ to the application of occupation law. This test will apply to the extent that the foreign forces still exercise, within all or part of the territory, governmental functions acquired when the occupation was undoubtedly established and ongoing.

The functional approach described above permits a more precise delineation of the legal framework applicable to situations in which it is difficult to determine, with certainty, whether an occupation has ended or not. 

It may be argued that technological and military developments have made it possible to assert effective control over a foreign territory (or parts thereof) without a continuous foreign military presence in the concerned area. In such situations, it is important to take into account the extent of authority retained by the foreign forces rather than to focus exclusively on the means by which it is actually exercised. It should also be recognized that, in these circumstances, the geographical contiguity between belligerent States could facilitate the remote exercise of effective control. For instance, it may permit an occupying power that has relocated its troops outside the territory to reassert its full authority in a reasonably short period of time. The continued application of the relevant provisions of the law of occupation is all the more important in this scenario as these were specifically designed to regulate the sharing of authority – and the resulting assignment of responsibilities – between the belligerent States concerned.[87]

While Israel claims that the law of occupation no longer applies to its actions toward Gaza,[88] the official position of the ICRC, and of the United Nations, is that Israel remains an occupying power in Gaza.[89]

The functional approach to the law of occupation means that responsibility is assigned commensurate with control. Where, for example, the Gaza authorities fail to protect human rights defenders who criticize the behavior of armed groups, it is they who bear responsibility because they operate a police force that controls daily life inside Gaza and should provide protection. But where, for example, the Israeli military refuses to allow human rights defenders to access training outside Gaza, it is the Israeli military that bears responsibility because it controls movement into and out of Gaza.

Article 43 of the Hague Regulations of 1907 outlines the powers and responsibilities of an occupying power. It authorizes an occupant to take restrictive measures that are militarily necessary but also requires the occupant to restore public order, meaning to facilitate normal civilian life to the extent possible.[90] Israel is authorized to restrict travel for concrete security reasons, and it has the sovereign authority to regulate who crosses through Israeli territory, for example on the way to the West Bank or foreign countries, but it must balance its military needs and its authority to regulate who may enter Israel with its obligations to facilitate normal life to protected persons living under occupation.

As an occupying power, Israel also has an obligation to respect the human rights of Palestinians living in Gaza and the West Bank,[91] including their right to freedom of movement throughout the Palestinian territory[92] and the rights for which freedom of movement is a precondition, for example the right to education[93] and the right to work.[94] Palestinians enjoy a right to travel – without arbitrary restrictions – between the two parts of the Palestinian territory, Gaza and the West Bank, which Israel recognized as a single territorial unit, to leave the Palestinian territory and to return to it. Individuals also have a right to leave their own country.[95] Under international human rights law, the right to travel can be restricted for security reasons and to protect public health, morals, public order and the rights and freedoms of others. Any such restrictions, however, must be proportional, and “the restrictions must not impair the essence of the right; the relation between right and restriction, between norm and exception, must not be reversed.”[96]

These obligations limit the ability of the Israeli government to restrict travel into and out of Gaza mostly to cases in which it is necessary to meet concrete, individualized security needs. The Israeli authorities also have an obligation to facilitate the proper functioning of civil society inside Gaza, including the human rights community which works to further protections for vulnerable members of society, develop democratic values and promote fundamental individual rights – all part of developing normal life in Gaza.  There is an obligation to permit Palestinian human rights defenders to travel in and out of Gaza. However, Israel should normally not block the travel of foreign human rights defenders, present in Israel, who seek permission to enter Gaza.

The Israeli authorities should act in accordance with the United Nations Declaration on human rights defenders.[97] The Declaration states that individuals and groups working to defend human rights should be able to access resources, that NGOs have an important role to play in protecting human rights, and that limitations on the work of human rights defenders should accord with applicable international obligations.[98] Israeli authorities should consider the resources that Palestinian human rights defenders seek to access in the form of trainings abroad and foreign experts entering Gaza. In regulating access, they should take note of the role that human rights defenders play in developing and maintaining a society that protects and promotes human rights. While the declaration is not legally binding, it represents the consensus of the international community and enshrines rights protected in other instruments, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.[99] Respect for its principles can be seen as part of facilitating normal civilian life for Palestinians who have lived under occupation for the last 50 years and seek to develop and enshrine human rights protections as part of public life in the occupied territory.

Analysis of Israel’s Travel Restrictions

Israel’s current criteria for evaluating travel requests – citing generalized security threats to limit travel to exceptional humanitarian circumstances personal to the applicant – are inconsistent with these obligations. It is noteworthy that in some cases, human rights workers receive permits to travel via the Erez crossing for an event sponsored by an international organization, medical treatment or other non-work related reasons, but the Israeli authorities refuse to allow those same individuals to travel to further their human rights work.  Normal civilian life in Gaza requires allowing people to access family members, educational and economic opportunities, medical care, and other rights for which freedom of movement is a precondition. Travel, including for human rights and health workers, is also necessary for meeting humanitarian needs, and it is required by Israel’s obligations, under the Fourth Geneva Convention, to facilitate humanitarian access in Gaza.[100]

The restrictions imposed appear to contradict Israel’s own policy, as articulated by the most senior political and military officials including the prime minister, the defense minister and the army chief-of-staff, to improve living conditions in Gaza in order to enhance stability and security.[101]  A properly functioning civil society helps communities thrive.

Israel has the sovereign authority to determine who may enter its borders. But Israel is barring Palestinians in Gaza from traveling abroad via their own ports, thus rendering them dependent on Israel for access. In addition, its authority to bar entry into Israel should be balanced by the obligations it assumes as the occupying power and its signing of international agreements requiring it to allow Palestinians to travel and choose their place of residence within the single territorial unit that Gaza and the West Bank comprise.[102] 

Israel’s restriction on Palestinians traveling between Gaza and the West Bank is based on its characterization of the West Bank as a closed military zone and its characterization of Palestinians whose addresses are listed in Gaza within the Israeli-controlled population registry as foreigners with respect to the right to enter the West Bank. Based on that position, Palestinians with addresses listed in Gaza are barred from entering the West Bank via Jordan, through the Allenby crossing, which does not require entry into Israel. In other words, Israeli restrictions on travel for Gaza residents go beyond its interest in regulating who enters its own territory. They promote a policy to keep Palestinian residents of Gaza from entering the West Bank irrespective of whether or not that travel takes place via Israel.

Al-Quds Hospital in the Gaza Strip. 

© 2017 Abier Almasri

Furthermore, Israel generally prevents foreigners, including human rights workers, already present in Israel, from crossing through the Erez crossing in order to reach Gaza. The substance of the restriction, therefore, is not refusal to allow foreigners to enter Israel but rather refusal to allow them to enter Gaza from Israeli territory, at a time when Israel is also preventing the operation of an airport or seaport that would allow independent access.

At the same time that Israel bars travel for human rights workers, since 2008 it has increased the number of crossings via Erez to thousands each month, a small fraction of the level of travel recorded prior to the outbreak of the second Intifada or uprising, but still an indication that, whatever security concerns may exist, much more can be done. Israel acknowledges that it weighs foreign policy considerations in determining which categories of Palestinians may travel, for example allowing travel at the request of diplomats from friendly nations or for football players, at the request of the world football organization FIFA.  Israel should also take into account its obligations under IHL and human rights law and allow human rights workers the access they need to maximize the effectiveness of their work.

Egypt’s Role

Egypt is not an occupying power in Gaza and therefore, despite the devastating effect that its border closure has on life in Gaza, its legal responsibilities toward Gaza residents are more limited than those of Israel.[103] Like all parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention, Egypt should do everything within its power to ensure the universal application of the Convention’s humanitarian provisions, including protections for civilians living under occupation who are unable to travel due to unlawful restrictions imposed by the occupying power.[104]  Egypt’s obligations to permit access into and out of Gaza also include facilitating humanitarian access and supplies to persons affected by armed conflict. The Egyptian authorities should also consider the impact of their border closure on the rights of Palestinians living in Gaza who are unable to travel in and out of Gaza through other routes. They should ensure that their decisions are transparent, free from arbitrariness and take into consideration the human rights of those affected. They should consider possible additional responsibilities they may have under the right of transit, usually invoked in cases of enclaves or land-locked states, and enshrined in a number of bilateral and multilateral treaties.[105]  Gaza’s access to the sea for travel abroad has been blocked by Israel since 1967, rendering it dependent on neighboring states for transit. Given the importance of the Rafah crossing, Egypt should consider allowing transit via its territory, subject to security considerations. Certainly, Egypt has legitimate security concerns regarding the Sinai desert, but it should find a way to address them through means less extreme than total closure of the border, most of the time, especially considering the fact that it kept Rafah mostly open between 2010 and 2013, despite the activities of armed groups in Sinai during that time. The current border closures take place in the context of repressive activities taken against the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, which is allied with Hamas.

Egypt should normally permit passage for human rights workers, especially Palestinian workers and United Nations human rights investigators, into and out of Gaza. Egypt may also have additional duties under its human rights obligations, including the African Charter of Human and People’s Rights.[106]

ICC Prosecutor’s Office’s Role

The ICC prosecutor should consider Israeli restrictions on travel by human rights workers in assessing whether Israeli domestic legal authorities can effectively investigate potential serious crimes committed in Palestine since June 2014, particularly in assessing what is known as “complementarity”. Under ICC rules and jurisprudence, the ICC will not prosecute alleged serious crimes if domestic proceedings are ongoing or have been conducted, unless the national authority is unwilling or unable to conduct genuine investigations and prosecutions.[107] Even at the stage of preliminary examinations, the ICC prosecutor considers whether a case would be inadmissible due to the existence of genuine national investigations and prosecutions.

In its November 2016 report on ongoing preliminary examinations, the ICC prosecutor indicated that her office “will assess information on potentially relevant national proceedings, as necessary and appropriate.”[108] In deciding whether a case would be admissible, the ICC prosecutor examines whether national proceedings are taking place and if so, whether the authorities are genuinely able and willing to investigate and prosecute.[109] In the event that a person has already been tried for a crime or crimes, the ICC will not prosecute that individual for the same conduct, unless the domestic proceedings were not conducted independently or impartially in accordance with international due process norms or were conducted in a manner which, under the circumstances, “was inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice.”[110]

While the two criteria – willingness and ability – are distinct, the ICC pre-trial chamber often assesses them together, as they are related.

In assessing the willingness of national authorities to carry out genuine investigations, the prosecutor considers, among other things, whether the way the proceedings are conducted indicates an intent to shield persons from criminal responsibility. The prosecutor can assess such intent by indicators that include “manifestly insufficient steps in the investigation or prosecution,” “flawed forensic examination,” and “lack of resources devoted to the proceedings at hand as compared with overall capacities.”[111]

In assessing the ability of national authorities to carry out genuine investigations, the prosecutor considers, among other things, “the ability of the competent authorities to exercise their judicial powers in the territory concerned” and “the absence of conditions of security for witnesses, investigators, prosecutors and judges or the lack of adequate protection systems.”[112]  The ICC’s pre-trial chamber has in the past considered a national authority’s inability to obtain the necessary testimony from witnesses as an indicator of its inability to conduct adequate investigations and prosecutions.[113]

When it comes to the admissibility of cases being prosecuted, the assessment is holistic, with the ICC’s pre-trial chamber examining the entirety of the domestic proceedings, to determine their genuineness, including the availability of necessary witness testimony and documentary evidence.[114]

At this preliminary stage, in which the ICC prosecutor is examining the willingness of the Israeli authorities to investigate and prosecute potential serious crimes committed as part of the 2014 hostilities, she should consider the contradiction between the importance that the Israeli authorities’ state they attach to the role of human rights groups in obtaining evidence and witness testimony – and the steps the Israeli authorities take to limit and constrain the work of those same groups, Palestinian, foreign, and Israeli. 

In evaluating the ability of the Israeli authorities to conduct genuine investigations, the prosecutor should consider the restrictions imposed by the Israel authorities on human rights workers which have, in turn, limited their ability to collect evidence for potential cases. Human rights organizations can be essential in identifying possible victims and providing physical evidence gathered in the context of their own investigations, as the Israeli Military Attorney General’s Office notes. However, the very tight restrictions on travel by Palestinian human rights workers and the blanket ban on workers from foreign human rights organizations entering Gaza limit the scope of witness testimony and physical evidence that can be available to the Israeli authorities.

The prosecutor should consider the limitations on forensic evidence available to the Israeli authorities as a result of their refusal to allow outside weapons experts into Gaza and to allow human rights workers in Gaza to leave Gaza in order to obtain training and certification. Further, Palestinian victims and witnesses may not be easily persuaded to come forward in light of their high levels of distrust of Israeli authorities, making it even more difficult to bring forward criminal cases and making the effective interventions of human rights organizations even more critical.

To the extent that allowing more human rights workers to travel into and out of Gaza would require resources from Israel’s military and intelligence, Human Rights Watch notes that the Israeli authorities have devoted resources to accommodate travel requests from other categories of people, including merchants, football players, and VIPs.[115] Against this backdrop, the limits on human rights workers seems especially difficult to justify. 

[1] See Section I, infra.

[2] Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, adopted October 18, 1907, 1 Bevans 631, entered into force January 26, 1910.

[3] United Nations Refugee Works Association (UNRWA), “Where We Work,” http://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work/gaza-strip (accessed August 4, 2016).

[4] Israeli Military Advocate General Corps, “General Exit Permit (no. 5) (Judea and Samaria),” West Bank, 1972; Corresponding Permit for the Gaza Strip.

[5] The Israeli Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, September 28, 1995, art. 31; Human Rights Watch, Israel’s Closure of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, vol. 8, no.3, July 1996, https://www.hrw.org/reports/1996/Israel1.htm; Gisha-Legal Center for Freedom of Movement, Separating Land, Separating People: Legal Analysis of Access Restrictions between Gaza and the West Bank, June 2015, pp. 3-4, http://gisha.org/UserFiles/File/publications/separating-land-separating-people/separating-land-separating-people-web-en.pdf (accessed August 4, 2016).

[6] Ibid, Gisha, Separating Land, Separating People, timeline on p.3. See also B’Tselem and Hamoked, One Big Prison: Freedom of Movement to and from the Gaza Strip on the Eve of the Disengagement Plan, March 2005, http://www.btselem.org/download/200503_gaza_prison_english.pdf (accessed August 4, 2016).

[7] Ibid, B’Tselem, One Big Prison, p. 13.

[8] A summary and analysis of official Israeli statements at that time are available in Gisha, Disengaged Occupiers: The Legal Status of Gaza, January 2007, pp. 22-26, http://www.gisha.org/UserFiles/File/publications_english/
Publications_and_Reports_English/Disengaged_Occupiers_en.pdf
(accessed August 4, 2016).

[9] Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Security Cabinet Declares Gaza Hostile Territory,” September 19, 2007,  http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/pressroom/2007/pages/security%20cabinet%20declares%20gaza%20hostile%20territory%2019-sep-2007.aspx (accessed August 4, 2016). On the policy to restrict movement in order to weaken the economy in Gaza, see Albassiouni v. Prime Minister, Case no. HCJ 9132/07, State Submission of November 2, 2007, para. 44 (in Hebrew), http://gisha.org/UserFiles/File/Legal%20Documents_/fuel%20and%20electricity_oct_07/state_response_2_11_07.pdf (accessed August 4, 2016).

[10] Gisha, What is the Separation Policy?, June 2012,  http://www.gisha.org/UserFiles/File/publications/Bidul/bidul-infosheet-ENG.pdf (accessed August 4, 2016); Gisha, The Separation Policy: List of References Prepared by Gisha, July 2014, http://gisha.org/UserFiles/File/publications/separation_policy_2014.pdf (accessed August 4, 2016).

[11] Kafarne v. Defense Minister, Case no. HCJ 495/12, State Response of August 16, 2012, para. 26 (in Hebrew), tinyurl.com/k3o8ckn (accessed August 11, 2016). Excerpts unofficially translated by Gisha are available at tinyurl.com/p4jc9x9 (accessed August 11, 2016).

[12] B’Tselem v. State of Israel, (Application no. 19657-08/13), Preliminary State Response of August 14, 2013, Beersheva, Appendix; Letter from Public Complaints Unit of the Gaza District Coordination Office in the Israeli Defense Ministry to Gisha, August 11, 2013 (in Hebrew), http://www.gisha.org/UserFiles/File/LegalDocuments/19657-08-13/preliminary_response_14.8.13.pdf (accessed August 4, 2016).

[13] Gisha, “Exit of Palestinians to Israel and the West Bank via Erez Crossing 01/2010 – 12/2016,” http://gisha.org/graph/2392 (accessed February 8, 2017).

[14] Ibid.

[15] Ibid.

[16] UN OCHA-OPT, “Erez Crossing: Movement of People into and out of Gaza,” http://data.ochaopt.org/gazacrossing.aspx (accessed March 22, 2017).

[17] Nandini Krishnan, Tara, Vishwanath, Angelica Thumala, Patti Petesch, Aspirations on hold? Young lives in the West Bank and Gaza (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2012) http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/200831468328798038/Aspirations-on-hold-Young-lives-in-the-West-Bank-and-Gaza (accessed March 3, 2016); Gisha, A Costly Divide: Economic Repercussions of Separating Gaza and the West Bank, February 2015, http://gisha.org/UserFiles/File/publications/a_costly_divide/a_costly_divide_en-web.pdf (accessed August 10, 2016).

[18] B’Tselem and Hamoked, So Near and Yet So Far: Implications of Israeli-Imposed Seclusion of the Gaza Strip on Palestinians’ Right to Family Life, January 2014, http://www.btselem.org/sites/default/files2/201401_so_near_and_yet_so_far_eng.pdf (accessed August 11, 2016).

[19] Palestinian Center for Human Rights, Actual Strangulation and Deceptive Facilitation, March 2016, pp. 31-33, http://pchrgaza.org/en/?p=7962 (accessed August 15, 2016); Physicians for Human Rights-Israel, #Denied: Harassment of Palestinian Patients Applying for Exit Permits, June 2015, http://cdn2.phr.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Denied-2015-New-Report.pdf (accessed August 15, 2016).

[20] Gisha, Student Travel Between Gaza and the West Bank 101, September 2012, http://www.gisha.org/UserFiles/File/publications/students/students-2012-eng.pdf (accessed August 11, 2016).

[21] “Gaza: Donors, UN Should Press Israel on Blockade,” Human Rights Watch news release, October 12, 2014, https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/10/12/gaza-donors-un-should-press-israel-blockade.

[22] UN OCHA-OPT, “Rafah Crossing-Movement of People into and out of Gaza,” http://data.ochaopt.org/gazacrossing/index.aspx?id=2 (accessed February 9, 2017).

[23] Gisha, Scale of Control: Israel’s Continued Responsibility in the Gaza Strip, November 2011, pp. 12-14, http://gisha.org/UserFiles/File/scaleofcontrol/scaleofcontrol_en.pdf (accessed August 9, 2016). In 2001, Israel bombed the airport that had operated briefly in Gaza and destroyed the site where construction of a seaport was to begin.

[24] Palestinian NGO Network, “Mission and Vision,” http://www.pngo.net/mission-vision/ (accessed August 4, 2016).

[25] Gisha v. Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories, (Application no. 22775-02-11), unpublished document on file with Human Rights Watch, Tel Aviv, January 13, 2013; Gisha v. Office of the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories, (Application no. 51147-05-13), unpublished document on file with Human Rights Watch, Tel Aviv, May 10, 2016.

[26] Department of Operations and Coordination, Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT), Israeli Ministry of Defense, “Unclassified status of permissions for entry of Palestinians to Israel, their passage between Judea and Samaria and the Gaza Strip, and their departure abroad,” February 6, 2017 (in Hebrew), http://gisha.org/he/legal/procedures-and-protocols/ (accessed March 12, 2017).

[27] “Israel: Rules Curtail Family Visits for Gaza Prisoners,” Human Rights Watch news release, July 31, 2016, https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/07/31/israel-rules-curtail-gaza-family-visits-prisoners.

[28] Gisha, “Exit of Palestinians to Israel and the West Bank via Erez Crossing 01/2010 – 12/2016,” http://gisha.org/graph/2392 (accessed February 8, 2017).

[29] OCHA OPT, “Erez Crossing.” Figures are for the first half of 2016.

[30] COGAT, “Status of permissions,” chap. 2, para. 6a.

[31] See, e.g., Musalam v. IDF Commander, Case no. HCJ 2748/12, unpublished document on file with Human Rights Watch, April 16, 2012 (in Hebrew), rejecting a request for the legal advisor of the Gaza Community Mental Health Programme to cross to the West Bank to receive training in rehabilitation for torture victims because, among other reasons, there was no humanitarian situation “specific to the petitioner.” See also email from Maj. Or Elrom, head of foreign relations and infrastructure section, Coordination and Liaison Administration to the Gaza Strip, to Human Rights Watch, August 14, 2014 (unpublished email on file with Human Rights Watch), rejecting a request to allow foreign staff members into Gaza because Human Rights Watch is not registered with the Israeli Ministry of Welfare or Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Letter from Captain Guy Shekel, legal adviser to Gaza DCO, Department of International Law, Israeli Military Attorney General’s office, to Gisha, February 3, 2014 (unpublished letter, in Hebrew, on file with Human Rights Watch), rejecting a request from the Palestinian Center for Human Rights (PCHR) to have a foreign doctoral student enter for meetings because the request did not raise exceptional humanitarian reasons, and PCHR is not a recognized foreign organization.

[32] Letter from Ofer Iko, Public Information Officer, Israeli Ministry of Social Welfare, to Gisha, January 27, 2014, http://www.gisha.org/UserFiles/File/LegalDocuments/procedures/foreign_nationals/55.pdf (accessed August 5, 2016).

[33] Letter from Gisha to Attorney General Avichai Mandelblit, June 2, 2016 (unpublished letter, in Hebrew, on file with Human Rights Watch).

[34] B’Tselem v. State of Israel-Interior Minister, (Application no. 19657-08/13), Beersheva, State Preliminary Response of August 14, 2013, para. 10.

[35] B’Tselem v. State of Israel-Interior Minister, (Application no. 19657-08/13), Beersheva, State Response of September 17, 2013, para. 23 (in Hebrew), http://gisha.org/he/legal/4016/ (accessed July 27, 2016).

[36] See for example a letter from Public Affairs Department of COGAT to Gisha, August 12, 2013 (in Hebrew), http://www.gisha.org/UserFiles/File/LegalDocuments/19657-08-13/preliminary_response_14.8.13.pdf (accessed March 1, 2017); Musalam v. IDF Commander; Letter from Guy Shekel to Gisha, February 3, 2014.

[37] B’Tselem v. State of Israel-Interior Minister, (Application no. 19657-08/13), Beersheva, Petition of August 8, 2013 (in Hebrew), http://www.gisha.org/UserFiles/File/LegalDocuments/19657-08-13/petition.pdf (accessed August 10, 2016).

[38] Human Rights Watch interview with Jaber Wishah, deputy director of PCHR, Gaza City, November 11, 2015; Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Samir Zaqout, field research unit director of Al-Mezan, August 4, 2016.

[39] Email from Saleh Hijazi of Amnesty International to Human Rights Watch, August 17, 2016.

[40] Ibid.

[41]  Ibid.

[42] Email from Maj. Or Elrom, August 14, 2014.

[43] Letter from Sec. Lt. Nir Yaron, civil application officer, Gaza CLA, COGAT, to Human Rights Watch, August 19, 2014 (on file with Human Rights Watch): “In these times, the state of Israel only lets doctors and medical staff crosses (sic) through the Gaza strip. Because your purpose of crossing is not a medical reason - your request is denied (emphasis in original).”

[44] Letter from Captain Guy Shekel, legal adviser, Gaza DCO, Department of International Relations, Military Attorney General’s Office, to Human Rights Watch, August 4, 2016 (in Hebrew).

[45] ”Sameh Shoukri: Rafah Crossing does not contribute to siege on Gaza,” ElWatan News, July 25, 2014 (in Arabic), http://www.elwatannews.com/news/details/527334 (accessed February 20, 2017);  “Egypt closes Rafah border crossing with Gaza ‘until further notice’,” Middle East Eye, October 25, 2014, http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/egypt-rafah-772435585 (accessed March 2, 2017).

[46] Letter from Lieut. Coral Mel, public inquiries officer, Gaza District Coordination Office, to Human Rights Watch, January 11, 2016 (in Hebrew, on file with Human Rights Watch). 

[47] Masalam v. IDF Commander.

[48] Letter from Sergeant First Class Adham Salame, Public Inquiries Department, Gaza District Coordination Office, to Human Rights Watch, December 1, 2015. The letter was sent in response to a request for a foreign staff member to enter Gaza in order to provide security training for an employee living in Gaza.

[49] OCHA OPT, “Erez Crossing,” Figures are for 2016; Gisha, “Erez Crossing;” Gisha, “Exit of Palestinians to Israel and the West Bank via Erez Crossing,” http://gisha.org/graph/2392 (accessed February 8, 2017).

[50] Human Rights Watch, “Process of Getting a Permit,” in Israel’s Closure; Association for Civil Rights in Israel, “ACRI: Rescind Shin Bet Prohibited Classification,” February 6, 2007, http://www.acri.org.il/en/2007/02/06/acri-rescind-shin-bet-prohibited-classification/ (accessed August 10, 2016); Gisha, “Security blocks restricting travel through Erez crossing,” December 2016, http://gisha.org/UserFiles/File/publications/Security_blocks/Security_blocks_factsheet_designed.pdf (accessed December 23, 2016).

[51] See for example B’Tselem v. Defense Minister, State Response of August 14, 2013, para. 16. One of the petitioners, a field researcher for B’Tselem, had crossed through Erez for reasons unrelated to his work three years prior to the petition. In paragraph 18, the state asserts that it did not request security screenings for the petitioners at the time of the petition because “their request does not fall within the criteria that permit entrance.”

[52] Gisha, “Split Apart,” March 2016, http://gisha.org/UserFiles/File/publications/civil_society/Split_apart_en.pdf (accessed June 24, 2016).

[53] Human Rights Watch phone interview with Kareem Jubran, field research director, B’Tselem, July 28, 2016.        

[54] Human Rights Watch interview, Gaza City, November 8, 2015.

[55] Ibid.

[56] Human Rights Watch interview, Gaza City, November 11, 2015.

[57] Interview, Jaber Wishah, November 8, 2015.

[58] Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Saleh Hijazi, Israel and OPT researcher, Amnesty International, July 22, 2016.

[59] “UN Commission of Inquiry on Gaza hears moving testimony, seeks access,” United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights press release, December 23, 2014, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=15456&LangID=E (accessed March 1, 2017).

[60] Human Rights Watch telephone interview, August 4, 2016.

[61] Telephone interview with Saleh Hijazi.

[62] Ibid.

[63] “Israel/Egypt: Provide rights groups access to Gaza,” Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International news release, August 20, 2014, https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/08/20/israel/egypt-provide-rights-groups-access-gaza.

[64] “Palestine: Crackdown on Journalists, Activists,” Human Rights Watch news release, August 29, 2016 https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/08/29/palestine-crackdown-journalists-activists.

[65] PCHR, “PCHR Calls for Stopping Extra-judicial Executions in Gaza,” August 22, 2014,  http://pchrgaza.org/en/?p=1590 (accessed August 11, 2016). The Independent Commission for Human Rights also documented the executions: ICHR, Monthly Report, August 2014 (published October 15, 2014), http://ichr.ps/attachment/35/August%20report-ICHR.pdf?g_download=1 (accessed December 15, 2016).

[66] United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Report of the Independent Commission of Inquiry on the 2014 Gaza Conflict,” U.N. Doc. A/HRC/29/52, June 2015, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/
HRCouncil/CoIGaza/A-HRC-29-52_en.doc
(accessed July 15, 2016).

[67] See also “UNRWA strongly condemns placement of rockets in school,” UNRWA press release, July 14, 2014, http://www.unrwa.org/newsroom/press-releases/unrwa-strongly-condemns-placement-rockets-school (accessed July 20, 2016).

[68] Mahmoud Abu Rahma, “The gap between resistance and governance,” Ma’an News Agency, January 5, 2012, http://www.maannews.com/Content.aspx?id=449852 (accessed August 1, 2016).

[69] “Gaza/West Bank: Investigate Attacks on Rights Defenders,” Human Rights Watch news release, January 19, 2012, https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/01/19/gaza/west-bank-investigate-attacks-rights-defenders.

[70]“Palestine: Crackdown on Journalists, Activists,” Human Rights Watch news release, August 29, 2016, https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/08/29/palestine-crackdown-journalists-activists.

[71] Foreign Press Association of Israel, Statement of August 11, 2014, http://www.fpa.org.il/?categoryId=101307 (accessed August 11, 2016).

[72] Israeli Military Attorney General’s Office, “Inquiry and investigatory mechanisms regarding complaints and allegations about violations of the laws of wars,” Position Paper, December 19, 2010, pp. 4-5 (in Hebrew), http://www.turkel-committee.gov.il/files/wordocs/9111emPatzar.PDF (accessed December 1, 2016).

[73] Ibid, pp. 5-6.

[74] Israeli Military Attorney General’s Office, “Inquiry and investigatory mechanisms regarding complaints and allegations about violations of the laws of wars – additional information,” Position Paper, August 9, 2011, para. 6 (in Hebrew), cited in Public Commission to Examine the Maritime Incident of 31 May 2010, Second Report – the Turkel Commission, February 2013, p. 336 para. 87, http://www.turkel-committee.gov.il/files/newDoc3/The%20Turkel%20Report%20for%20website.pdf (accessed July 10, 2016).

[75] Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Gaza Conflict: Factual and Legal Aspects, May 2015, para. 422, http://mfa.gov.il/ProtectiveEdge/Pages/default.aspx (accessed August 8, 2016).

[76] Ibid, paras. 439-440.

[77] B’Tselem, Occupation’s Fig Leaf: Israel’s Military Law Enforcement Mechanism as a Whitewash Mechanism, May 2016, http://www.btselem.org/download/201605_occupations_fig_leaf_eng.pdf (accessed August 7, 2016).

[78] Al-Mezan, Briefing Update: Israel’s investigations on criminal complaints submitted by Palestinian NGOs in Gaza on behalf of victims of attacks on Gaza in July and August 2014, November 2015, p.3, http://mezan.org/en/post/20953/
UPDATE%3A%3Cbr%3EBriefing+on+Israeli+investigations+into+%E2%80%8Ecriminal+complaints+submitted+by+Palestinian+NGOs+in+%E2%80%8EGaza+on+behalf+of+victims+of+attacks+on+Gaza+in+July+%E2%80%8Eand+August+2014%E2%80%8E
(accessed August 5, 2016).

[79] Ibid, p. 4.

[80] Ibid, p.7; Palestinian Center for Human Rights, Annual Report, 2014, p. 87, http://www.pchrgaza.org/files/2015/annual_pchr_eng_2014.pdf (accessed August 9, 2016). See also “Palestine: ICC Should Open Formal Probe,” Human Rights Watch news release, June 5, 2016, https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/06/05/palestine-icc-should-open-formal-probe.

[81] A full English translation of the letter from the Military Attorney General is provided in Annex 2 of this report.

[82] See footnote 23 (Gisha, Scale of Control).

[83] Israel controls the Allenby Bridge land crossing between Jordan and the West Bank and ordinarily does not allow passage into the West Bank for Palestinians who are listed in the Israeli-controlled population registry as living in Gaza. Israel says that the West Bank is a closed military zone, and that Palestinians whose addresses are listed in Gaza in the Israeli-controlled population registry have no right to enter the West Bank, irrespective of whether they seek to transit through Israel. Ibid, p. 24.

[84] Ibid, pp. 17-19.

[85] Ibid, pp. 20-22.

[86] Ibid, p. 30.

[87] International Committee of the Red Cross, International humanitarian law and the challenges of contemporary armed conflicts, 32IC/15/11, November 2015, p. 12, https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/2015-ICRC-Report-IHL-and-Challenges-of-Armed-Conflicts.pdf (accessed August 10, 2016). See also an article by the legal adviser to the ICRC on issues of occupation, writing in his personal capacity: Tristan Ferraro, “Determining the Beginning and End of Occupation,” International Review of the Red Cross, vol. 94, no. 885, Spring 2012, p. 157, https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/review/2012/irrc-885-ferraro.pdf (accessed August 9, 2016).

[88] See for example Physicians for Human Rights v. Defense Minister, Case no. HCJ 10265/05, State Submission of July 11, 2006 (on file with Human Rights Watch); Hamdan v. Southern Military Commander and related cases, Case no. HCJ 11120/05, State Response of January 19, 2006, para. 26-29 (in Hebrew), http://tinyurl.com/l9ourfg (accessed December 15, 2016).

[89] Both the ICRC and the UN continue to refer to Gaza as occupied territory. See email from Yves Sorokobi, Office of the UN Secretary General Spokesperson, to Gisha, February 7, 2007 (on file with Human Rights Watch): “The UN welcomed the Israeli disengagement from Gaza in August 2005. However, there has been no change in our characterization of the Gaza Strip as occupied territory.” See ICRC, “Gaza Closure Not Another Year!”, June 14, 2010, www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/update/palestine-update-140610.htm (accessed December 14, 2016).  See also Gisha, Scale of Control, pp. 29-30; Gisha, Separating Land, Separating People,” footnote 5, pp. 10-11.

[90] Hague Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land.

[91] International Court of Justice (ICJ), Advisory Opinion Concerning Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, ICJ GL no, 131, ICJ Rep 136, July 9, 2004, paras. 106-113.

[92] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), art. 12. See also the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 13, which reflects customary international law. Article 13 of the Universal Declaration stipulates that “everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state” and that “Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.”

[93] International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 13.

[94] Ibid, art. 6.

[95] ICCPR, footnote 92 (ICCPR), art. 12 (2).

[96] General Comment no. 27, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9 (General Comments), paras. 13-15.

[97] Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“Declaration on human rights defenders”), adopted on March 8, 1999, G.A. Res 53/144, U.N. Doc. A/RES/53/144. 

[98] Declaration on human rights defenders, arts. 13, 17, 18.

[99] United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Fact Sheet no. 29, “Human Rights Defenders: Protecting the Right to Defend Human Rights.”

[100]Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention), adopted August 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, entered into force October 21, 1950, arts. 23, 50, 55-56.

[101] Gisha, “List of quotes by officials on security-access nexus,” July 4, 2016, http://gisha.org/UserFiles/File/publications/
Gaza_reconstruction_quotes.pdf
(accessed August 12, 2016).

[102] The Israeli Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, September 28, 1995, art. 11. For a discussion of the application of the right to freedom of movement to the Palestinian territory, see Gisha, Separating Land, Separating People, footnote 5, pp. 17-25.

[103] Gisha, Rafah Crossing: Who Holds the Keys?, March 2009, pp. 162-7,  http://www.gisha.org/UserFiles/File/publications/Rafah_Report_Eng.pdf (accessed August 11, 2016).

[104] Fourth Geneva Convention, art. 1. See also ICJ, Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, July 9, 2004, paras. 155-160, finding that states have an obligation not to recognize the illegal situation created by the construction of the separation barrier in the West Bank.

[105] Elihu Lauterpacht, “Freedom of Transit in International Law,” in Transactions of the Grotius Society, vol. 44 (1958), p. 320; Convention on Transit Trade of Landlocked States, adopted July 8, 1965, 597 U.N.T.S. 3, entered into force June 9, 1967, art. 12.

[106] A 2014 complaint to the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACPHR) alleges that Egypt’s closure of its border with Gaza violates Charter provisions protecting the right to life, the right to freedom of movement and the right to self-determination. ACPHR, Communication 479/14 Palestine Solidarity Alliance and 5 others v. Egypt, ACHPR/COMM/EGY/ 479/14/02/262/15, 2014, https://www.scribd.com/document/258275977/Human-Rights-Council-Resolution-S-21-1# (accessed February 13, 2017).

[107] Rome Statute, arts. 17(1)(a) and 17(1)(b).

[108] International Criminal Court (ICC), Office of the Prosecutor, Report on Preliminary Examinations 2016, November 14, 2016, para. 145.

[109] ICC, Office of the Prosecutor, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, November 2013, para. 49, http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/acb906/ (accessed November 18, 2016).

[110] Rome Statute, art. 20(3)(b).

[111] Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, para. 51.

[112] Ibid, para. 57.

[113] Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi, Case no. ICC-01/11-01/11-344-Red, Decision on the Admissibility of the Case against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, May 31, 2013, para.209. 

[114] See for example Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi, Case no. ICC-01/11-01/11, Decision on the Admissibility of the Case against Abdullah al-Senussi, October 11, 2013, paras. 190-191, 202.  

[115] COGAT, “Permissions in the Closure,” note 26.

Posted: January 1, 1970, 12:00 am