Loan Torondel, 21, worked with L’Auberge des Migrants in Calais for two years, helping to provide legal information and support and humanitarian assistance to migrants and asylum seekers in northern France.

© 2018 Loan Torondel
(Paris) – An appeals court’s confirmation of the defamation conviction of an aid worker on June 24, 2019 for an ironic tweet sets a dangerous precedent for freedom of expression, Human Rights Watch said today. The case was a serious escalation in harassment and intimidation of aid workers in France

The Court of Appeal in Douai, northern France, found Loan Torondel, the aid worker, guilty of defamation for a tweet he published in early January 2018 and sentenced him to pay a 1,500 euro fine (about US$1,700), which it suspended, and ordered him to pay damages and court costs. It was the first defamation case against an aid worker in France for criticizing the French government’s actions against migrants. Torondel told Human Rights Watch that he would appeal to the Court of Cassation, France’s court of last resort.

“This decision against Loan Torondel is a worrying precedent and a blow to freedom of expression,” said Bénédicte Jeannerod, France director at Human Rights Watch. “It resonates as a pernicious intimidation against staff or volunteers for organizations that speak out against police abuses against migrants.”

In January 2018, while working for the Auberge des Migrants, which provides crucial assistance to migrants and asylum seekers in Calais, Torondel published a tweet criticizing abusive police practices toward migrants. This tweet, with a photo showing two police officers standing over a young man seated in a field, imagined that the young man was protesting against the confiscation of his sleeping bag in the middle of winter and that the officer replied: “Maybe, but we are the French nation, sir,” an allusion to a speech President Emmanuel Macron gave in late December 2017.

Torondel was prosecuted following a complaint by one of the police officers and was sentenced by the first instance by a court in Boulogne-sur-Mer on September 25.

Torondel worked with Human Rights Watch earlier in 2019, and the organization is about to resume the collaboration to research police practices during identity checks in France.

A volunteer operating in Calais, Tom Ciotkowski, was also prosecuted, for “insult and violence” after filming French police officers who were impeding a food distribution to migrants and asylum seekers by volunteers in Calais. But he was acquitted on June 20 by the Boulogne-sur-Mer court. 

Torondel's conviction and Ciotkowski’s prosecution expand on what aid workers have regularly described as harassment by the French police to hinder or prevent aid workers and volunteers supporting migrants and asylum seekers from carrying out their work in Calais.

The aid workers have reported repeated fines for minor infractions and parking violations, excessive use of identity checks, and temporary confiscations of mobile phones to look through or delete their content. In some cases, aid workers have reported being improperly sprayed with tear gas or pushed or insulted by police officers. 

Human Rights Watch, the French Defender of Rights, UN observers, and four associations in Calais reported abusive practices by the police in Calais, both against migrants and asylum seekers and against aid workers. Amnesty International recently published a detailed report on the criminalization and harassment of people defending refugee and migrant rights in northern France. 

Criminal defamation laws are a disproportionate and unnecessary restriction on free speech and create a “chilling effect” that effectively restricts legitimate as well as harmful speech. The UN special rapporteur on freedom of opinion and expression and the representative on freedom of the media of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), together with the Organization of American States’ special rapporteur for freedom of expression, have called for the abolition of such laws.

The UN special rapporteur on freedom of opinion and expression has said that countries should take particular care to ensure that defamation laws – civil or criminal – “should never be used to prevent criticism of government” and “should reflect the principle that public figures are required to tolerate a greater degree of criticism than private citizens.”

“Obstructing assistance to migrants and bringing legal proceedings that criminalize the denunciation of abuses is a shameful tactic to deter solidarity,” Jeannerod said. “France should not go down this dangerous path, which reduces the working space of both aid workers and government critics.”

Posted: January 1, 1970, 12:00 am

Two Syrians walk along a fence near the Turkish-Syrian border in Gaziantep province, Turkey, November 30, 2016. Syrians who arrived in Turkey since late 2017 have been unable to register for temporary protection and receive basic services.

© 2016 Umit Bektas/Reuters
(Istanbul) – Turkish authorities in Istanbul and nine provinces on or near the Syrian border have stopped registering all but a handful of recently arrived Syrian asylum seekers. The suspension is leading to unlawful deportations, coerced returns to Syria, and the denial of health care and education.

The European Commission has recently praised Turkey’s asylum system and plans to release the second batch of €3 billion under its March 2016 migration deal which includes support for refugees in Turkey. European Union institutions and governments have stayed publicly silent on the suspension and other refugee abuses committed by Turkey, suggesting their primary concern is to halt the movement of asylum seekers and migrants from Turkey to the EU.

“While the EU supports Turkey to deter asylum seekers from reaching Europe, it’s turning a blind eye to Turkey’s latest steps to block and discourage people fleeing Syria,” said Gerry Simpson, associate refugee program director at Human Rights Watch. “But forcing Syrians who manage to get past Turkey’s border guards to live in legal limbo only risks driving them underground and onward to the EU.”

Syrian refugees queue for food aid in Gaziantep, Turkey on May 20, 2016. Turkey’s suspension of Syrian refugee registration blocks them from receiving such aid.

© 2016 Kyodo/ AP Images
The suspension of registration is Turkey’s latest effort to deny new asylum seekers protection. Over the past three years, Turkey has sealed off its border with Syria, while Turkish border guards continue to carry out mass summary pushbacks and to kill and injure Syrians as they try to cross.

Between early 2011 and the end of May 2018, Turkey had registered almost 3.6 million Syrians, making it the world’s largest refugee hosting country. That generosity does not absolve it, or its international partners, of the duty to help newly arrived asylum seekers, Human Rights Watch said.

In mid-May 2018, Human Rights Watch interviewed 32 Syrians in Turkey’s Hatay province about their attempts to register for a temporary protection permit in Hatay, Gaziantep, and Istanbul provinces. A permit protects Syrians from arrest and the risk of deportation. It also entitles them to get health care and education, to work, and to seek social assistance, including the EU-funded Emergency Social Safety Net for the most vulnerable Syrians.

Syrians said Turkish police deported them in groups of up to 20 people for not having a permit and that hospitals and schools refused to take them in without permits. Some said they returned to Syria so they, or their relatives, could get urgent medical care. Others said they decided to return to Syria because only some family members had been able to register. All said, they lived in constant fear of arrest and deportation and severely restricted their movement to avoid the police.

Turkey is bound by the international customary law rule of nonrefoulement, which prohibits the return of anyone in any manner whatsoever to a place where they would face a real risk of persecution, torture or other ill-treatment, or a threat to life. This includes asylum seekers, who are entitled to have their claims fairly adjudicated and not be summarily returned to places where they fear harm. Turkey may not coerce people into returning to places where they face harm by denying them legal status or access to essential services.

On October 30, 2017, the Hatay governor’s office said that to discourage smugglers from helping Syrians enter Turkey through Hatay, the province would no longer register newly arriving Syrians for temporary protection permits. In early February 2018, Turkey’s Interior Ministry said Istanbul province would also no longer register Syrians.

Eight other provinces on or near the Syrian border have also suspended registration for newly arriving Syrians since late 2017 or early 2018, according to three agencies working closely with Syrian refugees, as well as a European Commission official and a Turkish public official who previously worked on migration issues. The provinces are Adana, Gaziantep, Kahramanmaraş, Kilis, Mardin, Mersin, Osmaniye, and Şanlıurfa.


© 2018 DigitalGlobe and © 2018 Human Rights Watch

Since late August 2015, only registered Syrians who obtain a special travel permit have been allowed to travel within Turkey. In practice, the vast majority of Syrian asylum seekers enter Turkey irregularly through the few remaining gaps in Turkey’s border wall in Hatay province. Blocked from registering there, they are unable to lawfully leave Hatay province and travel to other provinces where registration has not been closed. This forces them to live illegally in Hatay province, or to use smugglers to reach other parts of Turkey, risking arrest and deportation.

According to three confidential sources, Turkey has rejected proposals for a new system that would allow Syrians arriving in Hatay, and to a far lesser extent in other border provinces, to register in other parts of Turkey where fewer refugees live.

Refugee agencies told Human Rights Watch that Turkey’s strict controls on international and local refugee agencies prevent them from finding and helping unregistered Syrians. This lack of aid agency monitoring means that there are no statistics or estimates on the numbers of Syrians denied registration, deported, or refused urgently needed services.

In response to a June 13 letter presenting the Human Rights Watch findings, the migration authorities in Ankara denied that any of the country’s 81 provinces, including Hatay and Istanbul, had suspended registration of Syrians. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) told Human Rights Watch that as of mid-May, the authorities had reassured them that registration of Syrians was ongoing, including in Hatay and Istanbul. Other aid agencies that support refugees say that the authorities in the 10 provinces have only continued to process Syrians pre-registered at the time of the suspension, and to register urgent medical cases referred from Syria and babies born to registered Syrians in Turkey. Two refugee aid agencies also said that in some cases they have managed to convince the authorities in Hatay and Osmaniye provinces to register particularly vulnerable unregistered Syrians.

In early 2018, the authorities in Hatay opened a new registration center in Antakya. Representatives of three aid agencies and two Turkish security personnel working in Antakya said the center is exclusively for unregistered Syrians to request help to return to Syria, while registered Syrians can request help to return at other migration authority-run centers.

Turkey does not allow any independent monitoring of whether unregistered Syrians signing up for return are in fact returning voluntarily or whether they are effectively being coerced. In contrast, Turkey does allow independent monitoring of some registered Syrians’ decision to return to Syria.

Turkey should protect the basic rights of all newly arriving Syrians, regardless of registration status, and register those denied registration since late 2017. The European Commission and EU member states with embassies in Turkey should support Turkey to register and protect Syrians and press Turkey to allow all agencies working for refugees to freely assist and help protect all Syrians, including all unregistered Syrians.

“Unregistered Syrians in Turkey may be conveniently out of sight, but they shouldn’t be out of mind,” Simpson said. “EU states and the commission should speak up and support all Syrians in Turkey, not just those who got in before Turkey started driving them underground.”

Asylum Seeker Registration

The first Syrian refugees fled to Turkey in early 2011 and in the subsequent three-and-a-half years, Turkey adopted an ad hoc approach to their registration, without conferring a clear legal status with related rights. Although Turkey ratified the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, the country maintains a geographical limitation that excludes anyone not originally from a European country from full refugee recognition. That means it does not fully grant asylum to people fleeing violence or persecution in Syria and any other non-European country.

In 2013, Turkey adopted its own legal framework on the protection of asylum seekers and refugees. In October 2014, Turkey also adopted a regulation under which it grants Syrians temporary protection. As of June 28, 2018, Turkey said it had registered 3,562,523 people under the regulation. Registered Syrians are entitled to assistance. Even though the regulation says Syrians who fail to register will not be deported to Syria and will only face an “administrative fine,” Human Rights Watch found that unregistered Syrians have been deported for not having temporary protection permits.

The Hatay governor’s office and the interior minister said registration has been suspended for newly arriving Syrians in Hatay and Istanbul. Refugee aid agencies and Syrians in Hatay’s main city, Antakya, told Human Rights Watch that police carried out mass arrests of Syrians in November and early December, just after registration was suspended.

Five sources told Human Rights Watch that since late 2017 and early 2018, migration authorities in eight other border provinces followed suit and turned away all newly arriving Syrians seeking registration.

As of June 28, seven of the provinces that suspended registration were in the top 10 provinces hosting Syrians: Adana, Gaziantep, Hatay, Istanbul, Kilis, Mersin, and Şanlıurfa. Together they were sheltering 2,422,804 registered Syrians, or 68 percent of the total in Turkey. The other three – Kahramanmaraş, Mardin, and Osmaniye – were sheltering 235,549, or just under seven percent.

Aid agencies say that, in practice, the authorities in affected provinces continued to process Syrians pre-registered at the time of the suspension and to register people with urgent medical needs referred from Syria. They also continued to register babies born to registered Syrians in Turkey, an estimated 306 each day. Agencies with first-hand knowledge of the suspension of registration in the 10 provinces say the registration of these Syrians may explain the claim authorities made to Human Rights Watch that eight of the provinces on or near the border registered a total of 116,059 Syrians between November 1 and June 20.

One refugee aid agency with close knowledge of registration procedures in all of Turkey’s provinces told Human Rights Watch that in a few exceptional cases, authorities in Hatay and Osmaniye province have registered children in urgent need of medical care, together with one caregiver. Another refugee assistance agency that sometimes deals with unregistered Syrians said that between late 2017 and late April 2018, it had convinced the Hatay authorities to register a few dozen newly arrived Syrians on an exceptional basis because they had specific needs, but that even then it was a “headache” to get them through police checkpoints to registration offices. Agencies estimate that as of mid-May, the total number of such vulnerable cases of unregistered Syrians whom the authorities have registered on an exceptional basis was in the low hundreds.

Turkey’s travel permit system for registered Syrians prohibits unregistered Syrians from traveling from border provinces to register elsewhere. Seven Syrians told Human Rights Watch they paid smugglers to drive them from Antakya, in Hatay province, to Istanbul to register. But security officials at migration authority offices in Istanbul told them registration had been suspended for newly arriving Syrians.

UNHCR and some diplomats in Turkey told Human Rights Watch they have been encouraging Turkey’s Directorate General for Migration Management to adopt a referral system under which authorities in Hatay, or other border provinces where Syrians first arrive, would pre-register Syrians and then refer them to other provinces where fewer Syrians live to register. Some EU member states have proposed that if such a system were to be adopted, the EU should help support job-creation for Syrians and Turkish citizens in the provinces to which Syrians are referred. But all attempts to convince Turkey to set up a referral system have failed.

Consequences of Suspended Registration

In mid-May 2018, Human Rights Watch interviewed 32 Syrian asylum seekers in Antakya, the capital of Hatay Province, and the first city most Syrians reach after being smuggled across the closed Turkish border. They said the authorities in Antakya, the nearby town of Reyhanli, and in Gaziantep province had refused to register them during the first few months of 2018. They also described how not having a temporary protection permit – or “kimlik,” as it is popularly called (a Turkish shorthand for identification card) – had affected them. Human Rights Watch explained the purpose of the interviews, gave assurances of anonymity, and obtained interviewees’ consent to describe their experiences.

All said they were turned away from registration offices at least twice. Only three said they managed to register after brokers bribed registration officials between US$300 and $500.

Most said officials simply said “no more kimliks here” or “no one gets a kimlik” and told them to leave. Two said they also tried to register in Gaziantep in April, but that saw a sign on the office that said “no kimliks.”

Four said that only some members of their family had been registered, leaving the rest in legal limbo and that as a result, the entire family was contemplating returning to Syria. One man said his sick wife was given permission to enter Turkey for emergency medical treatment in Antakya, and was allowed to register there, together with their newborn baby. When he and their five other children, aged 6 to 14, managed to enter Turkey and tried to register in Antakya, they were turned away.

Three Syrians said that Turkish police had previously summarily deported them to Syria for not having a temporary protection permit. One, a 22-year-old man from Aleppo governorate, said he entered Turkey in early April and was refused registration in Antakya. In early May, he said, police stopped him at about 8 a.m. near the Antakya bus station and asked for his permit. When he said he tried to register, but had been turned away, the police drove him to a local police station, recorded his personal details, and then drove him and about 20 other unregistered Syrians to the Bab al-Hawa border crossing and deported them. He said 15 of the 20 told him they had been caught without temporary protection permits in Istanbul and the other five said they had just entered Turkey a few days earlier and were arrested after arriving at a smuggler’s house in Antakya. A few days later, he managed to return to Turkey with smugglers.

Another former deportee, a 28-year-old man from Idlib, said he and his brother entered Turkey together in January and were denied registration in Antakya. He said his brother traveled with a smuggler to Istanbul to find work there, but Turkish police arrested him on May 17 and the next day, took him to the Bab al-Hawa border crossing and deported him.

On May 22, Human Rights Watch spoke to a 31-year-old man from Hama who said the authorities in Antakya had arrested his brother a few hours earlier, were holding him in the new center for unregistered Syrians to sign up to return to Syria, and said they were about to deport him. Human Rights Watch alerted UNHCR, which intervened and prevented the deportation.

Human Rights Watch interviewed four Syrians at the newly established center for unregistered Syrians who wish to sign up for return to Syria. They decided to go back because their relatives had been denied urgent medical care, or because some family members who arrived after registration was suspended could not register.

Two Syrians said they heard from other Syrians in Antakya about many cases in which the wives of men who had been deported told Turkish authorities they planned to go back to Syria because they and their children could not survive alone in Turkey.

All of the 29 other unregistered Syrians interviewed said they lived in constant fear of arrest and deportation and said they heard of many cases involving the deportation of unregistered Syrians. Eight said they reduced their movements to a minimum, often staying at home for days at a time. A 17-year-old boy who said he never left his uncle’s house in Antakya out of fear of arrest said “this feels like prison.”

Three unregistered Syrians said they regularly use Syrian-owned driving services which use back roads to avoid police checkpoints or informal police stop-and-search patrols in Antakya.

Nine said they attempted to get medical treatment in clinics and hospitals in Antakya, but had been refused treatment because they were not registered. Four others said they did not even try to access medical care, because they heard others were turned away, and because they were afraid local hospitals would call the police to arrest them for not having a permit.

A 27-year-old woman from Idlib province seeking cancer treatment said two hospitals in Antakya refused to treat her because she did not have a permit.

A 34-year-old, eight months’ pregnant woman from Aleppo, with four children all born by caesarean section, said she was too afraid to go to the local hospital to ask for a checkup and prepare for her delivery, because she had been told hospitals turn away unregistered Syrians and was afraid of being arrested and returned to Syria.

Similarly, a 31-year-old woman whose entire family was refused registration in March said her husband was extremely sick with a serious lung condition, but he would not go to a hospital out of fear of being arrested and deported. She said he never left the house and lived in constant fear of being discovered.

A nongovernmental organization working with Syrians in Hatay province said that during the first few months of 2018, they heard of dozens of cases of Syrians in Antakya seeking emergency medical care, many of them pregnant women, who were turned away by hospitals because they had been denied registration.

Six Syrians interviewed by Human Rights Watch said their children were unable to go to school, because schools would only take registered Syrians.

Nowhere to Turn for Help

The Turkish authorities consider Syrians denied registration to be in the country unlawfully. Nongovernmental groups working with refugees said the government only allows them to work with lawfully present asylum seekers and refugees.

Six organizations working with refugees in Turkey’s provinces on the Syrian border – which asked to remain anonymous for the staff’s security – said Turkey strictly controls and monitors their work in various ways.

Some said they must get special permission to assess registered Syrians’ assistance needs or to visit registered Syrians’ homes, in some cases in the presence of staff from the Ministry of Family and Social Policies. The agencies said the rules are applied in an ad hoc and unpredictable way, depending on the local authorities, and they are never certain of what refugee outreach activities are allowed.

As a result, they said, they found it difficult to identify Syrians blocked from registration procedures, including the most vulnerable, for example those in urgent need of medical or other care. They also said the situation in Hatay province – through which almost all newly arriving Syrians using smugglers enter the country due to continued gaps in the border wall – is particularly sensitive.

Because of the restrictions imposed by the Turkish authorities, aid agencies said they cannot proactively identify unregistered Syrian refugees. At best, they can only react if they are made aware of unregistered Syrians who are seeking help, or if they come across them by chance. They said they sometimes raise the most vulnerable of such cases with the authorities in the hope that they will allow those in urgent need to register.

One agency working in the border areas said: “It’s very simple, we can’t just reach out to registered or unregistered Syrians. We need approval for everything and we’d never get approval to help unregistered Syrians.” Another agency worker said: “We have repeatedly asked the authorities for permission to do protection outreach work, but we’ve been refused every time.”

Agencies said their extremely limited contact with unregistered Syrians means they can neither estimate how many unregistered Syrians now live in Hatay and other provinces, nor the extent to which the registration suspension has led to deportation and denial of service access. EU member states and other donors funding Syrian refugee assistance and protection projects in Turkey therefore don’t know the extent to which Turkey’s registration suspension is excluding Syrians from receiving help.

European Union Remains Silent

EU member states and the European Commission have remained publicly silent on Turkey’s registration suspension, as they have on Turkey’s long-standing abuses against Syrian asylum seekers at the border.

Turkey’s suspension of registration could drive many Syrians underground and onward to the EU, or coerce them into going back to Syria. The suspension, Turkey’s ongoing border abuses, and its recent abuses against Afghan asylum seekers means that any attempts to return Syrians from Greece to Turkey is also likely to be met with significant resistance by lawyers challenging return attempts on the grounds that Turkey is not a safe third country to which to return asylum seekers.

On April 17, the European Commission released its latest update on whether Turkey is meeting the EU’s criteria for becoming an EU member state. As part of its assessment of Turkey’s asylum system, the commission said: “There have been reports of alleged expulsions, returns and deportations of Syrian nationals, in contradiction of the non-refoulement principle,” without going into any further details or citing the sources.

In March, the European Commission promised to release the second batch of €3 billion under its March 2016 deal with Turkey. Under the deal, the EU maintains that Turkey is a safe country to which to return Syrian asylum seekers. In fact, Turkey does not meet the EU safe third country criteria.


Turkey should resume temporary protection registration for all newly arriving Syrians and register those denied access to registration since late 2017. If necessary, Turkey should pre-register Syrians in its provinces on the Syrian border and require Syrians to move to, and live in, other provinces with fewer Syrians. In the meantime, Turkey should instruct all medical facilities to provide emergency medical treatment to any Syrian in need, regardless of registration status. Schools should also take in Syrian children pending their registration. All Turkish public officials should refer unregistered Syrians to the nearest registration center.

Turkey should also allow all refugee agencies working with Syrians to actively work to identify unregistered Syrians, help them access registration procedures, and raise with the authorities all cases of unregistered Syrians deported to Syria or denied access to health care and education.

To help ensure protection for Syrians in Turkey, the European Commission and EU member states with embassies in Turkey should press Turkey to resume registration of all newly arriving Syrians and guarantee their access to health care and education in line with existing policies. If Turkey requires help to resume registration, they should respond generously. They should also press Turkey to allow all agencies working with refugees to freely carry out protection monitoring work throughout Turkey to identify and assist unregistered Syrians and to publicly report on any abuses, including forced return to Syria, and denial of assistance.

Finally, the European Commission should proactively seek information and publicly report on credible accounts of killings, injuries, and mass deportations by Turkish security forces at the Syrian border, including in its regular reports on Turkey’s accession process and the European Agenda on Migration.

Posted: January 1, 1970, 12:00 am

A Turkish soldier surveys the border line between Turkey and Syria near the city of Kilis, March 2, 2017.

© 2017 Reuters/Murad Sezer
(Brussels) – Turkish security forces have routinely intercepted hundreds, and at times thousands, of asylum seekers at the Turkey-Syria border since at least December 2017 and summarily deported them to the war-ravaged Idlib governorate in Syria, Human Rights Watch said today. Turkish border guards have shot at asylum seekers trying to enter Turkey using smuggling routes, killing and wounding them, and have deported to Idlib newly arrived Syrians in the Turkish town of Antakya, 30 kilometers from the Syrian border.

The Russian-Syrian military alliance’s December offensive against anti-government forces in Idlib has displaced almost 400,000 civilians, according to the UN. They have joined more than 1.3 million others trapped inside Idlib in insecure, overcrowded camps, and in makeshift camps in fields near the closed Turkish border where they are under constant threat of attack and lack food, clean water, shelter, health care, and aid. At a March 26, 2018 summit meeting in Bulgaria, the European Union should press Turkey to allow Syrian civilians fleeing fighting to seek protection inside Turkey and pledge increased aid to Syrian refugees in Turkey and the region.

“As border guards try to seal the last remaining gaps in Turkey’s border, hundreds of thousands of Syrians are trapped in fields to face the bombs on the Syrian side,” said Gerry Simpson, associate refugee rights program director at Human Rights Watch. “The EU should press Turkey to open its border to those in need, and provide meaningful support, not silently stand by as Turkey ignores refugee law and pushes thousands back to face the carnage.”


Border area where Turkish security forces regularly carry out mass deportations of Syrian asylum seekers.

Satellite data © 2018 DigitalGlobe; Analysis © 2018 Human Rights Watch
In response to these allegations, the Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM) in Turkey’s Ministry of Interior provided Human Rights Watch with a lengthy statement, which said, in part, that “while maintaining the security of borders against terrorist organizations, Turkey continues to accept Syrians in need coming to the borders, and never opens fire on or uses violence against them.”

The DGGM said that it registered 510,448 Syrians coming through the designated border gates in 2017, and 91,866 so far in 2018, and provided them with temporary protection. As seen from the numbers, the DGMM statement said, “allegations suggesting that Syrians are not registered are not true.” It does not appear that Turkish authorities conducted an investigation into Human Rights Watch’s specific findings.

In mid-February, Human Rights Watch spoke by phone with 21 Syrians about their repeated failed attempts to cross into Turkey with smugglers. Eighteen of them said that intensified Russia-Syrian airstrikes in Deir al-Zour and in Idlib had repeatedly displaced them until they finally decided they had no option but to risk their lives and flee to Turkey.

Those interviewed described 137 incidents, almost all between mid-December and early March, in which Turkish border guards intercepted them just after they had crossed the border with smugglers. Human Rights Watch spoke with another 35 Syrians stuck in Idlib who had not tried to escape for fear of being shot by border guards.

Nine people also described 10 incidents between September and early March in which Turkish border guards shot at them or others ahead of them as they tried to cross, killing 14 people, including 5 children, and injuring 18.

Civilians in Idlib have also been caught in the crossfire between Kurdish and Turkish forces during the offensive by Turkey in the Kurdish-held town of Afrin in Syria, north of Idlib, which began on January 20.

In November, the United Nations refugee agency said in its latest country guidance on Syria that “all parts of Syria are reported to have been affected, directly or indirectly, by one or multiple conflicts” and therefore maintained its long-standing call on all countries “not to forcibly return Syrians.”

Syrians who tried to enter Turkey said they were intercepted after they crossed the Orontes River or near the internally displaced persons camp in al-Dureyya. They said Turkish border guards deported them along with hundreds, and at times thousands, of other Syrians they had intercepted. They said the guards forced them to return to Syrian territory at an informal crossing point at Hatya or across a small dam on the Orontes River known as the Friendship Bridge that aid agencies have used.

Human Rights Watch obtained satellite images of both crossing points and of four security posts with large tents set up on basketball courts in the immediate border area where asylum seekers said they were held before being sent back to Syria.

The findings follow a February 3 Human Rights Watch report on Turkey’s border killings and summary pushbacks of asylum seekers between May and December 2017 and similar findings in November 2015 and May 2016.

In response to the February 3 report, a senior Turkish official repeated his government’s long-standing response to such reports, pointing out that Turkey has taken in millions of Syrian refugees. Human Rights Watch described its latest findings in a letter on March 15 to Turkey’s interior minister, requesting comment by March 21.

Turkey is hosting over 3.5 million Syrian refugees, according to the UN refugee agency. Turkey deserves credit and support for its generosity and is entitled to secure its border with Syria.

However, Turkey is also obliged to respect the principle of nonrefoulement, which prohibits countries from returning anyone to a place where they face a real risk of persecution, torture, or inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment. This includes a prohibition on rejecting asylum seekers at borders that would expose them to such threats. Turkey is also obliged to respect international norms on the use of lethal force as well as the rights to life and bodily integrity.

Turkey insists that it respects the principle of nonrefoulement. “Syrians are accepted and taken under protection in Turkey and Syrians who have entered into Turkey somehow and demand protection are definitely not sent back and the reception and registration procedures are carried out,” the DGMM’s statement in response to this report said. “Syrians coming to Turkey are under no circumstances forced to go back to their own country; their registration is continuing and these foreigners can benefit from many rights and services in Turkey.”


Map of the Turkey-Syria Border.

Satellite data © 2018 DigitalGlobe; Analysis © 2018 Human Rights Watch
As of December, Turkey had completed almost 800 kilometers of a planned 911-kilometer border barrier with Syria, which consists of a rocket-resistant concrete wall and steel fence. The satellite imagery Human Rights Watch obtained of the area where Syrians say they crossed with smugglers shows areas without a wall.

Turkey’s continued refusal since at least mid-2015 to allow Syrian asylum seekers to cross the border legally has been reinforced by a controversial EU-Turkey March 2016 migration agreement to curb refugee and migration flows to the European Union. The EU should instead be working with Turkey to keep its borders open to refugees, providing financial support for Turkey’s refugee efforts, and sharing responsibility by stepping up resettlement of refugees from Turkey, Human Rights Watch said.

“The EU should stop ignoring Turkey’s mass refugee deportations,” Simpson said. “The meeting in Bulgaria is a clear opportunity for the EU governments and institutions to change course and ramp up efforts to help Turkey protect Syrian refugees including through increased refugee resettlement.”

For more details about Turkey’s mass border pushbacks and the situation displaced Syrians face in Syria’s Idlib governorate, please see below.

Turkey’s land borders are legally protected by army border units of the Turkish Armed Forces. Gendarmerie also on duty at the borders operate under the authority of the land forces command. There are also gendarmerie stations near the borders charged with regular rural policing activities. This report refers to border guards without specifying if they are soldiers or gendarmes since many of those interviewed did not provide or do not have such specific information.

Regular Mass Pushbacks at the Turkish Border

Between February 14 and 20, Human Rights Watch interviewed the 21 Syrian asylum seekers who had tried multiple times to cross the border. Human Rights Watch interviewed them by cell phone and explained the purpose of the interviews and gave assurances of anonymity. We also received interviewees’ consent to describe their experiences.

They described 137 incidents – 107 of them between January 1 and March 6 – in which Turkish border guards intercepted them at the border near the Syrian town of Darkush and held them at nearby security posts and then deported them back to Syria with hundreds, and at times thousands, of others.

A man from Deir al-Zour governorate who fled Syrian government attacks on his village in September 2017 said border guards intercepted him nine times in January and the first half of February in border areas close to the al-Dureyya displaced people’s camp in Syria.

Describing three incidents in February, he said:

Each time they insulted the men, calling them “Syrian traitors.” They forced some of them to collect firewood. Then they took all of us in military trucks to a basketball court at a security post near the Hatya border gate. There was also a big tent there. They put us all in the tent and kept us overnight. They didn’t give us any food or water or let us go to a proper toilet. There were so many in the tent, that we were spilling out into the open of the basketball court. We were hundreds of people. The next morning, they took us all back to the border in buses.

A Turkish security base about 250 meters from the Turkey-Syria border, 2 kilometres south of the Turkish village, Saribük. The base has a basketball court and large tent, as described in statements by deported Syrian asylum seekers who said they were held in such a location before being deported.

© 2018 Digital Globe
Three Syrians said they were deported with thousands of others. A man from al-Hamediyah who said Turkish border guards intercepted him 11 times between September and January said that he was usually deported with about 500 other people. However, he said that on one occasion, in January, the border guards gave the people they had intercepted trying to cross from Syria numbers and his was 3,890. He said he was one of the last to be put on buses and taken to the border.

Many people referred to two deportation points that they said were between 10 and 30 minutes’ drive from the security posts where border guards had held them: one was an informal border crossing at Hatya, and the other was a small dam on the Orontes River called “Friendship Bridge.” Human Rights Watch obtained satellite imagery of both crossing points and of four security posts in the immediate border area where asylum seekers said they crossed into Turkey.

A woman from Hama governorate who repeatedly tried to cross the border said she was deported six times during the first two weeks of February with groups she estimated to be between 50 and 600 other Syrians:

The second time, on around February 4, the border guards took us to a military post and put us in a big tent with 200 other people they had already caught. Four hours later, at about 8 a.m., they put us in large buses and drove us to the Friendship Bridge. There they told us to get out and walk across the river back into Syria.

The satellite imagery Human Rights Watch obtained confirms there are gaps in the wall the full length of the Orontes River, west of the Syrian town of Salkeen, and at various points between the southern tip of where the river meets the border and the Hatya border crossing.

Deportations from Antakya

Three Syrians said Turkish police had deported them or relatives from the town of Antakya, about 20 kilometers west of the Syrian border.

A man from Deir al-Zour governorate said:

I crossed the border at night with my wife and two daughters and about 20 other people in late December 2017 near the al-Dureyya [displacement] camp. The border guards didn’t find us. The smugglers took us to their house in Antakya, about two hours’ drive away. There were 20 other Syrians already there and they told us they had also crossed from Syria that night. Not long after that, Turkish police arrived at the house. They took all of us to a police station and held us there until the next morning. They took our fingerprints and photos. Then they took all of us in police vans to the border at Bab al-Hawa and sent us back to Syria.

A man from Hama governorate described what happened to his wife:

The Turks sent my wife back from Antakya twice. She told me everything that happened. The first time was a week ago [about February 10]. The smugglers drove her and about 10 other people from the border near the Orontes River up to Reyhanli and from there they drove to Antakya. They reached the edge of Antakya at about 6 a.m. Turkish police shot at the car’s wheels to force it to stop. They beat the driver and immediately put my wife and the others in a police van and drove them to the border at Bab al-Hawa.

My wife crossed again four days later. The smugglers took her and about 10 others to a small house in a Turkish village near the border and then drove to a house in Antakya where there were already about 50 other Syrians who said they had arrived that night. Suddenly Turkish police arrived, at about 7 a.m. They wrote down their names and took photos. They put them in a big truck and took them to the Bab al-Hawa crossing. They held them there for the whole day and then sent them back to Syria.

Shootings by Border Guards

Nine Syrians interviewed described a total of 10 shooting incidents by Turkish border guards between September and March in which they said 14 people were killed and 18 injured.

In mid-February, a man from Deir al-Zour governorate said that in the previous five weeks he had tried four times to reach Turkey with his wife and five children. The first three times, he said, Turkish border guards deported them. The fourth time they turned back because Turkish border guards shot at their group as they approached the border:

A few hundred meters from the border near the al-Dureyya [displacement] camp the Turks suddenly started shooting at our group. They killed an 8-year-old girl and injured two men, one in a leg and the other in the stomach. I helped the man shot in the stomach turn back with the rest of us while the others carried the girl and helped the other man. Later the smugglers told us that a 13-year-old girl in another group trying to cross at the next time had also been killed during the shooting.

A man evacuated with his wife and baby from Aleppo in late 2016 said he unsuccessfully attempted to cross with them to Turkey three times near the al-Dureyya camp in September 2017 and January 2018 and was deported with hundreds of others the first two times. During the third attempt, in January, he said:

The border guards shot at us and injured my wife in her stomach and leg. She was pregnant and the baby died. They also injured two men and a 5-year-old boy, who was shot in the leg. We took my wife to a hospital in Syria near the border. Her heart stopped twice, but she lived. They couldn’t operate on her, so they sent her to Turkey through the Bab al-Hawa gate for surgery. They amputated her leg and removed her womb. They didn’t let me cross with her but a few days later a smuggler helped me and my daughter cross to Turkey.

Human Rights Watch also spoke with a doctor in a Syrian hospital near the Turkish border west of the town of Idlib who said that between August 1 and February 16, the hospital had received 66 people with gunshot-related injuries who said they had been shot while trying to cross the Turkish border.

Conflict and Humanitarian Crisis in Idlib governorate

According to the UN, about 2.65 million people are currently in Idlib governorate, over 1.75 million of whom have been displaced from elsewhere in Idlib or other parts of Syria, including almost 400,000 displaced since December. Civilians in Idlib have faced years of conflict. In September, Russian and Syrian forces began a fresh offensive in Idlib, three days after Russia, Iran, and Turkey had agreed to a ceasefire and “de-escalation” zone in the province and parts of Hama and western Aleppo. Human Rights Watch documented that attacks in September struck markets and populated residential areas and caused thousands of people to flee to displacement sites near the Turkish border.

Hostilities in Idlib halted on October 8 after Turkey deployed monitors there, but restarted in late December. In January, the Russian-Syrian military alliance carried out airstrikes to support Syrian ground troops. Some attacks involved prohibited weapons and targeted hospitals.

The Atma displaced persons camp on the Syrian side of Turkey’s border wall, where on February 6, 2018, during an exchange of fire between Turkish and Kurdish forces, a shell hit killing a girl and injuring seven others.

© 2017 Reuters/Osman Orsal
On January 21, Turkey started a military offensive in Kurdish-held Afrin, also putting displaced civilians at risk. Turkish and Kurdish forces have shelled each other on either side of Syria’s Atma displacement camp, on the Turkish border, which shelters 60,000 people.

Witnesses said that on February 6, during the fighting, shells hit the camp, killing an 8-year-old girl and injuring seven other civilians.

Human Rights Watch interviewed seven displaced Syrians about the incident. They all said it left their children terrified of the shelling and unable to sleep.

A father of seven children from Hama who lived close to where the shell landed on February 6 said:

I was there when it happened and rushed to help. I heard a young girl had been killed, but I only saw two who were injured. One had lost an arm and a leg and the other was blinded. I was so scared the same might happen to my children, we fled the camp and went to live in a field near the Bab al-Hawa border crossing. But we couldn’t stay there all alone, without help, so we had to come back to the camp. We are all scared now, all the time.

A father of four children said the incident had so shaken his family, he had returned to his still conflict-riven home town of Kafr Zita in Hama governorate because all other displacement camps in Idlib were full. As his house had been destroyed, he said, he was living in a field on the edge of the town and struggling to survive: “There is still shelling here but if we die, it’s better to die at home.”

Human Rights Watch also spoke with five Syrians who had been repeatedly displaced in recent months within Idlib to escape the shifting front line and who, as of mid-February, were living as close as possible to the Turkish border in the hope of escaping the fighting.

The UN says that since December, the violence has displaced at least 385,000 people who have joined 2.65 million other civilians, including 1.35 million civilians displaced in the past few years.

In mid-February, Human Rights Watch interviewed two aid officials working in Idlib governorate. One summarized the dire humanitarian situation:

There is no more room anywhere for people displaced in the past few months. Displacement camps are completely full and we [humanitarians] do not have the resources to properly address basic needs of water, food, heating, health care, and education. Rent has skyrocketed so people end up living in the tens of thousands on the edge of towns and villages in fields in makeshift camps. There is simply no way the aid agencies can help all these people. At best they can give very limited help once in a while to some of them, and it is not done in an organized way. There is suffering everywhere, in every camp and in every village.

The 56 displaced Syrians in Idlib that Human Rights Watch interviewed, including 42 displaced by the recent violence, all described the extremely difficult conditions they had faced in Idlib in previous months. The newly displaced said they had heard that displacement camps were completely full and that they could not afford to pay the extremely high rents in the towns and villages in the area. They ended up living in waterlogged fields across Idlib governorate, often with other families in makeshift tents made from sacks and other material sewed together, because they could not afford to buy proper tents.

They said they struggled to find food and had to pay high fees for water, delivered by trucks. They either had seen no one from an aid agency, or those who had, said they were unable to help or had promised help but hadn’t returned.

Turkish authorities have allowed Turkish and international aid groups based in Turkey to cross into Syria and join Syrian aid groups to distribute tents and other assistance to Syrians in camps in border areas. Human Rights Watch said that allowing much-needed cross-border aid is important, but does not absolve Turkey of its obligation to allow Syrian civilians fleeing fighting to seek protection in Turkey.

EU Silence

Human Rights Watch has documented that, since at least mid-August 2015, Turkish border guards enforcing the country’s March 2015 border closure have deported Syrians trying to reach Turkey. In April and May 2016, Human Rights Watch documented Turkish border guards shooting and beating Syrian asylum seekers trying to cross to Turkey, resulting in deaths and serious injuries, and sending those who managed to cross back to Syria. In February 2018, Human Rights Watch reported on further killings, injuries and pushbacks that happened in the second half of 2017.

On May 20, 2016, Human Rights Watch called on UN member states and UN agencies attending the World Humanitarian Summit in Istanbul to press the Turkish authorities to reopen Turkey’s border to Syrian asylum seekers. But neither the European Commission nor any European Union member state – or any other country – has publicly pressed Turkey to do so, while UN agencies have also remained publicly silent.

The world’s – and in particular the EU’s – silence over Turkey’s breach of the cornerstone of international refugee law condones Turkey’s border abuses.

The EU’s failure to take in more Syrian asylum seekers and refugees also contributes to the pressure on Turkey. The EU should swiftly fulfill its own commitments to relocate Syrian and other asylum seekers from Greece and, together with other countries, it should also expand safe and legal channels for people to reach safety from Turkey, including through increased refugee resettlement, humanitarian admissions, humanitarian and other visas, and facilitated family reunification.

Posted: January 1, 1970, 12:00 am

More than 13,500 asylum seekers remain trapped on the Greek islands in deplorable conditions as winter begins on December 21, 2017. Greece, with support from its European Union partners, should urgently transfer thousands of asylum seekers to the Greek mainland and provide them with adequate accommodation and access to fair and efficient asylum procedures.

Author: Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch
Posted: January 1, 1970, 12:00 am

(Beirut) – Lebanese authorities should conduct an independent, thorough, and transparent investigation into the deaths of Syrians in military custody and allegations of torture and ill-treatment in detention, Human Rights Watch said today. On July 4, 2017, the Lebanese military issued a statement saying four Syrians died in its custody following mass raids in Arsal, a restricted access area in northeast Lebanon where many Syrian refugees live. On July 14, Human Rights Watch received credible reports that a fifth Syrian detainee had also died in custody.

A Lebanese soldier at an army post in the hills above the Lebanese town of Arsal

© 2016 Reuters

A doctor with expertise in documenting torture reviewed photos of three of the men provided by their family lawyers to Human Rights Watch, which showed widespread bruising and cuts. He said the injuries were “consistent with inflicted trauma in the setting of physical torture” and that “any statement that the deaths of these individuals were due to natural causes is inconsistent with these photographs.” Human Rights Watch also spoke with five former detainees, who said that army personnel beat and ill-treated them and other detainees. A military officer told Human Rights Watch that the army was investigating the deaths and would publish its findings.

“While the Lebanese army’s promise to investigate these shocking deaths is a positive step, the promise will be meaningless without transparent and independent accountability for anyone found guilty of wrongdoing,” said Sarah Leah Whitson, Middle East director at Human Rights Watch. “Anyone who supports the Lebanese army should support efforts to tackle such serious allegations of military abuse.”

Photos of the bodies of three Syrians who died in Lebanese military custody, provided to Human Rights Watch by their families' lawyers. © 2017 Private

On June 30, the Lebanese army announced it had raided two unofficial refugee camps in Arsal that day, and was met with suicide bombers, a bomb, and a grenade, resulting in the injury of seven soldiers. On July 15, the army released a statement saying that it detained 356 people following these raids. It referred 56 for prosecution and 257 to the General Security agency for lack of residency. A humanitarian organization official told Human Rights Watch that children were among those detained.

The Lebanese army regularly conducts raids on unofficial refugee camps in Lebanon, but has not responded to questions from Human Rights Watch about the purpose of these raids. The raids came amid calls from Lebanese politicians for the return of refugees to Syria and reports of an impending military operation against armed groups on the Syrian border near Arsal.

Human Rights Watch has not been able to confirm reports that Syrians died during the raids themselves, but a source in Arsal said the municipality received nine bodies, not including the five men who were reported to have died in custody.

The army’s July 4 statement said that four detainees who “suffered from chronic health issues that were aggravated due to the climate condition” died before being interrogated. It identified them as Mustafa Abd el Karim Absse, 57; Khaled Hussein el-Mleis, 43; Anas Hussein el-Husseiki, 32; and Othman Merhi el-Mleis. The army did not specify where it had detained them.

Human Rights Watch spoke with a family member and a close acquaintance of two of the deceased, who said that they had no known serious health conditions. Both said that the army gave no reason for the arrests and did not notify the families of the deaths.

On July 14, Human Rights Watch received reports that a fifth Syrian detainee, Toufic al Ghawi, 23, died in detention after the army transferred him to the Elias Hrawi government hospital. A witness in Arsal who saw the body before burial said, “Toufic didn’t look human anymore. His flesh was torn apart.” Human Rights Watch has not received photographs of the body.

Additional evidence supports the allegations of abuse and torture during the arrests in Arsal and at military detention facilities. A witness in Arsal told Human Rights Watch that he had seen 34 former detainees with marks on their hands, legs, and backs, and in one case, on a former detainee’s head.

Human Rights Watch spoke with five former detainees who said they were mistreated, physically abused, and denied food and water, along with scores of other detainees during four to five days of detention without charge before being released.

Human Rights Watch wrote to the military on July 10 to verify the number of those arrested, injured, or killed during the army raids; those still in custody; and the conditions of their detention, but has not received a response. Human Rights Watch also requested permission to enter Arsal to interview witnesses, but has not received permission. An army officer told Human Rights Watch that the army was not allowing “media organizations” to enter Arsal. Human Rights Watch shared its findings with the military and military prosecutor.

Under international law, Lebanon has an obligation to investigate deaths in custody and hold those responsible to account. Human Rights Watch and local human rights organizations have long documented reports of torture and ill-treatment by security services including the army. Impunity for violence is a recurring problem in Lebanon. Even when officials have initiated investigations into deaths, torture, or ill-treatment, they have often not been concluded or made public. Human Rights Watch is not aware of cases where military personnel have been held to account.

“The Lebanese public and the Syrian families of those who died in detention deserve a clear accounting of what happened to them and punishment for those found responsible,” Whitson said. “Unfortunately, Lebanese authorities have a history of opening investigations in response to public pressure, but failing to conclude them or publish the results.”

Photographic Evidence of Torture
Human Rights Watch received 28 photographs of three of the deceased men, taken at the Elias Hrawi government hospital in Zahle, from the law firm representing the families of the deceased. The lawyers said they were not able to locate Othman el-Mleis’s body. Dr. Homer Venters, director of programs at Physicians for Human Rights, who has expertise in documenting torture, reviewed the photographs and shared his report:

The photos reveal widespread physical trauma of the upper and lower extremities. The lack of defensive wounds suggests that these injuries were inflicted while the victims were restrained or otherwise incapacitated and the distribution of these injuries are consistent with inflicted trauma in the setting of physical torture. Several of the photos are consistent with lacerations caused from being suspended by the wrists. It would be reasonable to conclude that the deaths of these men is the result of in-custody violence, although the precise cause of death cannot be predicted based on the information and photographs submitted. Any statement that the deaths of these individuals was due to natural causes is inconsistent with these photographs.

Corroborating Evidence of Torture and Mistreatment of Arsal Detainees
Human Rights Watch spoke with five former detainees from Arsal who said they were detained without charge for four to five days. They said soldiers handcuffed them, hooded them with their shirts, put them on the ground in the sun, and stomped or hit anyone raising their head. “I moved my head up slightly, and immediately a soldier hit me with his boot,” one man said.

The men said soldiers then loaded them onto trucks “one over the other, as if they’re shipping potato bags,” and took them to multiple detention sites including Rayak Air Base in the Bekaa Valley and the military intelligence and military police bases in Ablah. At Rayak Air Base, they said, army personnel held more than 100 of them in one room overnight, denied them food and water, and did not allow them to use the bathroom. “They would beat whoever asked to go to the bathroom,” said a former detainee in his 60s.

They said that army personnel at Rayak beat, insulted, and threatened them and others. “They beat people, some with batons, others with the butt of a gun,” one said. “I saw one soldier on the outside poking one of the detainees from the window with a bent skewer. He beat him, then he started cutting his face…until blood came out.”

The men interviewed said they were finally transferred to General Security, the agency in charge of foreigners’ entry and residency, who did not mistreat them and released them. The former detainees said that the army never told them why they had been detained.

One former detainee, interviewed on July 11, said: “I had to leave my son behind [in detention]. To this day, I don’t know what has happened to him.” Lebanese law limits pre-charge detention to 96 hours.

Medical Reports
Human Rights Watch also reviewed medical reports for three of the deceased, dated July 1 and 2, and prepared by a forensic doctor at the request of the general prosecutor, concluding that they had suffered heart attacks and a stroke, and that the bodies did not show marks of violence.

A lawyer representing the families said she had received permission from a Judge of Urgent Affairs for a forensic doctor to examine the bodies, conduct an autopsy, and take medical samples to ascertain the cause of death. After she took the medical samples to the Hotel Dieu hospital in Beirut for analysis, the lawyer said, Military Intelligence personnel there demanded she turn them over, by order of the Military Information Directorate. She handed them over after the general prosecutor, Samir Hammoud, instructed her to do so. Following the military’s intervention, she said that the X-ray, CT scan, and autopsy results have not been released to her or made public.

The investigation into the men’s deaths is now before the military court, the family’s lawyer said. Human Rights Watch has previously raised concerns about the independence, impartiality, and competence of the Military Tribunal, where the majority of judges are military officers who are not required to have law degrees, and where trials take place behind closed doors.

Posted: January 1, 1970, 12:00 am

(Erbil) – Iraqi forces have forcibly displaced at least 125 families said to have familial ties to affiliates of the Islamic State (also known as ISIS), Human Rights Watch said today.

Sunni tribal groups (known as the Hashad al-Asha'ri), within the Popular Mobilization Forces (known as the PMF or Hashd al-Sha'abi), which are under the control of Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, and Iraqi soldiers forced the families out of their homes following the passage of a decree issued by local authorities. The families, all from Salah al-Din governorate, are being held against their will in a camp functioning as an open-air prison near Tikrit. The PMF also destroyed some of the families’ homes.

“While politicians in Baghdad are discussing reconciliation efforts in Iraq, the state’s own forces are undermining those efforts by destroying homes and forcing families into a detention camp,” said Lama Fakih, deputy Middle East director at Human Rights Watch. “These families, accused of wrongdoing by association, are in many cases themselves victims of ISIS abuses and should be protected by government forces, not targeted for retribution.”


Video: Local Authorities Displace Suspected "ISIS-Families" in Iraq

Iraqi forces have forcibly displaced at least 125 families said to have familial ties to affiliates of the Islamic State (also known as ISIS). 

In August 2016, the Salah al-Din governorate council passed a decree stating that anyone proven to have been complicit or affiliated with ISIS has no right to return to the governorate. The decree also orders the expulsion of immediate relatives of ISIS-members from Salah al-Din for 10 years to life, and says that they are only allowed to return if they are deemed “safe.” The decree establishes a committee to seize ISIS-affiliates’ property and suspend their, and their families,’ provision cards. Families that kill their ISIS-affiliated relatives, or hand them over to the Iraqi authorities, are exempted.

One woman from al-Shakrah village, three kilometers south of al-Shirqat, said that PMF fighters forced her and her relatives from their home on January 7, 2017, because her husband’s brother had joined ISIS. She said that the fighters “forced our whole family of 14 people out and onto the truck. They didn’t let us grab even a change of clothing.”

Two women from the village of al-Aithah said that local PMF forces destroyed hundreds of homes with explosives after they retook the area on September 21, targeting not only some of the families they thought to be affiliated with ISIS, but also some families that had fled because of the fighting. Satellite imagery reviewed by Human Rights Watch showed that between September 23 and October 23, 220 homes in the village were destroyed by explosives and fire.

Before and after satellite imagesBefore and after satellite images

Satellite imagery shows the village of al-Aithah, outside Tikrit, Iraq, before and after the destruction caused by the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). 

Before: © 2017 DigitalGlobe After: © 2017 DigitalGlobe

Under the laws of war, parties to a conflict may only attack military objectives. The intentional or wanton destruction of civilian property is unlawful unless the property is being used for a military purpose. Destroying property merely to punish the population is always prohibited.

Iraqi federal authorities should investigate any intentional destruction or looting of civilian property, punish those responsible – including those in command control at the time of such acts who failed to prevent the crimes – if abuses are found, and compensate victims, Human Rights Watch said.

Human Rights Watch visited the Shahama camp for displaced people, 13 kilometres north of Tikrit, on February 3, to interview families affected by the decree. Hussein Ahmed Khalaf, the camp manager, said that 362 families were there, of whom 237 had fled Hawija, a city 50 kilometers west of Kirkuk that is still under ISIS control. Those families had arrived when the camp opened at the beginning of January.

He said that over the next month, 125 families from the al-Shirqat area were brought to the camp. Human Rights Watch interviewed 14 people forcibly displaced with their families to the camp. They all said that PMF fighters, in the presence of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) with army vehicles, had forced them out of their homes. They said that they were prohibited from leaving the camp and from having mobile phones.

In a Salah al-Din news broadcast in January, Brigadier General Juma Enad Sadoon, the Salah al-Din operational commander for the ISF, said that he ordered the forced displacements of immediate relatives of ISIS members following the passage of the decree by the Salah al-Din governorate council. He said “ISIS families” were identified by other residents and through intelligence gathered by the security forces. He said he gave the order because of concerns about family members communicating with their ISIS relatives fighting in Mosul and other fronts and because of complaints from the relatives of victims of ISIS abuses. He said he would not stop displacing these families.

But most families who spoke to Human Rights Watch either denied they had a relative in ISIS or said that if they did, this family member was as distant as a cousin or brother-in-law.

Residents of Shahama camp speak with relatives through the camp fence. 



© 2017 Sami Hilali

On January 26, two videos were posted on a Facebook page covering news from Salah al-Din showing local PMF forces in al-Shirqat displacing families of ISIS suspects using army vehicles.

Both videos feature a female commander known as Um Hanadi of the local PMF of al-Shirqat known as the Group of Um Hanadi for Special Tasks (Tashkeel Um Hanadi La Mohmat al-Khasah). In one video, she and a group of armed forces are loading families they refer to as “ISIS families” onto at least two Iraqi army trucks with military license plates. The video shows at least two Iraqi military commanders, recognizable because of their red berets. One fighter and the cameraman identify themselves as members of the Iraqi military’s Division 17, Brigade 60. In the other video, Um Hanadi says to the camera, “It is an honor for me to clean and cleanse al-Shirqat with these elite forces.”

A New York Times article from January 29 about the camp quotes Salah al-Din’s deputy governor, Amar Hekmat, as saying that the aim behind the forcible displacement is, “to defy the terrorists and send a stern message to the families.” Salah al-Din’s First Deputy Governor Khazhal Hamad is quoted in the same article saying that displacing the families was a way of protecting them from retaliatory attacks by neighbors who lost family members to ISIS. “There are hostile feelings towards these people, and these feelings can affect the civil peace we are trying to achieve,” he said.

A February 28 response from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ human rights office to Human Rights Watch’s findings stated that the displacement was carried out by the Salah al-Din operational command in order to protect the families from revenge attacks; for security reasons linked to continued suicide attacks; and because some of these families may be sharing information about ISF positions with ISIS. It stated that the operational command was mandated with holding and protecting the families in the camp. Representatives of the PMF did not respond to questions sent by Human Rights Watch.

The article goes on to say that Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi sent a letter in late January to the local governor criticizing the displacement and ordered governorate and federal government officials to resolve the issue. There was no indication he had called for the punishment of armed forces under his command that participated in it. Iraqi federal authorities including al-Abadi should continue to condemn the forcible displacement of these families and censure any state forces that participate in the practice, Human Rights Watch said.

Two of those interviewed by Human Rights Watch said that Salah al-Din’s Governor Ahmad Abdullah al-Jabouri came to the camp in late January and told them that he was working on a solution to secure their release, but that nothing had happened since.

It is a basic international standard that punishment for crimes should only be imposed on people responsible for the crimes, after a fair trial to determine individual guilt. Imposing collective punishments on families, villages, or entire communities is strictly forbidden and can itself be a crime, especially if it results in forced displacement.

Under the laws of war, forced displacement of civilians is strictly prohibited except in the limited cases when displacement is necessary to protect civilians or for imperative military necessity, and then only for as long as it is needed. Under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, it is a war crime to order such unlawful displacements of civilians during a conflict. Widespread or systematic unlawful forced displacement imposed as a policy of the state or organized group can amount to a crime against humanity.

Local governorate councils should reverse any decrees targeting the families of alleged ISIS affiliates in violation of international standards. Iraq’s parliament should issue a decree calling on the local governorate councils to rescind the decrees and on armed forces to cease the forced displacements, reiterating the unlawfulness of these displacements and stipulating that any armed forces who participate in the displacements should be censured.

“There is growing concern among parliamentarians and ministers about the forcible displacement of so-called ISIS families and what this will mean for reconciliation efforts in areas recently taken back from ISIS,” Fakih said. “That concern needs to translate into action before these destructive policies are mimicked across the country.”

Local Justifications for Displacement
Local leaders from Salah al-Din told Human Rights Watch that the forcible displacement of families of alleged ISIS affiliates was in line with jalwa, an Arabic term for eviction and a principle that entails the forced relocation of a clan to avoid friction if one of its members murders someone from another clan living in the same area.

Other local officials are taking similar measures to expel so-called “ISIS families.” In July, the Babylon governorate council passed a decree calling on authorities to demolish the homes of anyone proven to have participated in terrorist activities, deport their families from the governorate, and to authorize legal procedures against the families proven to have “concealed” their ISIS-affiliated relatives. Families from Anbar face similar difficulties. In July, local leaders issued a covenant saying that people who “promoted” ISIS are not allowed to return until their charges are reviewed. Individuals who did not renounce relatives who supported ISIS are only allowed to return home “when this situation stabilizes,” they said.

Identified with ISIS
Four of the 14 people Human Rights Watch interviewed were from al-Shakrah village and were brought to the Shahama camp on January 7 and January 26. Three were from al-Aithah village, 11 kilometers north of al-Shirqat, and were brought to the camp in early January. The rest were from three neighborhoods of the town of al-Shirqat and were brought to the camp on January 26, 28, and 29. Some were brought alone, while others said they were loaded into approximately 30 vehicles, some with up to 11 other families. Several said they had only the most tangential connections, or no connections at all, to people who had joined ISIS.

One couple said that their cousin, a member of Um Hanadi’s PMF group with whom they had a running land dispute for years, was the one that brought forces to their home and made them leave. They said they had no links to ISIS. Another woman said she was a nurse, and had continued her work at the local hospital under ISIS because she was the only female nurse and felt it was her duty to provide health care for women. Fighters brought her and her family to the camp, saying it was because she had been affiliated with ISIS, she said.

One widowed woman said that ISIS fighters forced her to marry off her 14-year-old daughter to one of their fighters after they took her village in 2014. According to the mother, the daughter married the fighter, who was subsequently killed, and gave birth weeks before she and the rest of her family were forcibly displaced. The woman said PMF and Iraqi soldiers displaced her and her family, including her daughter and grandchild, to the camp because of the forced marriage.

“They [the PMF] told me: ‘You gave your daughter to ISIS,’” she said. “But they do not understand our situation with ISIS and the pressure they put on us. We couldn’t say anything to them…I had no choice. I couldn’t say anything…ISIS became the government ruling over everyone. They’ve gone to war with every country. What could I do as a woman to oppose them?”

“As they drove us from al-Shirqat they were celebrating, it was like a victory for them,” said a man from the Jamia neighborhood. He said PMF and ISF jointly rounded up 28 people from his area and brought them to the camp on a convoy of dozens of cars, blaring celebratory music from their loudspeakers:

We saw all these cars and trucks suddenly pull up in our village, and I saw several Hashad fighters [PMF] knock on the door of my neighbors. Their son had been with ISIS. They forced them out immediately and into one of the trucks. Then came the knock at our door, and my mother-in-law opened and told the fighters that her son’s family, my husband’s brother, who had joined ISIS, lived down the road. They said to her, “But you are also related to him.”

Shahama Camp Conditions
Human Rights Watch observed that the families from Hawija and al-Shirqat in the Shahama camp are housed in tents in separate areas of the camp. The camp manager said that this was because of concerns over possible tensions between people who left Hawija voluntarily and those forcibly displaced from al-Shirqat over suspected family ties to ISIS suspects.

Shahama camp residents are not allowed to leave or to have mobile phones, and visitors are restricted. Residents at the camp from the initial wave of families from Hawija told Human Rights Watch that until the al-Shirqat families arrived they had been allowed to have phones, and leave the camp at will.

The camp receives assistance and support from four international aid organizations, but two aid workers said that most aid groups would not support a camp that is functioning as a holding site for forcibly displaced people, rather than a camp to which displaced people have gone voluntarily. Having visited about a dozen camps in Iraq and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, Human Rights Watch researchers observed significantly worse conditions in the Shahama camp than in the other camps it had visited. According to a senior aid worker and the camp manager, the camp has no clinic, no school, and lacks adequate sanitation services and food, water, and heating oil.

Destruction and Looting
A local sheikh from the village of al-Aithah interviewed in the Shahama camp said the PMF arrived three days after the Iraqi military retook the village from ISIS on September 19. Two women from the village said that the PMF forces destroyed hundreds of homes. One said her home was included and the other that she witnessed the destruction:

I saw them destroying the houses. They would destroy around 15 homes a day. For about 15 days the destruction didn’t stop in the village. My house was not destroyed when the army came, but…lots of neighbors’ homes were destroyed by the PMF. It was the local PMF destroying the homes. I saw them and know them personally as being from the local PMF.

She said the PMF targeted the homes not only of some families thought to have links to ISIS, but also some of those who had simply fled the area out of fear.

Local residents said that as far as they were aware, there were no airstrikes on the village after it was retaken, so the destruction could not have been a result of aerial attacks, and there was seemingly no military necessity for the destruction, meaning it most likely constituted a war crime. “We want the Iraqi government to show mercy on these women and children,” one of the women said. “Don’t act like ISIS, by destroying homes and displacing families.”

Several members of the displaced families also said PMF members looted their property. One woman from Tal al-Jumaila neighborhood in al-Shirqat said that the morning before she was displaced, PMF confiscated her cow without giving any reason. A man from Tal al-Jumaila neighborhood and another from al-Shakrah village both said fighters took their cars. The rest of the interviewees said that because they did not have access to their phones, they did not know what had happened to their property since they left.

Seven people interviewed said that ISF had arrested one or more of their family members, in one case a 15-year-old boy, on suspicion of ISIS affiliation either at their homes or at a checkpoint in the area, some as early as August. Six had not heard from their relatives since and all of them said that because of the ban on phones, they were unable to make any calls to see if they were still in detention or had access to a lawyer.

One man from al-Shakrah said he had been detained by ISF at a checkpoint near Tikrit because his brother had been an ISIS member, and was beaten for a day with electric cables while guards asked him how he could have shared a home with an ISIS fighter. That night, he said, they transferred him to the Salah al-Din operations room, and then to a prison in Tikrit. A few weeks later he was taken before a judge and ordered released, after which he returned to al-Shakrah, he said. On January 7, he and his family were forced to relocate to the camp.

Another al-Shakrah villager said that on September 24, 2016, more than 15 Iraqi soldiers and PMF members who were in the village told all the men and boys ages 15 and over to gather at the local school to be screened:

I gathered there with my 15-year-old son, as we were told. A soldier called out three names of men from the village and detained them. Then about 20 fighters wearing PMF patches brought 10 more men with masked faces to us, and started pointing at people at random, while the ISF stood by and watched. The PMF took away the 14 men and one boy, my own son, whom they pointed at, loading them onto military trucks. One PMF fighter was filming the group of detainees on his phone as they waited to load the trucks, and ordered them to bark like dogs.

They brought his son back after 28 days. The family confirmed with Iraqi army officers that his son was not on a wanted list, but five days later, PMF came to the home with a masked man who said the boy was affiliated with ISIS and detained him again, the father said. The father said he has heard nothing from him since and that on January 7, local PMF members in the village came to their home and said they were an “ISIS family” and had to get onto the PMF trucks and go to the camp.

Iraqi federal authorities should make efforts to inform family members about the location of all detainees. Iraqi federal authorities should make public the number of fighters and civilians detained, including at checkpoints, screening sites, and camps during the conflict with ISIS, and the legal basis for their detention, including the charges against them. They should ensure prompt independent judicial review of detention and allow detainees access to lawyers and medical care and to communicate with their families, Human Rights Watch said.

Posted: January 1, 1970, 12:00 am

After 25 years of vicious conflict that has cost countless lives and displaced millions of people, peace has finally broken out in south-central Somalia — at least that's what Kenya says. And the UN refugee agency, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) has joined Kenya to tell the world it should now focus on helping as many refugees as possible to return home.

But I recently spoke with some of the estimated 320,000 Somali refugees in Dadaab, Kenya, the world's largest refugee camp. And it's clear that peace is the last thing some of those signing up for UNHCR's $400 repatriation cash handout are discovering.

A newly arrived Somali refugee is forced out of the queue outside a reception centre in the Ifo 2 refugee camp in Dadaab, near the Kenya-Somalia border, in Garissa County, Kenya, July 28, 2011

© 2011 Reuters

A number of refugees told me they had returned destitute to destroyed Somali villages without health care provision and schools, or faced danger as armed groups continue to clash in and around their villages, including towns. After doing their best to survive, they fled back to Kenya, once again as refugees.

One of them is "Amina," a 38-year-old single mother. After a decade in Dadaab, she decided to try her luck and returned in January 2015 with her five children to her village, Bula Gudud, in the Lower Juba region, hoping to rebuild her life.

She told me: "After two days back home, fighting broke out between government troops and al-Shabab [armed Islamist group]. I could hear the bullets. My children were so scared. They just ran around, trying to get out of the house." The following day, Amina fled to the closest city, Kismayo. She had no relatives there but hoped she'd find safety and work to feed her children. She found neither.

She and her family barely survived for nine months with other displaced civilians in Kismayo's appalling internally displaced persons' camps. After a man in a government uniform raped her, a common occurrence in the unprotected and aid-starved camps across the country, Amina gave up and 10 months ago begged her way back to Dadaab.

But her ordeal didn't end there. The Kenyan authorities have refused to re-register her and her children as refugees, and UNHCR has not reactivated her ration card or given her any food.

"If we send 1,000 people home under the voluntary repatriation agreement but we then register 1,000 new arrivals, we would not get the job done," a Kenyan government official in Dadaab told me

Kenya, Somalia and the UNHCR had signed an agreement in November 2013 on the "voluntary repatriation" of Somali refugees. It says that both countries and the UN would make sure that Somalis return voluntarily and safely and would get help to resettle back home. A few months later UNHCR said that "the security situation in many parts of ... Somalia [is] volatile [and] protracted ... conflict has had devastating consequences, including massive displacement, weakened community structures, gross human rights violations and the breakdown of law and order".

But Kenya has repeatedly referred to this agreement as evidence that it is time for all Somalis to go home, stressing that the UN agency should help Kenya "expedite" refugee repatriation.

Somali refugees have a collective memory of previous repeated attempts by Kenyan security forces to coerce "voluntary" returns. In late 2012, Kenyan police in Nairobi unleashed appalling abuses in an effort to enforce an illegal directive to drive tens of thousands of urban Somali refugees into the Dadaab camps and from there back to Somalia. In April 2014, Kenyan security forces, primarily police, carried out a second round of abuses against Somalis in Nairobi and then deported 359 a month later without allowing them to challenge their removal.

In May 2016, Kenya announced that "hosting refugees has to come to an end", that Somali asylum seekers would no longer automatically get refugee status and that the Department of Refugee Affairs, responsible for registering and screening individual asylum applications, would be disbanded.

So far, thankfully, the Kenyan police in Dadaab appear to have been acting properly and the refugees told us they had not been harassed or directly coerced. But they are all aware that the government intends to close the camp by the end of November. Everyone we spoke to expressed the fear that those who do not take the voluntary repatriation assistance package now will be forced back later this year with nothing.

Since mid-2015, Amina and at least another 4,000 Somali refugees have either returned to Kenya after facing conflict and hunger back home or fled to Dadaab for the first time.

But with refugee registrations now closed, Amina and the others won't get food aid. Their survival will depend on the kindness of neighbours or relatives whose own rations were slashed last year by a third because of a funding shortfall. Amina and other returnees and new arrivals will also be the first to face arrest and deportation for "illegal presence" if Kenya shuts down Dadaab in three months.

International and Kenyan law require the authorities to make sure that anyone seeking asylum in Kenya is fairly heard and, if found to need protection, gets it. As long as Kenya continues to shred its commitments, Amina and thousands of others like her will languish hungry and destitute in legal limbo and wake up every morning wondering whether they are about to be deported back to the dangers that many have repeatedly fled and still fear.

Author: Human Rights Watch
Posted: January 1, 1970, 12:00 am

Asylum seekers behind a metal fence in the ‘Hangar 1’ detention center, in Röszke, Hungary. September 9, 2015.

© 2015 Zalmaï for Human Rights Watch

(New York) – The massive refugee crisis demands an unprecedented global response. At two summits on September 19 and 20, 2016, at the United Nations, world leaders should take bold steps to share responsibility for millions of people displaced by violence, repression, and persecution.

Leaders will gather in New York to discuss providing greater support to countries where refugees first land, just as many of those countries are at breaking point. There is a grave risk to the bedrock foundation of refugee protection, the principle of nonrefoulement – not forcibly returning refugees to places where they would face persecution and other serious threats. People are fleeing violence in Afghanistan, Burma, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Honduras, Iraq, Somalia, and Syria, among others.

“Millions of lives hang in the balance,” said Kenneth Roth, executive director of Human Rights Watch. “This is not just about more money or greater resettlement numbers, but also about shoring up the legal principles for protecting refugees, which are under threat as never before.”

This year, Human Rights Watch has documented Turkish border guards shooting and pushing back civilians who appear to be seeking asylum; Jordan refusing entry or assistance to Syrian asylum seekers at its border; Kenya declaring that it will close the world’s largest refugee camp in November and pushing Somalis to return home despite potential danger; and Pakistan and Iran harassing and deregistering Afghan refugees and coercing them to return to a country in conflict.

The UN General Assembly has convened the September 19 summit “with the aim of bringing countries together behind a more humane and coordinated approach” to refugees. The final statement, already drafted, is a missed opportunity to widen the scope of protection and limits expectations for concrete, new commitments. However, it affirms refugee rights and calls for more equitable responsibility sharing. Given the scale of the refugee crisis and populist backlash in many parts of the world, this affirmation should be the basis for collective action, Human Rights Watch said.

On September 20, US President Barack Obama will host a “Leader’s Summit” to increase commitments for aid, refugee admissions, and opportunities for work and education for refugees. Governments are expected to make concrete pledges toward goals of doubling the number of resettlement places and other admissions, increasing aid by 30 percent, getting 1 million more refugee children in school, and granting 1 million more adult refugees the right to work. Though the participants have not been announced, 30 to 35 countries are expected to attend. Canada, Ethiopia, Germany, Sweden, and Jordan will join the United States as co-facilitators.

Boost Humanitarian Aid to Countries of First Arrival
The vast majority of the world’s 21.3 million refugees are in the global south, where they often face further harm, discrimination, and neglect. Human Rights Watch called on countries of first arrival like Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Thailand, Kenya, Iran, and Pakistan, to commit to proposals to provide refugees with better access to work and education.

The world’s richest nations have largely failed to help countries on the front lines of the displacement crisis. As of September 9, UN aid appeals were 39 percent funded, with some of the worst-funded in Africa; the appeal for refugees from South Sudan stands at 19 percent. The regional refugee response plans for Yemen and Syria are funded at 22 and 49 percent.

Increase Numbers Resettled in Other Countries
Resettlement from countries of first arrival is a key way to help refugees rebuild their lives and to relieve host countries, but international solidarity is glaringly absent. In 2015, the UN refugee agency facilitated resettlement of 81,000 of a projected 960,000 refugees globally in need of resettlement. The agency estimated that over 1.1 million refugees would need resettlement in 2016, but projected that countries would only offer 170,000 places. Representatives of 92 countries pledged only a slight increase in resettlement places for Syrian refugees at a high-level UN meeting in March.

In the European Union, the arrival by boat in 2015 of more than 1 million asylum seekers and migrants – and more than 3,700 deaths at sea – laid bare the need for safe and legal channels for refugees to move, such as resettlement.  However, many EU countries, including Austria, Bulgaria, and Hungary, are focused primarily on preventing spontaneous arrivals, outsourcing responsibility, and rolling back refugee rights.

A July 2015 European plan to resettle 22,500 refugees from other regions over two years has resettled only 8,268 refugees, according to figures from July 2016. Most EU countries underperformed, and 10 failed to resettle a single person under the plan.

End Abusive Systems, Flawed Deals
The EU struck a deal with Turkey in March to allow the return to Turkey of almost all asylum seekers on the deeply flawed grounds that Turkey is a safe country for asylum; it is on the verge of falling apart. Australia forcibly transfers all asylum seekers who arrive by boat to offshore processing centers, where they face abuse, inhumane treatment, and neglect.

The EU and Australia should renounce these abusive policies. EU countries should swiftly adopt a proposed permanent resettlement framework with more ambitious goals and a clear commitment to meet them, Human Rights Watch said. They should share fairly the responsibility for asylum seekers arriving spontaneously, and help alleviate the pressure on Greece and Italy.

Governments also undermine asylum with closed camps, as in Kenya and Thailand, and by detaining asylum seekers, as do Australia, Greece, Italy, Mexico, and the United States.

While by many measures the US leads in refugee resettlement and response to UN humanitarian aid appeals, it has been particularly slow and ungenerous in admitting Syrian refugees. And it has had notable blind spots, as with its border policies for Central American children and others fleeing gang violence and its use of Mexico as a buffer to keep them from reaching the US border.

The Obama Administration met its goal of admitting 10,000 Syrian refugees this fiscal year in the face of opposition from more than half of US governors and a lack of resettlement funds from Congress, but the US has the capacity to resettle many times that number. It should commit to meeting the Leaders’ Summit goals, which would mean doubling this year’s 85,000 total refugee admissions to 170,000.

Several other countries with capacity to admit far more refugees, including Brazil, Japan, and South Korea, have fallen woefully short. Japan admitted 19 refugees in 2015, South Korea only 42 aside from North Koreans, and Brazil only 6.

Russia resettles no refugees. The Gulf States do not respond to UN resettlement appeals, though Saudi Arabia says it has suspended deportations of hundreds of thousands of Syrians who overstay visitor visas. Most Gulf states, except Kuwait, have also fallen short in their response to Syrian-refugee-related UN appeals to fund refugee needs, according to an Oxfam analysis.

“Every country has a moral responsibility to ensure the rights and dignity of people forced to flee their homes,” Roth said. “When more than 20 million people are counting on a real international effort to address their plight, lofty pronouncements are not enough.”

Posted: January 1, 1970, 12:00 am

Bulgaria bears a “big responsibility” for protecting the European Union’s external borders and should do so “in full respect” of migrants’ human rights, says Europe’s senior minister for migration, Dimitris Avramopoulos.

Bulgarian border police stand near a barbed wire fence on the Bulgarian-Turkish border on July 17, 2014. 

© 2014 Reuters

Speaking in the country’s capital, Sofia, Avramopoulos, the European commissioner for migration, home affairs and citizenship, said Bulgaria had the EU’s support as well as his “personal commitment” as it seeks to police Europe’s outer frontiers.

But can Avramopoulos really be confident that Bulgaria will respect migrants' rights in the way he hopes? Its track record suggests not.

Take the case of 16-year-old ‘Abdullah’ from Afghanistan, who experienced Bulgaria’s “respect” first hand.

“When Bulgarian police saw us, we tried to run away,” he said. “They chased us with dogs and shot at us. There were five police. When they caught us, they started beating us. They kicked me and the others wherever they could reach. They did this for about an hour and threatened us with the dogs. They took my money and mobile.”

Abdullah (not his real name) is one of several migrants and asylum seekers who told Human Rights Watch about summary returns from Bulgaria, and violence both at its borders and inside detention centers in late 2015. These are not new problems; we also documented similar abuses in April and September 2014.

Yet Abdullah’s and hundreds of others’ similar testimonies have fallen on deaf ears at EU headquarters in Brussels. While Bulgaria has the right to protect its borders, it doesn’t have the right to summarily return people to Turkey or physically abuse them. By focusing on border protection, Avramopoulos missed the chance to press Bulgaria on violence against migrants and asylum seekers.

The commission should forcefully remind Bulgaria of EU laws and standards, and urge Bulgarian authorities to investigate these credible reports of abuses and bring them to a halt. Because ignoring Abdullah’s story won’t make the allegations go away, and resorting to violence is no way to manage the refugee crisis.

Author: Human Rights Watch
Posted: January 1, 1970, 12:00 am

Bill Frelick, director of Human Rights Watch's refugee program, monitors, investigates, and documents human rights abuses against refugees, asylum seekers, and internally displaced persons, and advocates for the rights and humanitarian needs of all categories of forcibly displaced persons around the world.

Before joining Human Rights Watch, Frelick directed Amnesty International USA's refugee program and the US Committee for Refugees (USCR), which he served for 18 years. He was the editor of USCR's annual World Refugee Survey and monthly Refugee Reports. Frelick has traveled to refugee sites throughout the world and is widely published. He taught in the Middle East from 1979-1983 and was co-coordinator of the Asian Center of Clergy and Laity Concerned from 1976-1979. Frelick has a B.A. from Oberlin College and an M.A. from Columbia University.

Posted: January 1, 1970, 12:00 am

Protesters holding banners march in Sydney to urge the Australian government to end the refugee crisis on Manus Island on November 4, 2017.

© 2017 PETER PARKS/AFP/Getty Images
(Sydney) –Papua New Guinea (PNG) has been arbitrarily detaining rejected asylum seekers virtually incommunicado in the Bomana Immigration Centre, raising serious concerns about their health and safety, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch said today. The men should be freed.

In August 2019, the PNG government transferred more than 50 rejected asylum seekers from Port Moresby housing to the Australian-funded Bomana Immigration Centre on the outskirts of Port Moresby. There are now understood to be 46 men remaining in Bomana.

“The men in Bomana Immigration Centre are being treated like criminals, but they’ve committed no crime,” said Elaine Pearson, Australia director at Human Rights Watch. “Restrictions imposed on the men in Bomana Immigration Centre are worse than prison – at least in prison you can be in contact with your loved ones and your lawyer, but these men have no contact with the outside world.”

“The abuses these vulnerable men have undoubtedly suffered over the past two months can’t continue and they must be urgently released,” Amnesty International Australia Refugee Advisor Dr. Graham Thom said.

Refugee advocates reported that detainees at the Bomana Immigration Centre have no access to phones or the internet, unless they have agreed to assisted voluntary return. In those cases, they are allowed a maximum of 15 minutes to call their families in their home countries or to arrange travel documents with home country authorities.

Behrouz Boochani, a Kurdish journalist and refugee in Port Moresby who has seen some of the detainees, told Human Rights Watch that some of the men detained in Bomana have lost significant amounts of weight, “their bodies are weak, the faces are just like bones, they seem physically and mentally damaged.”

Nearly all are from Iran, which does not accept forcible returns of rejected asylum seekers. Authorities forced the men to surrender mobile phones and medication when they entered Bomana. They are unable to communicate with their families, friends, lawyers, or doctors and psychologists who were previously assisting them. Many have mental health conditions or a physical illness, yet as reliable sources have confirmed, PNG authorities have told them they will not be released unless they “volunteer” to return home.


There are currently 262 current and former asylum seekers who had been sent to Manus Island under Australia’s offshore processing regime. The majority now have refugee status and most were transferred to accommodation in Port Moresby, where they fear for their safety.

The PNG government has rejected the refugee claims of the men detained at Bomana, yet PNG’s refugee status determination process falls far short of international standards.

Several of the men now detained in Bomana withdrew their asylum applications for various reasons, including after the 2014 riots at the Manus detention center in which Iranian Reza Berati was beaten to death and dozens more wounded. Their cases were then administratively closed without a refugee status determination on the merits.

PNG, as a party to the Convention against Torture, is obligated not to return someone to a country “where there are substantial grounds for believing that [they] would be in danger of being subjected to torture.”

Under international law, all detainees, including irregular migrants, have the right to challenge their detention, along with the right to legal assistance, and to be informed of that right. Rejected asylum seekers in Bomana are detained in the absence of any individualized assessment of the need for detention, and with no consideration whether their removal – mostly to Iran – can be effected within a reasonable and foreseeable time frame. Further, it would appear there is no framework in PNG law for their detention. There are no clear means to seek review of the lawfulness of their detention or for monitoring and evaluating the conditions of detention, including access to communication with family or lawyers. The result is arbitrary detention prohibited by customary international law and treaties to which both Australia and PNG are party.

UNHCR has appealed for all refugees and asylum seekers to be immediately brought from PNG and Nauru – the other county to which Australia has transferred those arriving by boat seeking asylum – to safety. In the interim, the PNG government should allow all detainees at Bomana access to visitors and external communications and provide adequate access to food and medical care.

“Australia shouldn’t turn a blind eye to the suffering of people warehoused offshore,” Thom said. “PNG needs to act immediately to end the men’s arbitrary detention and ensure they can access the medical treatment they desperately need.”

“It’s hard not to conclude that the cruel conditions at Bomana are a deliberate ploy to make people miserable so they accept to ‘voluntarily’ return to their home countries,”  Pearson said. “If the PNG government is unable to deport these men, it should release them.”

Posted: January 1, 1970, 12:00 am


On 11 November 2019, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch submitted a joint third-party intervention to the European Court of Human Rights in a case involving Libya’s abuses against migrants during operations at sea and upon return to the country in November 2017. 

In the case of S.S. and others v Italy (no. 21660/18) applicants are seeking justice before the court, claiming that Italy breached its obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights by cooperating with Libya to enable its coast guard to intercept people at sea and take them back to Libya. The applicants have told the court that people returned to Libya are routinely exposed to torture and other abuses in Libya, including through their routine containment in detention centers, where they are held arbitrarily.

In 2012 the European Court of Human Rights, ruling in the case of Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy (no. 27765/09), found that Italy’s practice of intercepting migrants at sea and forcing them to return to Libya had violated the European Convention on Human Rights, including the prohibition on returning people to countries where they face risk of human rights abuses. Since then, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have consistently documented the ongoing human rights abuses against refugees, asylum seekers and migrants in Libya, and condemned the EU’s, including specifically Italy’s, cooperation with and support to Libya in ways that has led to the prolonged arbitrary detention and abuse of people in Libya.

The joint intervention makes the case that Italy plays a decisive role in supporting and influencing Libyan migration control to pursue the same policies of intercepting migrants and sea and returning them to Libya, that the court condemned in 2012. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch argue that Italy shares responsibility for human rights violations that result from maritime operations by Libyan authorities that are carried out employing unnecessary or disproportionate force or that end in people being returned to abusive conditions. The intervention also provides updated findings on the inhumane conditions for refugees and migrants in Libya and the abuses committed or tolerated by Libyan authorities.

While fully aware of the situation, Italy, together with other EU member states, has offered support to Libyan authorities in order to contain people in Libya, without conditioning this support on measures to prevent serious human rights violations, such as closing the detention centres and releasing the thousands of people unlawfully detained. On the contrary, aid to the Libyan Coast Guard to return people intercepted at sea to indefinite detention in Libya, continues unhindered.

This case provides a crucial opportunity to secure accountability under the European Convention for Italy’s substantial role in shaping Libya’s border and migration control policy. Italian and broader EU support to Libya is instrumental in enabling horrific abuses by Libyan authorities against refugees and migrants during interceptions at sea and upon return to Libya. It should not, as such, be without consequence.

At the core of the case are the events of 6 November 2017, when a dinghy carrying an estimated 150 people started sinking in international waters off the Libyan coast and both a rescue vessel belonging to the nongovernmental group Sea-Watch and a patrol boat operated by the Libyan Coast Guard, linked with the UN-recognized Government of National Accord, but donated by Italy, arrived on the scene. According to 17 survivors who are the applicants in the case, the Libyan coast guard obstructed the Sea-Watch 3 crew, who had begun to rescue people, by throwing objects at them, and beat and threatened the rescued, some of whom had jumped overboard during the operation.

The Libyan Coast Guard took 47 people back to Libya, where they were detained and exposed to abuses. The Sea-Watch boat rescued and disembarked a number of other survivors in Italy including 15 of the applicants in the case. An unknown number of people died, including the small children of two of the applicants. 

Posted: January 1, 1970, 12:00 am


South Korean Unification Ministry spokesman Lee Sang-min briefs the media at a government complex in downtown Seoul, South Korea on Thursday, Nov. 7, 2019. South Korea says it has deported 2 North Koreans after finding they had killed 16 fellow fishermen onboard and fled to South Korea.

© 2019 Kim Seung-doo/Yonhap via AP
(Seoul) – The South Korean government deported two North Korean fishermen on November 7, 2019 to face murder charges in North Korea, where they face likely torture, Human Rights Watch said today.

On November 2, the South Korean navy intercepted a North Korean fishing vessel after a two-day pursuit, and brought the two North Koreans piloting the boat ashore. South Korea’s Unification Ministry said that the government conducted an inter-departmental investigation and determined that the two men, in their 20s, had killed 16 other crew members while squid fishing in the East Sea. After contacting North Korean authorities on November 5, South Korean authorities deported the two men to North Korea on November 7.

“Returning these two men to North Korea was illegal under international law because of the likelihood they’ll be tortured under North Korea’s extremely brutal legal system,” said Phil Robertson, deputy Asia director. “South Korean authorities should have thoroughly investigated the allegations against the two men and ensured they had a full opportunity to contest their being returned to North Korea.”

A Unification Ministry spokesman, Lee Sang-min, said the South Korean government decided to expel the two fishermen because they were “non-political, serious criminals who did not receive protection under the Act on the Protection and Settlement Assistance for Residents Escaping from North Korea (Settlement Act), [and] could pose a threat to the lives and safety of our people if accepted into our society, and as brutal criminals could not be recognized as refugees under international laws.”

The South Korean government has not released detailed information about how it reached these determinations, Human Rights Watch said. The authorities should explain its investigation of the case, the evidence it collected, and whether the suspects had access to legal representation who had the time and opportunity to present their case before an impartial authority. The government should also explain its basis for concluding that the two would not face torture or other ill-treatment if returned to North Korea.

South Korean authorities could have prosecuted the two men for their alleged criminal acts, since under article 3 of the country’s constitution, domestic law extends to the entire Korean peninsula.

While international refugee law excludes from refugee status individuals who committed serious non-political crimes outside the receiving country, human rights law prohibits returning anyone to a country where they would be at substantial risk of being tortured, whether they are a refugee or not.

South Korea is a party to the United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Article 3 provides that, “No State Party shall expel, return (refouler) or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.” The UN Human Rights Committee, which monitors state compliance with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which South Korea has also ratified, stated in a general comment that governments “must not expose individuals to the danger of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment upon return to another country by way of their extradition, expulsion or refoulement.”

South Korea’s constitution in article 6 makes international agreements binding law and provides non-citizens with rights under international law. In addition, South Korea’s Refugee Act in article 3 prohibits refoulement of “refugee status applicants,” and article 2(3) provides that a person unrecognized as a refugee may still obtain permission to stay in South Korea on humanitarian grounds if “there are reasonable grounds to believe that his/her life or personal liberty may be egregiously violated by torture or other inhuman treatment or punishment or other circumstances.”

The South Korean government should investigate this incident and hold accountable officials who violated the basic human rights of the two fishermen, Human Rights Watch said. It should take corrective action to ensure that the right not to be returned to torture and other ill-treatment is scrupulously respected in the future.

A 2014 report by the UN Commission of Inquiry found that the North Korean government has committed crimes against humanity against people who were forcibly repatriated, with inhumane acts like torture, murder, imprisonment, deliberate starvation, arbitrary detention, and enforced disappearances. It also found lack of due process in its criminal justice system, in which judges lack independence and impartiality, and there is an effective presumption of guilt, not innocence.

“The South Korean government has violated international law meant to protect everyone from torture worldwide, and put these men at grave risk in North Korea,” Robertson said. “South Korean authorities need to take immediate action to ensure that nothing like this happens again.”

Posted: January 1, 1970, 12:00 am







  1. Introduction: These submissions are presented on behalf of Amnesty International (AI) and Human Rights Watch (HRW) (“the Interveners”) pursuant to the leave to intervene granted by the President of the Section on 14 October 2019, under Rule 44 § 3 of the Rules of Court. The submissions address: (A) the existence of Italy’s jurisdiction under Article 1 European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”), as a result of its decisive influence over Libya’s migration policy and practice; and (B) the conditions for migrants[1] in Libya and the consequences of cooperation activities leading to the containment of migrants in the country, in light of Italy’s responsibilities under Article 3 ECHR.

A. Extraterritorial jurisdiction of States under Article 1 ECHR

I. Overview of ECHR standards

  1. This Court’s longstanding jurisprudence recognises that States’ protection of the rights and freedoms under the ECHR, as per Article 1, may extend to acts performed, or producing effects, outside their territory.[2] While this Court has developed guidance on extraterritorial jurisdiction, its case-law on this issue continues to evolve, taking into account the specificities of each case, thus allowing the Convention to remain practical and effective and not theoretical and illusory.[3] This Court considers that extraterritorial jurisdiction can generally arise by virtue of the presence of a Member State [MS] agent exerting ‘control and authority over an individual’ in a third country or due to the MS’s effective control over an area.[4] This Court also considered that jurisdiction can exist when a MS ‘exercises all or some of the powers’ of a country ‘through [its] consent, invitation or acquiescence’.[5]  
  2. In Ilaşcu and Others and subsequent cases, the Court indicated that jurisdiction can arise when a state operates ‘under the decisive influence’ of a MS.[6] Importantly, in these cases this Court links the concept of ‘decisive influence’ to the existence of a relation of dependency of some degree, to the effect that it considered ‘the fact that the local administration survives as a result of the [MS’s] military and other support’ to entail ‘that State’s responsibility for its policies and actions’.[7] This is irrespective of the active involvement of the influencing State in the alleged human rights violations.[8]. Various factors can be relevant in establishing if decisive influence exists.[9] The Court’s approach to the above cases should be taken as a place of departure to address situations where the relation of dependence is such that a MS does exert decisive influence over a third party’s policy and practice, thus attracting that state’s jurisdiction under the ECHR.
  3. The Interveners respectfully submit that even in the absence of physical occupation of a territory, States may nonetheless control areas of policy of third party entities. This could be argued by reversing the Court’s statement in Catan and others v. Moldova and Russia. Discussing situations where control on an area is established ‘as a consequence of lawful or unlawful military action’, the Court held that ‘Where the fact of such domination over the territory is established, it is not necessary to determine whether the [MS] exercises detailed control over the policies and actions of the subordinate local administration’.[10] Conversely, where such domination is lacking, it could be argued that other forms of control and influence should be sufficient to bring a situation within a State’s jurisdiction for the purpose of Article 1 ECHR. It is significant that this Court found the jurisdiction of MS beyond situations of military occupation, including following developments occurring after the facts of the case.[11] Failure to act to prevent human rights violations in the country where the MS exercises influence was also considered relevant in Mozer.[12]

II. Conduct of the Italian authorities and their relevance under ECHR Article 1 standards

  1. The Italy-Libya relation – legal and diplomatic framework: This Court acknowledged the longstanding cooperation between Italy and Libya on migration matters in Hirsi Jamaa and others v Italy.[13]. From the beginning of 2017, Italy has used the resumption of cooperation with Libya and the funding, political and material support that came with it to outsource migration control to Libya, while maintaining power to decide on its practical aspects. Following the change of policy resulting from Hirsi, between 2013 and 2017, when crossings increased sharply, Italian and other ships operating in the Mediterranean consistently disembarked those rescued in Europe and, most often, in Italy.[14] The Italian Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (IMRCC) would coordinate SAR operations not only in Italy’s SAR Region but also in the area of the central Mediterranean between the southern limit of its SAR region and Libya’s territorial waters, in line with international law standards (SAR/SOLAS).[15]
  2. Transferring coordination responsibilities to Libya would have been virtually impossible before 2017, as the country had not declared a SAR Region, constituted an MRCC or set up a coast guard function capable to receive and act upon distress communications. Between 2016 and 2017, Italy’s actions created conditions for Libya to build such capacity. On 2 February 2017, Italy signed a bilateral Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Libya’s Government of National Accord (GNA)[16] as a framework for joint efforts to stem irregular migration and smuggling,[17] with the clear aim of enabling Libyan authorities to conduct operations at sea and disembark people in Libya, with Italy’s material, technical and political support, coordination and capacity building, though without the physical presence of Italian forces in SAR operations. The combined effect of Italy’s withdrawal from the sea, its obstruction of SAR NGOs and active deferral of responsibility to the Libyan authorities contributed to this goal.
  3. Italy pursued these activities to enable Libya to conduct sea operations leading to the interception and return to Libya of migrants found at sea, and so to create the conditions for at least the appearance of Libya’s ownership of operations at sea with the effect, and arguably the intent, to achieve the same outcome of the pushback practices and policies that this Court found fell afoul of Convention standards in Hirsi, while trying to circumvent Italy’s relevant obligations. The Interveners submit that, in view of the extent and pervasiveness of Italy’s role in Libya’s migration and SAR system, Libya has acted under its decisive influence since at least 2017, to an extent that Italy should be found to have exercised jurisdiction, at least concurrently with Libya, in migration-related operations conducted by Libyan forces. The Interveners have conducted research on the range of acts realised by Italy to pursue this strategy and reported on their human rights implications throughout the post-Hirsi period, from 2013 to 2019.[18]
  4. Italy’s support to Libya enabling it to intercept and ‘pull back’ migrants:

a. Support in declaring Libya’s SAR region and establishing an MRCC in Libya: In early2017, the Italian government requested the Italian Coast Guard (ICG) to initiate activities instrumental to the declaration of Libya’s SAR region and to assist Libya in setting up its MRCC.[19] Relevant activities followed suit,[20] mostly funded by the EU.[21] As a result, Libya notified the creation of its SAR region to the International Maritime Organization (IMO), in July 2017,[22] and in December 2017.[23] IMO confirmed the establishment of the Libyan SAR region in June 2018.[24] As a result, the Libyan authorities assumed responsibility for coordinating SAR operations in the region, including the responsibility to instruct rescue vessels on where to disembark the rescued, also on its territory.

b. Donation of vessels and training of LCGN:[25] In May 2017, Italy provided the LCGN with 4 fast patrol boats[26] and committed to donate 6 more.[27] Italy allocated 2.5 million euros to maintaining the boats and related activities.[28] In parallel, it trained LCGN staff, including those to be employed on those boats, both independently and via the Italy-led naval operation EunavforMed Sophia.[29]

c. Operational assistance in SAR operations and presence on scene: Italy’s cooperation has crucially involved also the physical presence of Italian personnel in Libya, including its territorial waters. On 2 August 2017, in agreement with the Libyan government,[30] Italy launched naval operation ‘Nauras’ in Libyan waters and deployed navy officials on Libyan soil to support the contrast of irregular migration and smuggling.[31] Through an Italian Navy vessel docked in the port of Tripoli,[32] Italy directly supported the coordination of SAR operations, in particular by providing the Libyan naval authorities with the technical capabilities necessary to ensure communication and coordination between LCGN, IMRCC and any state or private ships operating at sea. As highlighted in a ruling by the Court of Ragusa in April 2018,[33] these capabilities were instrumental to enabling the LCGN to locate migrant boats at sea and issuing instructions to any ships in the area, including instructions to stay away from migrant boats as the LCGN would approach them.[34] With its formal intervention in Libyan territory since 2017, with Libya’s consent, and the formal assistance provided in the exercise of migration management and border control, Italy’s conduct should therefore be seen as meeting the conditions for extra territorial jurisdiction established by this Court.

d. Participation in SAR operations conducted by the LCGN: The Interveners’ research indicates that, throughout 2017, LCGN operations were increasingly conducted with Italian authorities’ input, which alerted them of the presence and position of boats in distress, and even directly participated in operations at sea. On 27 September 2017, a LCGN vessel intercepted two migrant boats in international waters, while testing a boat recently repaired by Italian officials. After receiving assistance from the Italian warship Andrea Doria, which was in the area and provided lifejackets, the LCGN ship took all of the approximately 200 people back to Libya.[35]

e. Transfer of responsibility for SAR operations to the LCGN: As of 2017, the IMRCC increasingly sought to transfer responsibilities for the coordination of SAR operations to the LCGN. As of at least May 2017, IMRCC started to transfer information and coordination to the Libyan authorities, in those cases when IMRCC had been informed first and had therefore assumed such responsibility, and to decline to indicate a place of safety for disembarkation to rescue vessels that had conducted operations in the Libyan SAR Region. On 10 May 2017, the IMRCC received a distress call about a boat in trouble and instructed the German rescue NGO Sea-Watch to provide assistance, before transferring the coordination to the LCG, which intervened with one of its speedboats to take over the operation.[36]  IMRCC also began instructing rescue NGOs to wait before conducting certain rescue operations, to facilitate the intervention of the LCGN. On 15 August 2017, a vessel run by NGO Migrant Offshore Aid Station (MOAS) initiated a rescue operation, but IMRCC reportedly requested that the crew wait for the LCGN to intervene before taking people on board. The LCGN failed to intervene and after two hours IMRCC authorised MOAS to take people on board and transfer them to Italy.[37] On 24 November 2017, NGO SOS Méditerranée reported that IMRCC instructed its rescue vessel Aquarius to stand by as the LCGN conducted the interception of three rubber boats in international waters, after which everyone was returned to Libya. The IMRCC’s approach, consolidated over time, must be deemed as an element of the established framework of cooperation and support provided by Italy to Libya, instrumental to achieving the aim of preventing migrants’ arrivals in Italy and ensuring the LCGN’s ownership of operations at sea. This should be read with Italy’s failure to offer a place of safety in its territory following rescues in the Libyan SAR region, including after the transfer of coordination for SAR operations. The decisive influence exercised over Libya through the support described above attracted Italy’s jurisdiction, for the purpose of its ECHR obligations.

f. Activities to hamper the involvement of NGOs in rescues: Italy’s strategy to ensure the undisturbed operation of the LCGN included activities to obstruct the action of NGOs, through policies and practices discouraging their intervention. In 2017, NGOs were continuously slandered by authorities and subjected to baseless criminal investigations. In July 2017 the government drafted a code of conduct for NGOS, substantially restricting SAR activities.[38]

B. Article 3 consequences of Italy’s role in Libyan migration policies and practice

  1. It is a well-established principle under this Court’s jurisprudence that States’ obligations under Article 3 shall be understood to include the internationally recognised principle of non-refoulement.[39] The non-refoulement obligation also applies to indirect or chain refoulement.[40] Procedurally, Article 3 imposes positive obligations on MS, who have a duty to ensure that people under their jurisdiction ‘would not face a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 in the event of repatriation’.[41] Addressing the situation of Libya in Hirsi, this Court recalled that this obligation ‘is all the more important when...the intermediary country is not a State Party to the Convention’.[42]  It found on the facts that the material conditions for migrants in the country were such that, by transferring the applicants there, ‘the Italian authorities, in full knowledge of the facts, exposed them to treatment proscribed by the Convention’.[43] Since Hirsi, the Interveners have continued to document abuses against migrants by Libyan agents in the country, including guards operating in detention centres managed under the responsibility of the General Directorate for Combating Illegal Migration (DCIM) within the Ministry of Interior, and members of the LCGN, and Libya’s inability or unwillingness to address violations by trafficking and smuggling groups.
  2. Research published by the Interveners between 2013 and 2019[44] documented how the treatment experienced by migrants in Libya, acknowledged in Hirsi, continues unchanged to date, and examined how cooperation by the EU and its member states – Italy in particular – with Libya on migration has been pursued despite the well documented abuse of migrants there. Abuses facing migrants start as early as during operations at sea conducted by the LCGN and extend to the often-automatic detention in centres on land. The Interveners documented episodes where the LCGN engaged in reckless conduct during rescue operations in international waters and used threats and violence against migrants on board boats in distress.[45] The Interveners also documented the systematic use of arbitrary detention, often in inhumane conditions, and the persistence of torture and other ill-treatment, in particular in the form of rapes and beatings, as well as of unlawful killings, sexual exploitation and forced labor.[46] The state of migrants’ rights in Libya is well-known and has been widely documented by international observers. UN bodies called the country’s situation a “human rights crisis” for migrants.[47] The severity of the situation was addressed by the UN Secretary General in his update to the UN Security Council in September 2017,[48] while in September 2018, the UNHCR reiterated its call on all countries “to allow civilians (Libyan nationals, former habitual residents of Libya and third-country nationals) fleeing Libya access to their territories”. UNHCR also urged all countries to suspend forcible returns to any part of Libya, including of anyone rescued at sea.[49] The Interveners consider that Italian authorities pursued cooperation activities with Libya, with the purpose of ensuring as many as possible migrants rescued or intercepted at sea would be returned to Libya while they knew or ought to have known that this would result in exposing people to arbitrary detention, ill-treatment and other serious human rights violations.
  3. Risk of ill-treatment at sea as a result of cooperation with the LCGN: In 2017, the LCGN on multiple occasions harassed, intimidated and threatened NGO rescue boats particularly in mid-2017. The Interveners have spoken to multiple NGOs who perform rescue operations in the Mediterranean about these incidents. For example, on 23 May 2017, crew aboard rescue ship Aquarius witnessed – and videotaped – LCGN approaching migrants on a boat, firing shots into the air. Survivors testified that the officers had demanded phones and money from them and that after hearing the shots, panicked people leapt into the sea.[50]
  4. Monitors on the scene reported that on 26 May 2017 LCGN fired shots at an ICG vessel in international waters, as it was taking rescued migrants to disembark on Lampedusa.[51] Overheard radio communication between a nearby Italian Navy ship and the LCGN made it clear that the LCGN boat had fired the shots because they mistook the ICG vessel for a migrant boat. The crew of NGO rescue vessel Golfo Azzurro reported that the LCGN threatened them in international waters, including by shooting in the air, in order to make them leave the area, on both 7 and 15 August 2017.[52] On 26 September 2017, an LCGN boat approached a vessel run by the NGO Mission Lifeline through a dangerous manoeuvre and fired one shot, before two LCGN officials jumped on board the NGO ship and said they wanted to take those rescued back to Libya. The NGO crew explained that they could not comply with the request because they were bound by the principle of non-refoulement. The Libyan officials threatened that they would sink the ship the next time they found it in “their waters”.[53] The OHCHR also reported similar behaviour from the LCGN.[54] The Interveners also heard similar descriptions of abusive use of force and firearms from individuals who were detained after LCGN intercepted their boats. One woman from a boat with approximately 170 people stopped by the LCGN in international waters explained: “Men on the large Libyan boat threw us a rope …The Libyans shot into the air and threatened us: ‘If you don’t tie it onto the boat then we will shoot at you.’”[55] A detained male reported a similar issue saying that individuals on the LCGN boat that approached them ‘shot into the water next to where we were. They also came very close to our boat and started to make waves to scare us. People got scared and finally started to board their ship’.[56] In April 2017 an LCGN commander told the Interveners that the use of force against migrants during rescue operations was “necessary to control the situation as you cannot communicate with them. Some can swim but others not.”[57]
  5. Collusion with Criminal Gangs: A confidential interim report from the UN Panel of Experts on Libya,[58] leaked to the press, concluded that most smuggling and trafficking groups have links to official security institutions. The report expresses concern ‘over the possible use of state facilities and state funds by armed groups and traffickers to enhance their control of migration routes’. A previous report from the same Panel in June 2017 had already concluded that ‘smugglers, as well as the Department to Counter Illegal Migration and the coastguard are directly involved in [...] grave human rights violations’ against migrants.[59] In June 2018, the UN Security Council imposed sanctions on six Libyans accused of human smuggling and trafficking including the head of a coast guard unit.[60] The Interveners interviewed many migrants who described how smugglers colluded with the LCGN. Interveners’ research reveals that the collusion between smugglers and the LCGN occurs through 3 main methods: LCGN officers escort boats until they reach international waters; boats are marked to show that they belong to a smuggler who has paid for ‘safe passage’; or the name of the “right” smuggler is communicated to LCGN staff conducting interceptions.[61] Many migrants also reported that criminal gangs engaging in trafficking and exploitation had access to detention centres and colluded with guards operating there.[62]
  6. Prolonged arbitrary detention as a result of interception at sea by the LCGN: Migrants without a regular status in Libya are detained based on laws that criminalise undocumented entry, stay and exit, which can be punished by a prison sentence, a fine and ultimately deportation.[63] The law does not indicate maximum terms for migration detention, and there are no formal procedures in place allowing detainees access to a lawyer or any opportunity to challenge the decision to detain them.[64] Coupled with the absence of an effective system to protect asylum-seekers and victims of trafficking, mass, arbitrary and indefinite detention has become the primary migration management system in Libya. When the LCGN –or other Italy-backed Libyan authorities, such as the General Administration for Coastal Security (GACS) under the Ministry of Interior – intercept boats at sea, they bring migrants back to Libya and routinely transfer them to DCIM detention centres. The support received from Italy and the EU massively increased Libya’s operational capacity and since 2016 the LCGN has intercepted tens of thousands of people at sea and returned them to Libya, to be placed in detention centres.[65]
  7. Abuse in detention: Individuals arbitrarily detained in DCIM centres are held in deplorable conditions.[66] As recently as July 2018, the Interveners documented inhumane conditions that included severe overcrowding, unsanitary conditions, poor quality food and water that has led to malnutrition, lack of adequate healthcare, and disturbing accounts of violence by guards, including beatings, whippings, and use of electric shocks. The detention of children in unsuitable conditions and allegations of rape and beatings of children by guards and smugglers were also documented.[67] Research by the Interveners includes testimonies by male and female detainees, held after being intercepted at sea, describing various forms of torture and other ill-treatment.[68] DCIM guards are directly involved in torturing and otherwise ill-treating migrants, very often in order to extort a ransom from them or their families in exchange for their release from indefinite arbitrary detention.  The Interveners submit that to date the conditions and treatment of migrants in Libyan centres has remained substantially the same, and there has been no development that could justify departing from this Court’s assessment in Hirsi.[69]
  8. Italian Knowledge of Abuses: At the time when they began engaging with Libya on migration-related cooperation, Italian authorities were aware of the widespread human rights violations and abuses suffered by migrants in Libya, and that the country lacked capacity to safely carry out SAR operations or to afford adequate protection to migrants in the event of their disembarkation in Libya.[70] Indeed, not only should Italian authorities have been aware of the long list of UN reports detailing such situation,[71] but in multiple circumstances Italian authorities openly acknowledged abuses. For example, in August 2017 Italy’s Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, signalling partial disagreement with the government’s decision to cooperate with the LCGN, noted Italian ships should keep collecting migrants, including those intercepted by Libyan authorities, ”because taking them back to Libya, at this moment, means taking them back to hell.”[72] In a letter to AI on 3 November 2017, Ambassador Mariangela Zappia, Diplomatic Counselor to the Italian Prime Minister, declared inter alia: “We are on the front line for the improvement of living conditions in the reception centres for migrants in Libya – whose problems have been well known to us for a long time – in cooperation with the main actors and international agencies.”[73] (emphasis added)
  9. In conclusion no meaningful action has been taken to avoid the predictable and foreseeable result that  decisive support for and cooperation with Libya would expose thousands of people to serious human rights violations, including in violation of Article 3. On the contrary, the MoU between Italy and Libya did not condition support and assistance upon human rights standards and recognition of the right to seek asylum, helping to perpetuate the horrific human rights violations against migrants in Libya.






List of relevant publications and statements by the Interveners

in the period between 2013 and 2019





1. Malta: the El Hiblu 1 Case: three teenagers in the dock for daring to oppose their return to suffering in Libya

October 2019


2. Cut adrift in the Med

September 2019


3. Libya: Abhorrent attack on migrant detention centre must be investigated as a war crime

July 2019


4. Italy: refugees and migrants' rights under attack: Amnesty International submission for the UN Universal Periodic Review, 34th session of the UPR Working Group

March 2019


5. Human rights in Libya: Review of 2018

February 2019


6. Libya: EU’s patchwork policy has failed to protect the human rights of refugees and migrants

November 2018


7. Between the devil and the deep blue sea: Europe fails refugees and migrants in the central Mediterranean

August 2018


8. Libya’s dark web of collusion: Abuses against Europe-bound refugees and migrants

December 2017


9. Europe: a perfect storm: the failure of European policies in the central Mediterranean

July 2017


10. Italy: losing the moral compass: innuendoes against NGOs which rescue lives in the central Mediterranean

April 2017



11. Hotspot Italy: how EU’s flagship approach leads to violations of refugee and migrant rights

November 2016



12. Refugees and migrants fleeing sexual violence, abuse and exploitation in Libya

July 2016


13. EU risks fuelling horrific abuse of refugees and migrants in Libya

June 2016


14. A safer sea: the impact of increased search and rescue operations in the central Mediterranean

July 2015


15. ‘Libya is full of cruelty’: Stories of abduction, sexual violence and abuse from migrants and refugees

May 2015


16. Europe's sinking shame: the failure to save refugees and migrants at sea

April 2015



17. Lives adrift: refugees and migrants in peril in the central Mediterranean

September 2014



18. Scapegoats of fear: Rights of refugees, asylum-seekers and migrants abused in Libya

June 2013





1. EU Governments Face Crucial Decision on Shared Sea Rescue Responsibility

October 3, 2019


2. Libya: Deadly Attack Highlights Disregard for Civilians

EU Containment Policy Helps Keep Migrants in Harm’s Way

July 3, 2019


3. Italy: End Curbs on Rescue at Sea

Rome Should Not Prosecute NGO Ship Captain

June 26, 2019


4. Italy: Reject Anti-Rescue Proposals

Criminal Penalties Could Deter Saving Lives at Sea

May 16, 2019


5. Libya: Detained Migrants at Risk in Tripoli Clashes

Release and Evacuate Them to Safety

April 25, 2019


6. Libya: Nightmarish Detention for Migrants, Asylum Seekers

EU and Italy Bear Responsibility, Should Condition Cooperation

January 21, 2019


7. No Escape from Hell

EU Policies Contribute to Abuse of Migrants in Libya

January 21, 2019


8. Libya: Migrants Forced off Ship at Libya Port

Misrata Security Forces Use Force After Rescued People Refuse to Land

November 21, 2018


9. Europe: Save Mediterranean Rescue Ship

Aquarius Has Saved Thousands of Lives

October 3, 2018


10. EU/Italy/Libya: Disputes Over Rescues Put Lives at Risk

Allow European Rescues, Agree on Safe Disembarkation

July 25, 2018


11. Italy: Migrant Rescue Ship Impounded

Don’t Criminalize Saving Lives

March 19, 2018


12. Italy: Navy Support for Libya May Endanger Migrants

Help for Libyan Coast Guard Risks Complicity in Abuse

August 2, 2017


13. EU: Draft Code for Sea Rescues Threatens Lives

Leaked Document Would Tie Nongovernmental Groups’ Hands

July 12, 2017


14. EU: Boat Migration Demands Shared Responsibility

Rescue and Safe Ports Needed as Libyan Authorities Unable to Guarantee Rights or Protect People

July 4, 2017


15. EU: Shifting Rescue to Libya Risks Lives

Italy Should Direct Safe Rescues

June 19, 2017


16. EU: Put Rights Above Politics

Outsourcing Migration Responsibility to Libya Fraught with Risks

February 1, 2017


17. Libya: End ‘Horrific’ Abuse of Detained Migrants

UN Report Details Widespread Torture, Forced Labor, Sexual Violence

December 14, 2016


18. EU Policies Put Refugees At Risk

An Agenda to Restore Protection

November 23, 2016


19. EU/NATO: Europe’s Plan Endangers Foreigners in Libya

Migrants, Asylum Seekers Face Killings, Torture, and Rape

July 6, 2016


20. EU: Migrants Seeking Opportunity or Refugees Seeking Protection?

July 28, 2015


21. The Mediterranean Migration Crisis

Why People Flee, What the EU Should Do

June 19, 2015


22. EU: Rights Abuses at Home Drive Mediterranean Crisis

Migrants Detail Horrors That Caused Them to Flee

June 19, 2015


23. EU: Mixed Messages on Boat Migration

Augmented Search and Rescue, but Focus Still on Preventing Departure

April 23, 2015


24. EU: Mediterranean Deaths Warrant Crisis Response

April 19, 2015


25. EU: Intolerable Inaction Costs Lives at Sea

Set Up Robust, Mediterranean-wide Search and Rescue Operation

April 15, 2015


26. EU: Act to Save Lives at Sea

Justice and Home Affairs Council Meeting in Luxembourg

October 8, 2014


27. Libya: Whipped, Beaten, and Hung from Trees

Detained Migrants, Asylum Seekers Describe Torture, Other Abuse in Detention

June 22, 2014


28. EU: Make Saving Lives at Sea Top Priority

Step Up Joint Rescue Operations; Resettle More Syrians

June 5, 2014


29. EU: Improve Migrant Rescue, Offer Refuge

Summit Needs Rights-Based Approach to Boat Migration, Syria Refugees

October 23, 2013




European Union/Libya: Act Now to Save Lives, Release, Evacuate Detained Refugees and Migrants, joint statement by Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and the European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE), 12 July 2019,


[1] The Interveners note that in this document the term ‘migrants’ is understood to include any individual on the move outside of their country of nationality or citizenship, including for reasons such as needing international or other protection.

[2] As summarised in N.D. and N.T. v Spain, nos. 8675/15 8697/15, § 49-51 and cases cited therein.

[3] ECtHR, Guide on Article 1 of the ECHR, 31 August 2019, § 28-29, and Renucci, Jean-François. Introduction to the ECHR: the rights guaranteed and the protection mechanism. Vol. 1. Council of Europe, 2005, p.6,

[4] ECtHR Guide on Article 1, §29 and subsequent.

[5] ECtHR Guide on Article 1, §33.

[6] Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia, no. 48787/99 § 392

[7] ECtHR Guide on Article 1, §47, Cyprus v. Turkey, no. 25781/94, §§ 76-77; Catan and ors. v. Moldova and Russia nos. 43370/04 8252/05 18454/06, § 122 and others.

[8] In Mozer v. The Republic of Moldova and Russia, no. 11138/10, §101, the Court accepted that there was ‘no evidence of any direct involvement of Russian agents in the applicant’s detention and treatment’.. no.

[9] Catan and ors., above in full, § 121, on Russia’s various forms of support.

[10] Catan and others., §106.

[11] See summary of political, military and economic developments considered in Catan, as listed by Mozer v Moldova and Russia, no. 11138/10 at §103.

[12] Ivantoc and ors v Moldova and Russia, no. 23687/05, §119: Russia ‘continued to do nothing either to prevent the violations of the Convention allegedly committed...’. Cited by Mozer at §106

[13] Bilateral agreement of 29 December 2007 and the Treaty on Friendship of 30 August 2008, particularly Article 19 - provision for efforts to prevent clandestine immigration in the countries of origin of migratory flows.

[14] AI, Libya’s dark web of collusion: Abuses against Europe-bound refugees and migrants, December 2017, p.42

[15] AI, Lives adrift: Refugees and migrants in peril in the central Mediterranean, September 2014

[16] This was then backed up by the members of the European Council in their Malta Declaration, adopted the following day,

[17] Memorandum d'intesa sulla cooperazione nel campo dello sviluppo, del contrasto all'immigrazione illegale, al traffico di esseri umani, al contrabbando e sul rafforzamento della sicurezza delle frontiere tra lo Stato della Libia e la Repubblica Italiana, 2 February 2017,

[18] See Annex for a list of the Interveners’ relevant publications between 2013 and 2019. 

[19] AI, Libya’s dark web of collusion, December 2017, p.45. A project agreement between ITG and EU Commission recognized that an efficient LCGN would be instrumental to border control activities to tackle irregular migration.

[21] In July 2017 the EU Trust Fund for Africa approved a 46.3million euro programme largely focussed on increasing the operational capacity of the LCGN through, inter alia, setting up operational rooms to enable the LCGN to co-ordinate operations, assisting with the establishment of a Libyan MRCC and demarcating and declaring a Libyan SAR zone. See and AI, Libya’s Dark Web of Collusion, above, p.45.

[22] The first declaration was then withdrawn due to technical issues. At a press conference in Tripoli on 10 August 2017, Libyan authorities announced the declaration and stated that foreign vessels would not be allowed to enter the zone without prior authorization, in breach of law of the sea principles regarding freedom of navigation in the high seas (UNCLOS Art.87).

[23] During the same month, the ICG wrote to AI, indicating that work towards the establishment of a MRCC in Libya was still at an initial stage. Letter dated 1 December 2017, Ref. 0149176, in file with AI. A presentation by the ICG, dated 28 February 2018, included a timeline for the project, indicating that only from July 2021 “The Libyan SAR Region is under the LCG control”,

[25] Training of LCGN and Navy staff was carried out via EunavforMed Operation Sophia and through Italian programmes. See: and

[26] AI, Libya’s dark web of collusion, pp.34-36.

[27] See relevant press releases by the Italian Ministry of Interior at: and

[28] Law no. 232, 11 December 2016, Article 1 c.621 174 Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Director General for Italians abroad and migration policies, Decree 4110/47 of 28 August 2017,

[29] In June 2016, the EU amended the mandate of the operation to include capacity-building and training of the LCGN. As of November 2017, 195 Libyan personnel had undergone training. AI, Libya’s dark web of collusion, p.45.

[30] Italian Chamber of Deputies, Deliberazione del consiglio dei ministri in merito alla partecipazione dell’Italia alla missione internazionale in supporto alla guardia costiera Libica, 28 July 2017, at:

[31] Ibid., in Libya’s dark web of collusion the Italian mission aims to provide ‘technical and logistical support and advice to the Libyan navy, including the LCG; protection for Libyan vessels involved in activities against irregular migration; reconnaissance capabilities to determine what operations should be carried out…support to set up a centre for co-ordinating operations’.

[32] Italian Navy vessels rotate in this role. The first to be deployed was ship Tremiti (August-December 2017), followed by Capri (December 2017 - March 2018) and Caprera (March-September 2018).

[33] Tribunale di Ragusa, Ufficio del Giudice per le indagini preliminari, Decreto di rigetto di richiesta di sequestro preventivo, 16 April 2018, The decision was confirmed in May, see: Giornale di Sicilia, Il Tribunale del Riesame di Ragusa conferma il dissequestro dell'Ong Open Arms, 17 May 2018

[34] Media investigations have highlighted how the LCGN has used lines of Italian vessels to communicate, that its emergency lines are not fully functional, and that its officers in charge of answering phone calls often do not speak English. See: and

[35] Italian Ministry of Defence, Difesa – Marina Militare: unità della Guardia Costiera libica effettua prima operazione di salvataggio dopo le verifiche di efficienza, 27 September 2017,, Also, AI, Libya’s dark web of collusion.

[36] HRW, EU: Shifting Rescue to Libya Risks Lives, June 2017,

[37] AI, Libya’s dark web of collusion, December 2017, p.48.

[38]AI, Libya’s dark web of collusion, December 2017, p.48

[39] Saadi v. the UK, no. 13229/03 § 56, Hirsi § 123. 

[40] Hirsi, § 146

[41] Hirsi, § 146 citing T.I. v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 43844/98, ECHR 2000-III, and M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, cited above, § 342), and 147 “It is a matter for the State carrying out the return to ensure that the intermediary country offers sufficient guarantees to prevent the person concerned being removed to his country of origin without an assessment of the risks faced’. This Court has provided detailed guidance on the requirements for State’s assessment of whether return decisions may expose individuals to risks under this Article. See: F.G.  v. Sweden, no. 43611/11, §111.

[42]Hirsi, §§ 146-47

[43] Hirsi § 137

[44] See Annex listing publications from the Interveners

[45] HRW, EU: Shifting rescue to Libya risks lives, June 2017; AI, Libya’s dark web of collusion, December 2017; HRW, Disputes Over Rescues Puts Lives At Risk, July 2018; HRW, No Escape from Hell, January 2019

[46] AI, Libya’s dark web of collusion, pp.26-33, HRW, No Escape from Hell, January 2019

[47] A December 2016 report from the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the UN mission in Libya documented widespread malnutrition, forced labor, illness, beatings, sexual abuse, torture, and other abuses in immigration detention centres in Libya: UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), "Detained and Dehumanised" - Report on Human Rights Abuses Against Migrants in Libya, 13 December 2016,

[48] UN, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council resolution 2312 (2016), 7 September 2017, §42,; “The conditions of detention in most facilities are characterized by chronic severe overcrowding, poor hygiene, and a lack of access to basic necessities or adequate medical care. Undernutrition in adults and children is rampant, particularly in facilities outside Tripoli. In some facilities, the conditions of detention in themselves may amount to torture or other ill-treatment.”

[49] UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNHCR Position on Returns to Libya - Update II, September 2018, available at:

[50] AI, Libya’s dark web of collusion, December 2017, p.35.

[52] AI, Libya’s dark web of collusion, p. 37, citing: among others, Reuters, 15 August 2017,

[53]AI, Libya’s dark web of collusion, citing Information shared by Mission Lifeline via email on 5 October 2017. See also Steve Scherer, Rescue ship says Libyan coast guard shot at and boarded it, seeking migrants, Reuters, 26 September 2017,

[54] OHCHR, "Detained and Dehumanised", abovepp.19-20

[55] HRW, Disputes over rescues puts lives at risk, July 2018,

[57] HRW, EU: Shifting rescue to Libya risks lives, Italy should direct safe rescues, June 2017;;

74 HRW, No escape from hell, January 2019, citing: United Nations, “Interim Report of the Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution 1973 (2011) Concerning Libya.” On file with Human Rights Watch.

[59] UN, Final report of the Panel of Experts on Libya established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011), 1 June 2017,, § 104

[60] and In 2019 it emerged that, Abd al Rahman al-Milad, head of the Zawiya branch of the LCGN, and, according to the UN report, ’directly involved in the sinking of migrant boats using firearms’, was at meetings with Italian officials in Mineo and Rome in May 2017: (ITA) (ENG)

[61] AI, Libya’s dark web of collusion, pp.37-40.

[62] AI, Libya’s dark Wweb of Ccollusion

[63] AI, Libya’s dark web of collusion, p.20, citing Law no. 6 of 1987 Organizing the Exit, Entry and Residence of Foreign Nationals in Libya, 20 June 1987

[64] HRW, No escape from hell, January 2019

[65] The presence of UN agencies at points of disembarkation in Libya has limited benefits, as Libyan authorities continue to perpetrate violations and those disembarked are immediately transferred to detention centres. See e.g. IOM, IOM deplores death of migrant, killed Thursday upon disembarkation in Tripoli, 19 September 2019,

[66] AI, Libya’s dark web of collusion, pp.30-33.

[67] HRW visited four DCIM centres in early July 2018. These were Tajoura and Ain Zara centres, both located on the outskirts of Tripoli, Zuwara centre in the town of the same name near the border with Tunisia, and the centre in the area of al-Karareem, near Misrata, a city to the east of Tripoli. They witnessed overcrowding, unsanitary conditions, inadequate health care, HRW, No escape from hell, January 2019.

[68] HRW, No escape from hell, July 2019, includes testimonies from detainees in various detention centres who have endured or witnessed abuses: one woman held in detention after an interception at sea said they “beat you with a pipe ... One man, they beat him so bad and they gave him electric shocks ...a man from Sierra Leone tried to escape but they caught him. They beat him unconscious”; a woman who was seven-months’ pregnant, described a guard beating her with a hose; another confirmed: “There is ill treatment here and beatings ... they beat women and flog women on the hand even if you are pregnant. One man tried to escape. They tied his neck like a dog to his legs so he cannot move his legs. They beat him seriously.” Another intercepted at sea confirmed “they will beat us with wooden sticks or plastic tubes”.

[69] See also: UNSMIL/OHCHR, Desperate and Dangerous: Report on the human rights situation of migrants and refugees in Libya, 20 December 2018, pp.38-47.

[70] AI, Libya’s dark web of collusion, December 2017.

[71] A list is provided in AI, Libya’s Dark web of collusion, December 2017, pp. 56-58.

[72] La Stampa, Giro: “Fare rientrare quelle persone vuol dire condannarle all’inferno”, 6 August 2017,

[73] AI, Libya’s Dark web of collusion, December 2017, p.58. Original letter in file with AI.



Posted: January 1, 1970, 12:00 am


Croatia Slams Door on Migrants

Abuses Should Rule Out Schengen Accession

 (Budapest) – The European Commission’s October 22, 2019 conclusion that Croatia is ready to join the Schengen Area wilfully brushes over evidence of violent pushbacks of migrants at its borders, Human Rights Watch said today in releasing a video documenting the abuses.

The European Commission’s action sends the message that serious human rights abuses are no obstacle to Schengen accession. The European Commission should investigate the situation instead of rewarding Croatia.

“Croatia’s unlawful and violent summary returns of asylum seekers and migrants should disqualify it from joining the Schengen Area,” said Lydia Gall, senior Eastern Europe and Balkans researcher at Human Rights Watch. “Ignoring Croatia’s abuses of migrants at its borders makes the notion that Schengen membership is contingent on respect for human rights just meaningless talk.”

The Human Rights Watch video features interviews with people shortly after they were summarily returned to Bosnia by Croatian police in August. It includes interviews with other pushback victims and witnesses of pushbacks, including the mayor of Bihac, a Bosnian town across the border from Croatia. It also shows credible secretly recorded footage of Croatian police officers escorting groups of migrants across the border to Bosnia and Herzegovina without following due process.

A migrant who claims he was beaten by Croatian police while attempting to cross the border to Croatia shows his injury at a factory hall turned migrants facility in Bihac, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Wednesday, March 13, 2019.

© 2019 Darko Bandic/AP Photo

In its assessment, the European Commission acknowledges that denying potential asylum seekers access to the asylum procedure and allegations of use of force by Croatian law enforcement officials remain a challenge. It concludes, however, that the creation of a system to monitor Croatian border guards’ actions and the Croatian government’s promises to investigate allegations are sufficient to conclude that Croatia has done enough “to fulfil its commitment in relation to the protection of human rights.”

The summary return of asylum seekers without consideration of their protection needs is contrary to European Union asylum law, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, and the 1951 Refugee Convention.

Human Rights Watch has documented summary collective expulsions from Croatia to Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina since 2016. In some instances, Croatian border officials have used force, pummeling people with fists, kicking them, and making them run gauntlets between lines of police officers. Violence has been directed against women and children. Unlike with lawful deportations, migrants are not returned at ports of entry, but rather in remote border areas, including, at times, forced to cross freezing streams.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Council of Europe’s Human Rights Commissioner, and other nongovernmental organizations have echoed Human Rights Watch concerns. Although President Kolinda Grabar-Kitarovic in July acknowledged that authorities engage in pushbacks, Croatian authorities have repeatedly denied the allegations, including to Human Rights Watch, and in some cases have accused aid groups and victims of fabricating facts to make Croatian police look bad.

Croatian authorities have not taken credible steps to halt the practice and to hold those responsible to account, Human Rights Watch said. In a meeting with Human Rights Watch in May, the Interior Ministry state secretary, Terezija Gras, said the Croatian police would investigate any complaints filed by migrants about police mistreatment but could not say how many complaints the authorities had received. Nor could she explain how a migrant pushed back from Croatia to Bosnia and Herzegovina would be able to a file a complaint with the authorities in Croatia.

To join the Schengen area – where 22 EU member states and 4 non-EU countries have effectively abolished border and passport controls – member states have to fulfil certain criteria set out in EU law, including respect for the right to seek asylum. The EU Schengen Borders Code Article 4 says that member states should act in compliance with EU law and “obligations related to access to international protection, in particular the principle of non-refoulement [banning the return to a country where they would face torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or other irreparable harm] and fundamental rights.” Pushbacks effectively preventing people from accessing the Croatian asylum procedure violate Article 4.

Before using the European Commission’s report to approve Croatia’s full access to Schengen, the European Council should call for a reassessment of Croatia’s compliance with the EU Schengen Borders Code. It should press Croatia to demonstrate concrete progress by putting in place an independent and effective monitoring mechanism and require evidence of thorough investigations of summary returns of migrants and asylum seekers at its borders and allegations of Croatian guards using violence against them. The Commission should also initiate legal enforcement action against Croatia for violating EU laws, Human Rights Watch said.  

“Letting Croatia join Schengen when migrants and asylum seekers continue to be brutally pushed back would be an EU green light for abuses,” Gall said. “The European Commission should not just accept Croatia’s empty promises, but ensure that Schengen criteria are truly met, which is clearly not happening now.”

Posted: January 1, 1970, 12:00 am